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By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

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LABOR AND WAGES IN ENGLAND.

THE history of human societies, when history was first attempted, was a narrative of events, told with greater or less accuracy and fairness, but made with little or no effort after the discovery of the causes on which the events themselves depended. In course of time an attempt was made to connect facts with near or contemporary causes, and to sustain the vivacity of the narrative by an exposition, more or less successful, of the motives which dictated a policy or provoked a war. It was because Thucydides sought to trace the real causes which brought about the first great war which permanently influenced the fortunes of the human race (that is, which not only altered the destinies of Hellas, but produced results which still have a force) that he is called a philosophical historian. But though his prediction that his work would be "a permanent possession" to mankind is signally verified, though the student of history is under lasting obligations to this great author, though the narrative is candid and the criticism of men and facts is just, no one who has really studied Greek history believes that his examination of causes is exhaustive, or doubts that, with his help, a competent interpreter of events could fill up the picture more completely than Thucydides himself was able to paint it. We know not only more than he has told us, but more than he could possibly have known. We can tell, for instance, why the passion for municipal independence was so keen and so fatal for Hellas, why it was incapable of developing not only representative but even federal institutions, and why the marvellous growth of its intellectual life was extinguished because it was disabled from

making a similar progress in political and economical civilization. In the same way the sagacious historian of the early Roman empire, that institution which has left deep and permanent marks on the political system of modern Europe, could convey, in a few words, the most vivid impressions of a system of government which was ancient to him and is archaic to us. The art of Tacitus is so perfect, that we seem to see the social Rome of nineteen centuries ago as he conceived it, and to be able, by an effort of the imagination, to people the deserts of the Forum, the Via Sacra, the Palatine, and the Aventine with the throng of men who, having once been free, were living under a despotism from which there was no escape, and which never slept or spared. But he does not tell us, he could not tell us, why the empire became necessary, and why, from a chain of causes, each separately weak, but collectively of adamant, that empire of Rome which gave unity to ancient civilization was to become its inevitable destroyer, and was even to control the revival of civilization many centuries afterwards, and to do so indefinitely. We know why these things have happened and are still vital; and though we may be unable as yet to fully tell the reason why they still influence mankind, our descendants will hereafter detect the process by which the imperialism of Rome was a survival in the nineteenth century, why Germany had a Claudius in its emperor, or an Agrippa in its Bismarck.

Another kind of history, and that of a very fascinating kind, because it gives the vivacity of a drama to the narrative of consecutive facts, is that of which Gibbon and Macaulay are the greatest masters. These eminent writers have so contrived to embellish two of the least attractive epochs in the history of mankind, that they have created, the one an unequalled interest in the story of the process by which the Eastern empire slowly wasted away, the other a dramatic narrative the actors in which, being generally the basest and unworthiest men who ever controlled the destinies of any country, are painted with a vigor and clearness which has never been paralleled. But the monarchs and generals, the priests and the adventurers whom Gibbon describes did not make the history of the Decline and Fall, nor was the Revolution of 1688 the work of those men

who created an aristocratical government on the ruins of the Stuart monarchy. Both histories are dramas in which the principal parts are played by conspicuous men, but in which what may be called the psychology of history is not examined. The empire of the East was not destroyed because Mohammed appeared, or the Latins captured Constantinople, or the Turks became the lords of Central Asia, but for reasons which lay deep in the social condition of Eastern Europe. Nor did the Stuarts fall because James proscribed the bishops, and had a son by Mary of Modena, or tried to create a standing army, or had joined the Roman Church, but by causes which had been growing for more than a century, had sometimes been visible, but were often unsuspected. It is often harder to interpret the origin of political events than to predict the consequences which must ensue from the existence of a certain number of manifest political facts.

There is yet a third school of historians, the method of which has as yet been applied generally, and that with very unequal success, by one writer, but the materials for which have been accumulated with great diligence, and, during the earlier ages of modern civilization especially, in large quantity. It may be fairly claimed for the late Mr. Buckle that he was the first person to insist on the fact that the interpretation of any given epoch in the history of any nation must be obtained from a careful study of the causes, remote as well as near, which have made up the life of the people. It is true that some of Buckle's inferences were rash and even ludicrous, that the materials in his possession were inadequate to the conclusions which he sought to draw, and that he rather showed what the philosophy of history is than applied the canons of that philosophy to the solution of social problems. But he proved at least that history, to be worthy of the name, must be more than a narrative, and even than a drama; that events have no meaning unless they can be traced to causes; and that portraits are not pictures unless the background can be sketched as accurately and as instructively as the principal figure. The work, however, which Buckle prematurely attempted, which no one has yet pretended to resume, will be hereafter assisted by those

researches which have been made into primitive society, primitive law, and early processes of government, for which Jacob Grimm has done so much, and to which large contributions have been made by Sir Henry Maine and others.

I am attempting a humble, but I hope not uninformative, part in this investigation of the process by which modern societies have been modified and distinguished, when I strive to point out how the economical condition of England has been the result of a number of insulated but co-ordinate causes, some of which can be traced to very remote times, some are of very recent date, and in the present paper seek to show how the existing state of labor and wages in England and the relations of operative and employer have been evolved from a long chain of historical facts. And I venture to think that, if I succeed in making my statement plain, the narrative may be of interest to readers in the United States, who had up to a century ago received their social traditions, with certain necessary modifications, from the old country, but who, after the War of Independence and the heats which the struggle caused and left, were as necessarily cut away from old associations, and who are therefore, in judging of their own social condition, nearly precluded from an historical estimate of that which existed in the days when they were the British plantations, and are still more completely shut out from the knowledge of those facts which have served to modify English life within the century alluded to. It may, perhaps, be added that very little is known in England of English economical history, though in this is probably to be found the only solution of many political problems and of not a few social dangers which press for interpretation or menace the prosperity of that country.

The settlement of England by various tribes of Teutonic origin, who, if they did not destroy, certainly absorbed, the earlier inhabitants of Britain, was effected on the same lines as those which designate the agricultural occupancy of other Aryan peoples. The invariable unit in the social system was the village, the boundaries of which were strictly marked out. As the occupation of England was a gradual conquest, the king or chieftain was always a principal figure in the settlement of the

race, and as these kings soon became engaged in interminable wars, the authority of the king was gradually extended, till at last, and before the Conquest, though the country was far from homogeneous, monarchy in England was wholly different from what it was in France or Germany. The settlement, too, was completed while the invaders were still pagans, and therefore was not accompanied by those prodigious ecclesiastical establishments whose motive was mainly political, and which followed on the struggle between the heathen Slaves and the Christianized Saxons of Eastern Europe. Moreover, as this invasion was an absolute resettlement of the country by races which had never been under the influence of Roman law or Roman civilization, English law and English royalty were at first no way colored by those dogmas which have modified and do modify the social and public life of all the rest of Western Europe. Within the village lay the settler's home ; in it was the authority to which he submitted, or which he might exercise ; out of it, except for the king's service, he had no duties and no rights. He might compensate the most heinous offence against his fellows by a pecuniary fine ; he was allowed to escape with similar penalties if he slew even king or bishop ; but the boundary of his village was sacred. To violate it was the only capital crime, and an offence against the majesty of the mark was punished by some or all of those mutilations and symbolical cruelties which were perhaps accumulated in the sentence pronounced half a century ago on English traitors. The fact that the village system was developed in extreme strictness among the Greeks explains the cause why Hellas had no political unity. The fact that even the acknowledgment of an English king long before the Conquest was not sufficient to weld together the social fragments of England accounts for the dynastic changes of the Danish and Norman victories. It is asserted, perhaps correctly, that England is still persistently parochial. If this be the case—and it can be easily and plausibly maintained—we have a survival of the Teutonic occupation. Mr. Freeman has said, and said truly, that the parish vestry is the lineal descendant of village autonomy. Very few Englishmen are a power beyond the immediate place in which they live

and are familiarly known. I remember my own surprise when, a few years ago, on passing a funeral procession in Regent Street, London, near the clubs, which are an artificial revival of the old Teutonic settlement, I was civilly told by an artisan who met me, "Perhaps, sir, you do not know that there is going the funeral of the great Mr. Grote." When I thanked him, I felt that there was at least one English artisan who knew somebody besides his own vestrymen, and could realize some power which lay outside his parish. It is not without a meaning that this connection between the artisan of to-day and the Saxon of fourteen centuries ago is insisted on. The English have emigrated from their native land more largely than any other race, but till latterly they have not emigrated as a rule directly from the rural districts, but have previously to their emigration become familiarized with such a movement by a more or less prolonged residence in towns.

There were doubtless slaves in Saxon England, some perhaps of British descent, some of the same blood with the newcomers, the latter having been reduced to servitude through their inability to pay the fines with which all offences were visited. But slavery, when the slave is of the same race and color as the owner, is never very severe, and the English slave appears to have been the possessor of a cottage and curtilage, and to have been allowed, with the master's license, to marry. At an early date, earlier than any existing records can define, the slave, serf, or villein's services were fixed at a small payment in labor. The days on which he was expected to toil were a certain number in the year, the disposal of the remaining part of his time being left to his own discretion. He is the progenitor of the landless laborer. But in the Middle Ages he had certain rights or functions which his descendant has lost. Under the presidency of the steward of the manor, he acted as a juryman, presented and convicted offenders, and in some cases gave verdicts which involved capital punishment on the culprit, though, for reasons peculiar to the social history of England, the power of inflicting death passed at an early date to the royal judges.

Land was the cheapest and readiest of all articles of value

with which services could be compensated. Grants of land in ownership, with rights over the land of those who were socially subordinated to the chief owner, were the means by which the king paid his servants or followers or mercenaries, from the days of William the Norman to the age of Anne. Every free person was the owner of land; every serf was, as long as he remained within the manor (and at first he was wholly disabled from leaving it), the owner of some real estate. Everybody cultivated land, from the king to the peasant. The wealth which these agriculturists possessed in farm-stock, live and dead, was generally three times the value of the land on which the stock was employed. The wealthy and powerful, in this possession of movable property, gave considerable pledges for the maintenance of order. Noble and peasant were equally concerned in upholding the king's peace. Agriculture in England was an honorable calling, in which the highest and lowest were equally interested. A different estimate of the occupation, due to the fact that the nobility disdained a life of husbandry, led to the degradation of the peasant in France and Germany, and to that war of classes which has never, except temporarily and for definite but transient causes, broken out in England. The fact that England was almost the only country in Western Europe in which sheep could be kept, is evidence of how rare marauders were in this, and how common they were in other countries. When an English farmer tells one that the quality of land and the success of cultivation are measured by the number of sheep maintained to the acreage of the farm, his calculation is a survival of the time when the English sheep-master supplied through the looms of the Low Countries most of the woollen clothing of Western and Southern Europe. Everybody had land, and everybody cultivated land. The English towns were not built like Continental cities, but generally had large gardens attached to the houses. Even the strongest of these cities, mediæval London, was full of gardens. The long vacation of the law courts and the universities was set in the summer, in order to free as many people as possible for the general occupation of husbandry and the harvest.

The agricultural laborer, then, who is the weekly tenant at

will of the tenant farmer, was unknown in the early social history of England, though there always appears to have been a tolerably numerous class of free laborers whose tenements were insufficient to supply a maintenance for themselves and their families. As is always the case with a community where land is very much divided, the wages of agricultural labor were relatively high. The wages of artisans are always higher than those of agricultural laborers. But the reason of this is obvious. Everybody knew the routine work of an agriculturist. The artisan knew this and something else.

This condition of opulence and content, sufficiently illustrated by the magnificence of churches and conventual architecture in the country between 1250 and 1350, was suddenly changed by the occurrence of the great plague in 1348-9. No event in the social history of England has had such permanent effects on English life as this event has had. The calamity was as great in other countries; in England it was a social revolution on the largest scale. It is a totally new departure in English history, incomparably more important in its permanent effects than the conquest of William, the civil war of the fifteenth century, the civil war and the revolution of the seventeenth. It has left abiding marks on the present condition of England. To it we owe the peculiar position of the English aristocracy and the equally peculiar position of the English peasant. It created the poor-law and the trades-union. It was the origin of Lollardism, which was itself the precursor of the Reformation. Fortunately it occurred after representative institutions had become a necessary part of English political life, or it would have destroyed them.

Physical calamities do not destroy wealth, and only temporarily interfere with the processes by which wealth is produced. The economical progress of a community is arrested or retarded, and the prosperity of a country is destroyed, by the vices or follies of governments and the unpunished crimes of men or of classes of men. Hence the economical interpretation of municipal law is the greatest service which an economist can render his fellow-countrymen, and it is a function in which he should be never weary of well-doing. The wise and well-

informed economist who interprets the present condition of industry, its forces, and the hindrances to which its forces are subjected, is the apostle of secular life, and as far as morality is concerned, urges the claims of justice and duty as energetically, though for different reasons, as the teacher of religion does. But his reasonings need to be supplemented by the coercive powers of government. Modern societies run more danger from fraud and the dishonesty which wrecks credit than ancient societies did from violence. The enemy of our day is the man who breeds distrust, who weakens confidence, and is an unpunished knave. When a government is so demoralized that it acts in collusion with such internal enemies, civilization is speedily wrecked. This is the condition of Turkey. Now the most precious gift which the history of the past bestows on us is the power which it gives to those who use the materials rightly of interpreting the future. The decay of ancient empires, the annihilation of ancient civilization, the process which has turned the gardens of the earth into howling deserts, and fair cities into ruins, are all the acts of men. It is easy to restore the waste of Nature, and to remedy the injuries which she inflicts. The only serious risks which mankind runs are from man's hand.

But a great natural calamity, as famine or pestilence, is speedily followed by a recovery. The first of these seldom inflicts a long loss, for naturally it attacks the most feeble, acting rapidly in what is called the struggle for existence. The second is more disastrous, for it finds its principal victims when its ravages commence among the vigorous and healthy. But these destructive forces do not destroy wealth, unless, indeed, the waste of life is so great that the process of production is arrested or limited. They interfere with the distribution of wealth, however, and when the mischief is widespread they may induce a complete revolution in the distribution of wealth, or even permanently modify the conditions of society. This was what the Black Death did. It destroyed a third or a fourth of the population, especially of the laboring classes. The wages of the survivors were instantly doubled. The profits of such agriculturists as cultivated their estates by

hand labor fell to zero. From this fact we can trace the most important consequences on the social life of England, both as regards the landowners on the one hand and the wage-earning class on the other. To deal briefly with the former first.

Many of the greater landowners instantly, or after a very short struggle, abandoned agriculture as a pursuit in which to invest their own capitals. Within forty years almost all landowners gave up agriculture, and began a system of leasing land and stock for short terms, at a fixed rate for the acre and a fixed sum for each head of cattle and sheep and for farm implements, the live and dead stock to be replaced at the end of the term, or an equivalent of money to be paid. On the whole, the tenants appear to have prospered, for the seasons were exceedingly propitious during the greater part of the fifteenth century. It was during this period that the English yeomanry came into existence, whose growth was witnessed to by Fortescue—yeomen who in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became the Puritan freeholders, and from whose ranks Cromwell enlisted his Ironsides. For the mass of the English people has never but once been stirred to attempt a revolution, and this attempt occurred five centuries ago. The political events of the seventeenth century never stirred any portion of English life which was socially below the landowner and the trader. As yet the English peasant has counted for nothing as a political factor in England, and the artisan does not count for much, though he has lately been enfranchised.

The effect on the upper classes of English society was that it instantly induced all the effects of primogeniture. By a custom, the origin of which has not yet been detected, the English common law, with rare and local exceptions, confers the estate of a deceased ancestor on his eldest male child. In the period before us there was no power to make a will of lands, such a power not having been given till the reign of Henry VIII., though an indirect devise had some time before that period become customary. Personal estate, however, had from time immemorial been devisable, and was not subject to the custom of primogeniture. Now up to the time in which agriculture was abandoned by the wealthy landowners, the live and dead

stock on an estate was three times the value of the land, and hence an ancestor had abundant means from which to provide for his younger children. From the time of the Black Death, therefore, the younger son comes into prominence as a social phenomenon peculiar to England. The noble ceased to have that stake in the country which was heretofore a guarantee of his good behavior and willingness to maintain the king's peace. Hence, from the deposition of Richard in 1399 to the battle of Bosworth in 1483, with the exception of the period in which England was engaged in the war with France, England was on the verge or in the turmoil of civil war. But the battles of the civil war were only a series of duels between the armies of partisan chieftains. These armies carefully abstained, as a rule, from ravaging the estates of non-combatants. Once, indeed, the northern army of the Lancastrians wasted in its march a part of Southern England. This error set Edward the Fourth on the throne. Finally the country demanded quiet, and accepted the title of Henry the Seventh. The political importance of the civil wars of the fifteenth century lies in the fact that the English nobility ceased to be a political power in England for two centuries. They became, or rather some of them became, the chief political force in the country from the Revolution of 1688 to the passage of the first Reform Bill in 1832.

But it is with the history of the laborer that we are chiefly concerned. It was not to be expected that the employers of labor should acquiesce without an effort in a rise of wages which instantly destroyed all their profits. When Parliament met, a stringent statute was at once passed, prescribing that these wages should be permanently fixed at the rates which had prevailed a few years before, and inflicting penalties on those who gave and those who received more than the statutable amount. Of course the law was inoperative, but it was re-enacted over and over again. It began that struggle between capital and labor in England, the outcome of which is the modern trade-union. It is true that the labor laws were repealed in 1824, four hundred and seventy-five years after their first enactment, and that the prohibitory statutes were never effectual in remedying the inconvenience which they were intended to deal with.

But it was intended that they should be operative, one to which attention will presently be called was operative, and at least workmen were educated into thinking that a combination of laborers with a view to force a higher rate of wages must have some efficacy, since the right of forming such a combination was denounced with such passionate and persistent eagerness.

It has been stated before that once in the history of English social life the peasantry rose in rebellion, and strove to upset the government. This was in 1381. The event is known as the Peasants' War, or the Insurrection of Tyler. But in fact Tyler's action, though more dramatic and more frequently told than the other incidents of the revolt, was only a small part of the movement. Two causes contributed to the rebellion—one an economical, the other a religious movement. It has been stated above that before the great plague the proprietors of labor rents had commuted them for money payments, which were less in amount than ordinary wages. But the money payment may well have been more valuable than the labor, for such labor would have been yielded unwillingly and inefficiently, while the money payment was certain and convenient. At any rate, the commutation was universal. But after the great rise in the wages of labor, the proprietors of these labor rents strove to readjust them to altered prices. Such an attempt was an introduction which was sure to be resisted. The crown had to be content with its ordinary and traditional dues. The valuation on which subsidies and other mediæval taxes were based was made in the days of Edward the First, and was not revised till the Restoration, when it was superseded altogether. In custom lay all the rights of Englishmen, all the means by which arbitrary power could be resisted. Long after this epoch, the alteration which Cecil made in the book of Rates in 1610 was the beginning of the struggle which led to the death of Charles, the exile of his family, and the irrevocable admission that in matters of taxation Parliament, or rather the House of Commons, was supreme and uncontrollable. The peasantry, therefore, were simply doing that which their superiors would have done had the same expedient been tried on them—an expedient which no English sovereign, however abso-

lute, ever ventured on till the Stuarts, to their cost, attempted it. In the fourteenth century, and for many a century afterwards, resistance to bad government took the form of armed intervention.

The religious movement with which Wiclif's name is connected was another impulse to which the outbreak owed not a little of its force. Wiclif himself did not encourage the discontent which burst so suddenly into civil war. He had at first become notorious for advocating in the strongest manner an opinion which had always been popular with a considerable section of the English clergy, that in secular matters the authority of secular government should be supreme, and that the Pope should not override the laws of England or the king's just prerogative. By a natural transition, he next attacked the regular clergy, whose wealth was already exciting discontent, and whose relations to the Roman See were always closer than those of the secular or national clergy. It is inevitable, however, that when a man attacks the exercise of power he should sooner or later question the authority on which the power itself is founded, and should ultimately proceed to accuse that personage of false doctrine whom he charges with malpractice. It is also almost invariably the case that a religious reformer strives to aid his cause by enlisting social discontent on his side. Wiclif, indeed, did not take this course, for he had become an aged man before he finally broke with Roman dogma, but his disciples and followers, his poor priests, as he called them, did. They invited their hearers to contemplate the natural equality of man, and the wholly artificial character of the distinctions which rank and wealth confer. The pastoral instruction of the mediæval church was confined to enforcing outward obedience to established dogmas and to the acceptance of certain ordinances to which a consummate efficacy was attributed. It did not, for the rank and file of its subjects, suggest that enthusiasm which often compensates them for the absence or denial of solid secular advantages, or makes them contentedly acquiesce in the straits of poverty. Hence it left them peculiarly open to the influence of men who might owe their power and authority to the fulness with which they accepted and formu-

lated the grievances of which the peasants complained. The priests of Wiclif's school were the teachers, the emissaries, and the instigators of the Peasants' War.

The Peasants' War destroyed villanage in England, and practically emancipated the laborer. And though the priests who led them were sought out and executed, and Wiclif's name ceased for a long time to be held in honor, the country folk in many places, especially in the eastern counties, then and for centuries afterwards the wealthiest part of England, clung secretly to Lollardism; disseminated, though at the peril of their lives, the tenets of Wiclif; and with the same peril transcribed and distributed his controversial writings, so that when the Reformation began in England it found its most sturdy advocates and resolute martyrs in those counties where the Peasants' War was fought.

It has been stated that the fifteenth century was a period of great prosperity to the peasant and the yeoman. The means of life were cheap—cheaper than in any other period of English economical history, and the wages of labor were high. The nobles gambled away their lives and their estates in the civil wars, and the agricultural population strove. But in the next century there came a lamentable change—at any rate to the classes who lived by labor and wages. The student of social history and economical forces cannot doubt that the first cause of this decline was the destruction of the monasteries, not because these establishments relieved the poor or employed labor, though almsgiving and employment were both curtailed by the sudden dispossession of the ancient owners of what was reckoned a third of the land in England. The principal inconvenience arose from the sudden acquisition of the hoarded wealth of these institutions by a sumptuous monarch, the rise in prices which followed on its being flung on the market, and the introduction of sheep-farming on a large scale by those who, having acquired the monastic lands, had not sufficient capital wherewith to bring them under the plough. But though other prices rose, wages did not, and the population began to perish. The towns decayed, the inhabitants in many of them being greatly reduced in number, a fact which

Mr. Froude admits, though he infers, without giving any evidence of his inference, that the townsfolk went to live in the country. To make matters worse, Henry, whose enormous confiscations rapidly wasted away, adopted an expedient, which, fortunately, had never been attempted before by an English sovereign, by which to relieve his necessities—the issue of base money. It is very likely that he intended to redeem it; but those monarchs who in the earlier periods of modern history have ventured on tampering with the currency had never fulfilled such an intention. It is almost superfluous to state that when base money has a forced circulation, they who live by wages suffer far more than any other class of persons. They who deal in money make a profit by discounting the alloy or paper which is made to act as currency.

But the English laborer had to undergo a further trial, the blow falling this time on the artisans. In all the English chartered towns, as the privileges which the towns gained were valuable, it was the custom to enroll the freemen in guilds or trading companies, entrance into these guilds being obtained by inheritance or apprenticeship. The wealthier members of these guilds frequently gave or bequeathed lands or money to the guild generally, on condition that a religious service should be said once or oftener in the year on behalf of the donor's soul, the residue being applied to the maintenance of sick or aged members of the company. In course of time these gifts fulfilled for the townsfolk the objects of a benefit society or poor-law relief of destitution. But at the accession of Edward the Sixth these guild lands were confiscated, through the agency of the Protector Somerset, who had embraced the Reformation, on the plea that the rental of the lands was devoted to superstitious uses. It is plain that numbers of people were alienated from the new doctrines, and still more from those who represented them. When the abortive attempt was made to set Jane Grey on the throne, Mary fled to Norfolk, the wealthiest and the most Protestant district in England, and that district also which had suffered the most from the confiscation of the guild lands. The Eastern counties baffled the Duke of Northumberland, and set Mary on the throne.

She repaid them with fire and fagot, eastern England supplying most of the victims of the heresy laws in Mary's reign.

Meanwhile the distress and destitution became so alarming, and the severe and sanguinary preventives which the government freely applied were so insufficient, that it became necessary to supply some legal relief to this growing evil. In the time of Henry the Eighth temporary measures had been adopted, but with no solid result, and the causes of destitution, natural and artificial, were increasing in force. Edward the Sixth's ministers procured the passage of the first poor-law. By it the minister and churchwardens were to receive voluntary contributions from the parishioners for the relief of the poor, were to stir up the willing, and to rebuke the unfeeling. In Mary's reign the law was re-enacted, with the significant addition that those who declined to give of their means were to be presented to the bishop, with a hint that their meanness would be treated as *prima-facie* evidence of heresy. At last, and at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the modern English poor-law was instituted, by which the occupants of certain kinds of property were rated by the overseers to the relief of the poor, and the tax was leviable by legal process.

In the fifth year of Elizabeth's reign an act was passed under which the English laborer became to all intent a serf again, though now without the possession of that land which had been his inheritance in earlier ages. The statute of apprenticeship succeeded in effecting that which the statutes of laborers had for more than two centuries been striving vainly to bring about. It made apprenticeship obligatory on all persons who practised any other calling than that of agricultural labor. Hence it gave some advantage to the artisan, by limiting the number of those who were engaged in handicrafts, and lowered the condition of the peasant by making his calling and labor residual. But this by itself was little compared with the clauses which empowered the magistrates in quarter sessions to fix the rate of wages to be paid to the peasant laborer and the artisan. No doubt the artisan of the towns was but little affected by the law, the county wright or smith being the only mechanics who could be reached by the justices, but the country folk were

fully under the control of this machinery. The employers of labor, by the aid of law, fixed the wages of those whom they could force to serve them, and they kept them at such rates as left the peasant nothing beyond a bare subsistence. In the middle of the seventeenth century, when food was very dear, the justices fixed the wages at rates very little in excess of those at which they were placed by the same authority early in the reign of Elizabeth.

Between the beginning and end of the seventeenth century the population of England was doubled. It was certainly not more than two and a half millions at the accession of James; it was over five millions at the accession of Anne. In the eighteenth century it was again doubled, being over ten millions at the first census of 1801. The explanation of this increase is to be found in the fact that early in the seventeenth century the cultivation of winter roots became general, early in the eighteenth the cultivation of artificial grasses. In both cases the improvement came from Holland. Of course the limit of population is given in the quantity of necessary food which can be produced or procured by a community on an average of years. Roughly stated, the population of England may be measured by the quarters of wheat which it grows or imports. But the improvements in agriculture which have been referred to above rendered it possible to keep stock in quantity through the winter, and to keep it in condition; to enable the agriculturist to adopt a rotation of crops, to gradually abandon the practice of fallowing, and, lastly, to apply an increased amount of dressing to the exhausted soil. During the seventeenth century the peasantry were generally ill off. During the first two thirds of the eighteenth they were generally well off. There are faint traces which suggest that the seasons in the eighteenth century corresponded with the series of years in the fifteenth, and that the two epochs form a cycle.

But the peasantry, though they enjoyed cheap food, on the whole, from the beginning of the eighteenth century till the accession of George III. (1701-1760), were already precluded by law from any solid and lasting benefit from the bounty of Nature. The poor-law of Elizabeth would, had it been strictly

carried out, have divided England into two classes—a pauper population, which would steadily increase, and finally absorb the other class of those whose labor, producing more than enough to maintain itself, was taxed to support the destitute and improvident. This risk was aggravated by the unequal division of land, by the existence of parishes every acre of which belonged to one owner, and which were called close, and of others in which land was largely divided, and which were called open. As each parish maintained its own poor, it became the interest of the owners of close parishes to pull down cottages and drive the laboring population into the open parishes, whenever the device was possible. Hence the English Parliament of 1661, which emancipated the landowners' estates from feudal obligations and compensated the king by levying an excise upon the consumption of the general public, strove to permanently raise the rent of land by a duty of 16s. 6d. a quarter on imported corn, and a bounty of 5s. a quarter on exported corn, and having starved the peasant in the landlord's interest, fixed him to the soil by enacting the law of parochial settlement. The apology for this invasion of the workman's liberty was the inequality of the poor-rate in different parishes; the effect of, probably the design of, it was to render the migration of labor all but impossible.

It is to the law of parochial settlement that the English peasant owed the loutish hopelessness which almost universally characterized him up to a few years ago. Except on the rare occasions when he drove his master's produce to the nearest market town, he never left his village. His life was the meanest routine, without variety, without prospect. He was passive under outrage and penury. He knew one thing, that, once settled, the parish was bound to feed him. Sometimes, but very rarely, he remained single, and saved enough out of his scanty pittance to create an annuity for his old age. Such a man—I remember one such in my youth—was the wonder of the gentlefolks and the scorn of his equals. The former gave him a handsome Bible and prayer-book, the latter, to stigmatize his mean eccentricity and insulting forethought, used to say that he was not fit to live, and not fit to die. Meanwhile, as all persons

were taxed to the poor-rate, it was the interest of landlord and tenant farmer to make use of the power which the law gave them, in order to fix the wages they paid at a quantity which was wholly insufficient to maintain a married man with wife and children, and to supplement those wages by an allowance, paid by other persons as well as by themselves, from the poor-rate, as head-money to the peasant's children. It may be doubted whether the field-hands in the slaveholding States of the Union were so stinted and starved as the agricultural laborer of the old English poor-law was. But, with all this, pauperism grew till it threatened the most serious consequences. I well remember, when I was a boy, that my father pointed out to me parishes where the poor-rate absorbed all the rent of the land. At last the law was changed; unions were established composed of numerous parishes, so as to get rid to some extent of the privileges possessed by sole owners; and checks were put on pauperism. But many persons denounced the change, asserting that the poor-rate was that heritage of the poor which compensated them for being ousted from the soil, for the inclosure of commons by the rich, and the other devices by which a parliament of landowners robbed the nation of its heritage.

Reform or ruin must have ensued long before this epoch had it not been for the almost simultaneous discoveries of Watt, Arkwright, and Crompton, by which steam-power was substituted for manual labor, and machines with multiplied powers in place of the ordinary hand-loom. The comparative cheapness which those instruments of industry brought about led to a great demand for labor—a demand far in excess of those hands which had been previously engaged on the simpler machines. The demand for labor restored, in some degree and in some localities, that power of migration which the law for a century had denied the laborer, and thereby made deep and almost indelible traces on his mental and moral nature. Employers could afford to neglect the law of settlement when all the new hands which they could get, men, women, and children, the latter from very tender years, were pressed into the service of this new industry. The labor was cheap, for it was

sought after eagerly. The gains of the capitalist were enormous. It is said that Arkwright offered a large annual contribution to the costs of government, during the Continental war, if his patents could be continued him. The offer was refused, but he accumulated so vast a fortune that, no such opulence having been anticipated, the greater part of it escaped the tax which was levied on smaller accumulations. The seat of British industry was displaced. Before the great inventions of the eighteenth century were made, Norfolk and the West of England were the wealthiest districts in the country, Lancashire and the West Riding of Yorkshire the poorest. The county families of Southern England generally put their younger sons into the cloth trade. The North-west undersold them, and the traveller in Devon and Dorset will constantly find day-laborers living on a poor pittance, who bear, nevertheless, some of the oldest and proudest names in England, and belong to families which were opulent in the days of the Plantagenets.

The opulence of Lancashire and Yorkshire increased the penury of the south. The busy district was too far for migration in days when locomotion was confined to the old coaches or wagons, and the distant or unknown was as terrible as the open sea to the ancient navigator. Even if the prospect had been attractive, the peasant was too spiritless to move. Now there came on his ill-paid labor the competition of the craftsmen whom the enterprise of northern ingenuity had undersold. The districts of England in which the agricultural laborers now earn the lowest wages are those in which the hand-loom weavers used to ply their calling. How they lived it is hard to guess. They knew, to be sure, that the law saved them from absolute destitution. Perhaps the English game laws have this to be said in their favor, that by bringing wild animals within his reach they gave the peasant the occasional opportunity of furtively satisfying his appetite. "I don't know," said an aged shepherd to a clergyman who commented on the infrequency of his attendance at church, "that I have done much that is bad, except not having enough to eat." The observation is suggestive of the peasant's condition, and of his theory of good works. Unless he was trying to deceive one,

I don't think I ever knew an English peasant who believed that a poacher was a wrong-doer. Similarly, before the English Government adopted free-trade I never met a man of the middle classes who sincerely thought that a smuggler was an offender against any moral law.

The condition of the English peasant, factory hand, and artisan during the long Continental war was at its lowest. The manufacturers gained wealth, and England a brand-new aristocracy. The shipper, after the battle of Trafalgar, except during the short war with the United States, became equally opulent. The contractor of loans amassed even greater wealth than the cotton lords did ; but the workman was starved, and bore the weight of taxation, as he shed his blood for dynasties and purposes which he knew nothing about. When the peace came, all suffered, for it is certain that all the gains of that industry which war stimulates are as nothing to the losses which have to be borne when the fever is over, and unnatural languor follows an unnatural activity. The landowners strove to debase the currency and to keep up rents. They were baffled in the former purpose, but they achieved the expedient by which they hoped to gain the latter, in a still more severe act against the importation of foreign corn. By this they starved the people and ruined the farmers for thirty years, till at last the mischievous law was triumphantly repealed.

In 1824 the laws which had been in operation for nearly five centuries, under which the price of labor was regulated by a machinery which repudiated the reciprocal action of supply and demand, and all combinations of laborers with a view to raise wages were severely punished, were repealed. With this epoch begins the modern trades-union. They who doubt—and many persons honestly doubt—that trade-unions ever raise wages, must admit that while these laws were in operation employers of labor firmly believed that they could do so, and cannot deny that the workmen would naturally believe in the efficacy of an organization which his employer had so steadily striven to prohibit.

It took nearly half a century for the impulse toward trade-unionism to reach the agricultural laborer. But he was far

more oppressed by the labor laws than his brother the artisan, and even more heavily bound by the law of parochial settlement. Apart, however, from the difficulty there is of developing common action among a scattered body of laborers, the peasant was too supine to take in the notion of a labor combination, and too much governed by landlords, the parochial clergy, and the farmers to feel the action feasible or even safe. At last his turn came. A Warwickshire shepherd, whose name and work are perhaps better known among the peasants of English origin than that of any other, undertook the task of forming an agricultural laborers' union. Joseph Arch is a man of ready speech, of great sympathy, of high courage, and of undaunted purpose. The opportunity was a good one, for universal suffrage had been granted to the inhabitants of towns by a government which conceded it in reluctant desperation, while the franchise was not given to the agricultural laborer. The indignation with which the farmers met the movement, the ferocity and derision with which they met the author of the movement, materially assisted Arch. He taught the peasants that they had wrongs, encouraged them in the belief that people who were so angry and intolerant must be in the wrong, and gained them no little external sympathy. Arch, who has no little genius as a leader and organizer, knew as by instinct how to succeed, and has generally succeeded in his work. For the agricultural laborer in a country like England has an advantage which no other laborer possesses. He is the most welcome of emigrants to newly-settled countries, for he brings with him the skill needed for the most universal, enduring, and necessary of callings—the industry which produces food. In a factory the man who can do one thing best is the best workman. On a farm, the man who can do the greatest number of different things fairly well is the most useful hand. Hence Arch can always compel terms, or at least make them feasible to his followers, by depleting the labor market. Besides, the struggle of the artisan is to appropriate to himself a share of his employer's profits. The struggle of the peasant is to appropriate through his employer part of the landlord's rent. Now, to trench too far on profits would destroy the employment of the artisan's industry ;

but to absorb rent need not lower the farmer's profits, if he insists on making new terms with his landlord. As yet the farmers have gone with the landlords against the laborer, and are raising the cry of agricultural distress. In course of time they will go, with or without the laborers, against the landlords, or will get into a more and more hopeless predicament.

It is impossible to do justice to the history of labor and wages in England without making some reference to emigration. In England this has been almost entirely spontaneous. For a time the Australian colonies were flooded with convicts, but the practice has been given up, for the most patient of settlers are likely to resist the importation of criminals. In the early history of the American plantation, a forced emigration of political proscripts was frequently effected. But this ceased long ago. The voluntary expatriation of malcontents has been a significant fact in the history of the English occupation of the New World. It was practised by the Puritans and the Roman Catholics, who forgot their natural animosities in a common danger and a common purpose. Undoubtedly England has been saved many a convulsion, if not a revolution, by the fact that her government has rarely been foolish enough to put an embargo on the expatriation of the discontented. While the atrocious commercial code of England was starving the nascent industries of Ireland, the Protestants emigrated, and thus forced Protestant ascendancy, the dream of the Whigs, to pass through the ivory gate. When the greater atrocity of the penal code was seeking to turn the native Irish into hopeless and lawless savages, it was lucky that the New World offered an asylum for the oppressed. But it should never be forgotten that the crimes of a government always come home to roost, and England is suffering now from factions which are unintelligible to those of her own lineage who live outside her, but which descend in inevitable succession from the evil days in which she did real wrongs in order to achieve unreal strength. France, on the other hand, whom the peace of 1762 and her own government shut out from the natural expansion of colonization, nourished within herself the mischief which burst forth after 1789. So no victory, no acquisition of territory and treasure,

no force of government, will save Germany from the explosion for which Prince Bismarck and his master are laboriously piling the materials. Like the inhabitants of Herculaneum and Pompeii, they are holding garden parties in the crater of a political Vesuvius, which is even now heaving with subterranean fires. No one can predict the time when these forces will find a vent, but the interpretation of the facts is open to those who can detect, as Bacon suggests, the likeness of the causes which make like events.

The genuine agricultural laborer of middle, eastern, and southern England has only just begun to emigrate immediately from his home to distant parts of the world. As yet these movements have been exceptional, have been organized by colonial agents and agricultural trades-unions, and are no way spontaneous. The landed interest, which the present English Government powerfully represents, does not dare to stop the movement, though it looks suspiciously on it. This is proved by the fact that it has prohibited the assisted emigration of pauper children from industrial schools. It is impossible for the present system of precarious tenancy to which English farmers submit, and which is maintained for the sake of securing political influence over the farmers, to last, and rents to keep up, unless the farmer be supplied with cheap labor. Hence the reluctance with which education is accorded to the children of the peasant, and the low standard required for his intellectual training. The farmers are afraid that if peasants' faculties are too well trained he may become dissatisfied and restless. The bulk of emigrants from the United Kingdom go from the manufacturing towns and agricultural districts of the north, from Scotland, and from the Irish cottiers. But before long the exodus of agricultural laborers from the south will commence, and the farmers and landowners will learn when it is too late that the laborers which are left are the weakest, least enterprising, and least trustworthy of the peasantry, and that what is left is further deteriorated by a large percentage of hereditary pauperism, insanity, and vagabondage. When they are gone they will not be recalled. I remember, half a dozen years ago, that I saw a score of strong young English peasants,

who had resolved on emigration, won back to their home by the tears of their female relatives. Before long these entreaties will have lost their efficacy, even if those who urged them to remain do not then urge them to depart.

I have, I trust, pointed out in the foregoing pages that the present condition of labor in England, ameliorated as it is in many particulars, is the outcome of a set of historical facts peculiar to that country, and singularly lasting in their effects. I do not pretend to assert that the trade-union of the artisan would not have been developed, for the relations of employer and laborer, and the fact that both are paid out of the difference which there is between the value of the material on which they work and that of the manufactured product would have undoubtedly stimulated an inquiry into the principle on which the difference is distributed between the two factors of the product. No reasonable person can, however, I think, doubt that the dispute has been embittered by the harsh English law which prohibited combinations, as the difference between the customary wages of artisan and peasant has been stereotyped by the act of Elizabeth prescribing apprenticeship in all handicrafts. But the peculiar position of the English peasant, utterly unlike that of his own order in other parts of the world, is the result of laws enacted in the interest of employers, and rigorously executed for nearly five centuries. To appearance free, he has hitherto been bound by invisible chains to the place of his birth more firmly than the Russian serf was. In the course of things it is common for the artisan, if he be thrifty and temperate, to rise from the condition of one working for hire to that of a producer on his own account, of an employer of labor, of a great capitalist, of even a millionaire. These things happen and excite no surprise. But no one ever hears of an agricultural laborer growing into the status of an English farmer, still less of a landowner. The sale of land in England is so hindered by the machinery of primogeniture, of entails, and settlements, that the newspapers publish lists of sales as though they were an article of special interest. The charges on the sale and purchase of land are so large, owing to the art with which conveyancers have multi-

plied their refinements and loaded their instruments with verbiage, that these processes often exhaust a year's interest on the value of the estate. Land to the English peasant, as an instrument of his own industry, is utterly unattainable. The rights which he had over commons have gradually been filched away, till a society has been formed for the purpose of saving a little of what was once his inheritance, as recreation ground. A short time ago it was necessary to pass a special act in order to enable the Free Church of Scotland to procure sites in that country of great wastes for building places of worship. But no one has yet attempted to grapple with the problem, which must force itself for a solution, before those who may recognize its importance too late : " How can the peasant be attached to the soil, and how can England take advantage of her natural fertility ? "

JAMES E. THOROLD ROGERS.

THE AIM AND INFLUENCE OF MODERN BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

NO feature of our time has more meaning for the Christian scholar than that of the new life, which has been poured into all studies bearing on the Scriptures. Biblical science may be called, indeed, one of the ripest outgrowths of the last half century. We can never forget the great periods of the past, when masters like Bengel gave a fresh impulse to sacred letters, or a school of Hebraists like the elder Lightfoot was to be found in England. Yet if we compare our wealth to-day, in every path of biblical learning, with the scanty literature of forty years ago, we may have some idea of the gain. I need not dwell on the influence which the larger knowledge of Oriental languages and history has had on the study of the Old Testament; the rich researches into its early annals, its literature, its later growth, and, above all, the obscure time from the decline of the hierarchy of Ezra to the day of Christ. Nor has the advance been less in the knowledge of the sources of the New Testament. A flood of light has been thrown on the structure of the Gospels, and the connection of the apostolic history with the half-known period just after it. It is not only in the scholarship of the continent we find this life, but we may safely say that there has never been in England so thorough and manifold a range of learning.

Yet there is a deeper cause than the general growth of letters for this zeal in biblical study. It is owing to the change in the whole culture of the time from more abstract pursuits to the real sphere of history and scientific research. The once-absorbing influence of our theological methods has given place to criticism. I am far from the belief that this shows in any

sense the decay of sound doctrine. I hold the very opposite. Theology must always have its high rank, because its truths awaken the highest thought of men. But it must find its work in the living atmosphere of the time, not merely repeat the strifes of a past metaphysics, with which we have as little to do as with the theory of phlogiston. Our scholars have begun to learn, that in a day when Baur and Renan are dissecting apostolic history to prove that the bulk of St. Paul's epistles are of later date, it is fruitless to fight over the remains of the Calvinistic and Arminian battlefield. Christian inquiry is, therefore, leading us to the sources. This is the open secret of the change from the theological to the critical spirit. Had I space, I should be glad to recall in the history of Protestant thought the earlier cases of the same striking fact. Protestantism itself was this appeal from the scholastic systems to the Bible ; and its first years were marked by the growth of critical learning. The commentaries of Calvin were for his time a model, yet he was only one in the host of scholars. It was when in its turn the living faith of Luther had been embalmed in a formal theology, that Bengel opened anew the page of the Gospels ; and its fruit was the revival of a more spiritual belief as well as a sounder criticism. But I can only glance at this history to grasp its principle. We may thank God for the quickening power of the Reformation, which compels us, in spite of the tendency at times to drift toward a dogmatic infallibility, always to return to that study of the open Word given as our birthright.

Such I hold to be the aim of our modern learning. There are many, indeed, to whom it means only the brilliant unbelief of German schools ; who are sore afraid of all researches into the date of our earth ; who shudder at the name of comparative religion, and would think it a blessing if no officious Tischendorf had unburied the Sinaitic MSS., to help on the perilous work of a revision. But it is folly to mistake the passing errors of a time for its real growth. If I cannot set right such incurables, I may yet hope to convince some clearer minds that the gain is greater than the loss, and the result sure of a more living faith in the Christian revelation. We are to find our unity, amidst the discords of opinion, in the sources of divine truth. We go backward from the seven mouths of the historic Nile,

and trace the turbid tide through the desert or the strip of green plain it has watered, until we reach the fountain-head. This is the purpose of my essay. I shall endeavor to show the principle of a true biblical criticism, its influence on theological inquiry, on our view of church history, above all on the growth of a more real Christianity in the life of the time.

Let us ask, as the first step in this treatment of the subject, what we mean by biblical science ; for to most minds, and not seldom to the clerical mind, it is an unknown quantity. The study of the Bible means to one the ecclesiastical tradition which he calls the voice of the Church, to another the theological system which he calls the Gospel ; yet in either case it may be without any clear critical principle. We mean, then, by biblical science, simply the application to the Scriptures of the methods which govern us in all thorough interpretation. It is, indeed, our starting-point as Christian scholars, that the sacred books are our supreme and sole authority in matters of faith, and "contain all truth necessary to salvation." Nor when we speak of criticism, do we at all imply that a mere scientific or literary study can give us that deeper knowledge of the divine truth, which alone can make it the Word of God. Far from it. This Word may speak to the mind and heart of a Christian reader, although he knows nothing of the methods of exact learning ; and if the keenest criticism do not approach it with special reverence for a book, which has fed the spiritual life of men as no other has done, it will be barren indeed even for the scholar. But we are not to confound the authority of its divine truth with the authority of any human systems of interpretation. As a book written in Hebrew and in provincial Greek, given in the historic form, its meaning, so far as it touches on any points of language, history, science, literature, can only be reached by an open criticism. Any theory that forbids or evades this is not only fatal to science, but to revelation itself. The authority of the church is valid, in that it preserves our unity in the essential truth of Christ, but it can never pronounce its decree on those questions, which in the nature of the case are within the field of a growing knowledge. If it do this, it has denied the supremacy of the Word, and affirmed the Romish dogma of a human infallibility. Biblical science, then, is simply the science

of right reason and moral honesty. There is nothing arbitrary in its methods. The principle of induction which it follows is the key of all sure knowledge. It is thus that a genuine science has gained its wonderful results in the domain of nature, because it no longer reasons from preconceived theory, but begins with facts and verifies them. The science of language has thus laid its firm groundwork in our time, in tracing the structural growth of manifold forms of speech to their common roots. Modern history has achieved every triumph in the same way, since Niebuhr sifted the Roman legends. It must be so, therefore, with the study of the Scriptures, if we can claim any just principles of criticism at all. Such a task, of course, is a most varied one. It must begin with the structure of the whole, and pass to the examination of each part ; it must involve the question of primeval man, of early religions, the phases of Hebrew growth, and the transition to the age of the Gospels with the formation of the Christian church. Yet the same critical canon runs through all our study. History, points of science, poetry and theology are judged by their own plain meaning, and verified by the impartial tests of science.

It must be clear, then, that such a critical study could only, as with all science, reach its sure results in a gradual growth. The divine truth of Christ abides unchanged alike in its substance, and in its real influence on the life of believers. But the exposition of the written Word is in its nature a human knowledge, which must pass through its earlier and crude methods. Any one, familiar with the history of Biblical interpretation, knows the fact of such a growth since the day of Origen ; and yet few have recognized in the very steps of the process a sure law. The modern rationalist will sneer at the use of the word science in regard of Scriptural study ; but our true answer, as the defenders of the faith will do well to know, is just this, that it has only kept pace with all science in its mistakes or its gains. The simplest laws of knowledge are always the latest. Alchemy must precede chemistry ; astronomy must grope its way through the fancies of the astrologer ; and philology, even to the day of Horne Tooke, was a system of ingenious guesswork. And I can, therefore, take no better mode of showing the results of biblical science than by a brief historic sketch.

It was, then, natural that in its growth toward a sound method of interpretation the church should pass through certain steps of development, which I may sum under the heads of the mystical and the dogmatic principles. My aim is to show how each sprang out of the character of the time, and how, in this view, we know alike the truth and the crude error. It was, first of all, by the Christian Fathers, in the time when there was a deep spiritual insight into the truth of revelation, but little critical knowledge of history or language, that the mystical principle was established. The system was an inheritance from the Jewish schools. It had developed in two directions.¹ In the schools of Palestine there was a stricter study of the letter; but the Old Testament was regarded as a book of occult wisdom, in which the Rabbis hunted for a mystery beneath each vowel-point. In the schools of Alexandria the Greek culture led to a far freer, speculative method. We can never understand the early Fathers, unless we read the works of Philo, the earlier master of symbolic wisdom. It was his aim to idealize the anthropomorphic features, that were in conflict with his Platonic ideas, and to bring out the loftier truth of revelation. Every chapter of Genesis is transformed into the most arbitrary fancies, and not a vestige of literal narrative is left.

Such was the method that passed into the literature of the church. We have in Origen, the noblest scholar of his age, a statement of the principle on which the Christian study of the Bible should rest. "Because the Scriptures are written by the Spirit of God, they have not only a manifest sense, but one hidden from many." In accordance with the received division of body, soul, and spirit, he therefore claims three senses or interpretations; the literal for the vulgar mind, the allegorical for the early, childish stage of belief, and the spiritual for the spiritual.² It is true that all the fathers were not such mystics in their exposition as Origen, yet all held the same idea of the Scriptures. Neander has said that the school of Antioch was of a far soberer learning, and has contrasted again the more practical teaching of the early Roman fathers with that of the Greek. Yet this criticism seems to us hardly

¹ Nicolas, "Hist. des doctrines relig. d. Juifs," pt. i., ch. 1.

² Origen, *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, lib. iv., 5, 12.

to touch the real point. We trace in the Christian expositors, as in the Hebrew, the two tendencies to the more symbolic method of Philo and the 'more literal of Palestine ; but both had the same notion of an occult wisdom to be found by a subtle interpretation. The truth of the Christ and his spiritual Gospel, which only could give the key to the Old Testament, was indeed a profound one. But instead of studying it in the clear method of history, the Bible was made a sacred anagram ; the most natural facts of Jewish worship or chronicle became arbitrary figures of the new dispensation. Type and allegory were the master-key that unlocked all the dark chambers, from the early chapters of the Genesis to the poetry of David or the grand utterances of Isaiah. Wherever we turn to the fathers, to the epistles of Clement or the sober Irenæus, to Tertullian, who finds the type of baptism in the Spirit brooding on the waters and in the passage through the Red Sea ; or to Augustin, who explains the six creative days as symbols of the ages of divine history, we have the numberless cases of this style of exposition. We prize the early Christian writers for their intellectual and spiritual power in the great conflict of the faith with a Pagan wisdom ; nay, we can often admire with Coleridge the rich, devout fancy glowing through the homilies of Augustin ; but as Biblical scholars all were simply of a time when true criticism was hardly known.

It was from this source, then, that the mystical method passed into the Latin Church of later times. Nor is it strange that it should remain there. It is indeed the best proof to-day of its incapacity of a sound Biblical learning, that Newman¹ in his essay on development claims, as one of the notes of the Catholic faith, the canon of mystical exegesis. The Bible becomes by the "fourfold method" of its doctors, the tropical, allegorical, analogical, and anagogical, a kaleidoscope, in which the disjointed bits of Scripture can be shaken into any shape of doctrine. That method has never indeed been so reduced to system by earlier or later Protestant expositors. Luther laughed at the fourfold division. It is to the honor of the English Church that her best translator of the New Testament, Tyndale, has stated the true principle most clearly : "Understand that Scripture hath but one sense, and that the literal sense. That

¹ "Development of Christ. Doct.," chap. vi., 5, 1.

is the root and ground of all, whereunto, if thou cleave, thou canst never err ; and if thou leave the literal sense, thou canst not but go out of the way.”¹ Few will to-day adopt the canon of Cocceius, that the more senses which can be drawn out of Scripture the better. Few, who turn to the Kabbala of Henry More, will not wonder at the allegorizing a learned Hebraist could once indulge in. Yet it is the defect of far too much of our exposition. It has turned plain history into prophecy. It mars the real learning of a scholar like Hengstenberg. We have it in one shape in our Anglican divines, who quote any ingenious conceit of the fathers, and can turn the scarlet cord of Rahab, or the ephod of the high-priest into a type of the Christian priesthood. We have it again in the evangelical school of men like Simeon, who declaim against ritualism, but follow the same symbolism in the interpretation of the Old Testament. Let us state the true principle, that none may mistake our meaning. All Christian scholars will admit typical features in the Hebrew worship, and prophetic passages which clearly point to the Christ of the New Covenant. But all such figurative portions are intelligible as such. If our typology be made to turn any natural fact or incident into a mystic meaning, it robs the Scripture of its whole historic truth. Nothing has done greater wrong to the Word of God than the exegesis, which has built a fanciful Christology out of any plain psalm of David, or any rite of the temple worship. It has not only been the source of every fancy, but it has led to much of that dishonest spirit, which “palters with us in a double sense.” We recognize at once its unsoundness in the fantastic system of Swedenborg, who found in Scripture, as Origen did, a threefold meaning—literal, spiritual, and celestial ; yet it is hard to know why three senses are not as reasonable as two. We may excuse the early methods of the Fathers ; but it is astounding to-day, when a Christian scholar forces on the word of God that style of exposition. Criticism can admit no such mystical canon. It bows in reverence before the spiritual mysteries of revelation ; but it will not distort its plain truth by the guesswork of a human fancy.

We can now pass to the second marked feature in the history of Biblical interpretation, which I have called the dog-

¹ Tyndale, “Obedience of a Christian Man,” p. 304. Parker ed.

matic principle. It was undoubtedly a step forward when the mystic and fanciful spirit gave place to the unity of system, as it had developed in the Latin Church. The law which reigned in the exegesis of its schools was the *analogia fidei*. Now there is assuredly a unity of truth in the Scriptures, a doctrinal basis, by which we may study the meaning of its several parts. But the abuse of the principle lies, first, in forgetting that the Bible is given in no scientific form, but in history, poetry, gospel, and epistle. If theology change its natural expression into logical proof-texts, it destroys the whole character of revelation as a living history. But it is yet worse when it substitutes for the true analogy of faith the later dogmatic system of one age, and so interprets the ideas of St. Paul, or the truth of Christ's own Gospel, by the controversial dialect of the schools. It was precisely this style of exegesis, which became the fixed method of the Latin doctors. All the living pages of the New Testament were used to sustain the definitions of the scholastic metaphysics, that had grown since Augustin. Every dogma, like that of the supremacy of Peter, or the transubstantiation of the elements, could have its scriptural texts, torn from their real connection. There could be no criticism in such a method. It was against this scholastic abuse that Protestantism declared the supremacy of Scripture. Luther touched the very point when he rejected the "*analogia fidei*," and claimed the "*analogia Scripturæ sacræ*." This pretended rule of faith was in his quaint phrase "a rover and a chamois-hunter."

And it is this false dogmatic tendency in the interpretation of the Bible, which a true criticism must correct in Protestant as well as Roman scholasticism. We need not gather the examples of it to convince any clear-sighted scholar. The habit of citing disjointed texts of Scripture as proofs of doctrine has often led to the worst sophistry. Poetry has been hardened into logical proposition, and the language of a familiar letter been wrested from its simple meaning. Many a discourse on reprobation has been wrung out of the Hebrew phrase, "The Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart;" the natural outburst of the Psalmist, "Behold, I was shapen in wickedness," has been tortured into a theological statement of total depravity; and the most unscriptural dogmas have been defended as holy mysteries by the verse, "Thou art a God that hidest thyself." But these are

only scattered instances. We may well say that almost all the great controversies are simply colossal proofs of the same vice. If we read the Epistle to the Romans by the light of real criticism, it has nothing to do with our metaphysics of divine decrees, but it speaks the grand catholic fact of the calling of all as redeemed in Christ, instead of a small pedigree of circumcised Jews; yet its sense has been lost by the two equally mistaken schools of Calvin and Arminius. If we take the whole question of baptismal regeneration, the simple word of Christ to Nicodemus, declaring a kingdom of more spiritual gifts than John taught in baptism by water, has been looked at through the sacramental theory of the scholastic. Stanley has lately shown that the classic text for absolution in the Gospels is no more than the mistaken phrase of the Rabbis, who meant by "binding and loosing" the action of their courts of law. It is so with the treatment of the Scripture on every side. Its real unity and harmony must be found by an honest criticism of its own pages, not an artificial system. Nor need we wonder, when it has been so often distorted by dogmatic methods, that a keen thinker, like Mr. Matthew Arnold, should try to exclude all its doctrine, and treat it as a literature which has in it only a moral element. If we will meet his brilliant paradox, we must accept its partial truth, and show that we do not confound its teaching of the personal, living God, its real history and real poetry, with either his barren ethics or our former modes of interpretation.

Our view of biblical science can now be clearly understood. It has been a growth out of these crude but natural stages to a ripper method. What, then, is the change which a later criticism has introduced? Simply the correction of such arbitrary rules, and the study of the Scriptures in their own direct meaning. Nothing of their truth has been lost in the process. The spiritual, the mysterious in the revelation of God is as fully recognized, although the mystical principle is not forced on its plain history. The doctrinal truth is not forgotten, because Scripture is not studied as if it were a treatise of systematic divinity. In a word, modern biblical science is nothing else than the method, which by degrees has grown out of the more thorough analysis of its language, structure, and design. In that view I will sum the results of this critical study, as it con-

cerns the character of the Bible itself, before I proceed to its influence on theology and Church polity. It would be interesting, in a fuller sketch, to speak of the rich evidence, which our researches into the history and archæology of the East have given to many of the facts of Scripture. We have far more reason to trust than to fear the results of science. But my task is not so much with the literature of the subject as with the principles of criticism. The first result of such study, then, in teaching us to examine its real structure, is to give us the true idea of the unity and design of Revelation. The Bible is not to a Christian scholar, as it has been too often regarded, a book of arbitrary teachings on all problems of doctrine, or natural science or morals. It is given for the revelation to man of the one grand fact of a personal, living God in human history; and we study his word, not as we do a systematic treatise, but in its living form.

If in such a light we turn to the Old Testament, we have the record of a nation, the development of the national life from its patriarchal beginnings to its Mosaic legislation, its kingdom, and its later sacerdotal state. Its chronicle has on it the stamp of all early writing, from a period of crude ideas of nature and man, from a childlike style of history to a later and clearer knowledge. Its social morality has the natural growth from polygamy, slavery, and heroic barbarism to the milder type of civilization. Yet there is no less the evidence of a divine character throughout the whole record. It is this very criticism which enables us to see this wonderful and unique feature. The knowledge of one God, Creator and Lawgiver; the pure ethical teaching of the Mosaic code; the social and religious fabric built on it, and abiding through all the epochs of the national growth in sharpest contrast with the idolatry and vice of the people; the Providential history amidst the changes of the outer world, all these stamp on the record the indelible proof of a supernatural design. Even the keenest criticism confesses this fact. The admission of Arnold of the moral supremacy of this religion is the best answer to his absurd denial of a personal God in Jewish history. And it is precisely this result of our criticism, which gives us the ground of agreement with the just demands of science or historic study. We deny by the most scientific proofs the *à priori* theory of all

who reject the divine origin of such a revelation. But we need not, with this knowledge of its essential truth, have any perplexity as to the questions geology may ask of the Mosaic cosmogony, or historic criticism as to the structure of the Pentateuch. If there be any who hold that all these details can be squared with science, we leave them to the test of honest criticism. All we demand is, that the defence of revelation shall not be endangered by resting it on any questionable ground. And still more, in regard of the morality of the Old Testament, we are no longer perplexed by the barbarity of a Jael, or the slaughter of the Canaanites, or the sins of David. We do not look in the earlier time for that pure social spirit, which only the teaching of the Gospel could give. It is a far higher reverence we pay, when we thus learn its divine truth, yet recognize in it a faithful record of the growth of Israel, as fully in its mental and moral stages as in its childlike ritual. We know its meaning as the education of a race for a perfect Christianity. Such is the method which our best scholarship has carried into the treatment of the Old Testament ; and whatever may be the differences between the brilliant, often over-ingenious researches of Ewald, and more sober scholars like Bleek, the method has wrought the most real results. Its history is history ; its poetry is poetry. Its prophecy is interpreted by the great historic law of connection between a preparatory religion and that of Him who is the "fulness of times," as we see the fruit in the seed. The Old Testament is a far more living book, since it has become no longer a volume of allegories, but is studied in its real structure.

If we turn now to the book of the New Covenant, we have the like method. As we open the Gospels and learn their formation, it is the person and life of Jesus Christ, the kingdom he established, which we see in the record of living history. Each of these four biographies reveals to us the character of that Jewish time, the ideas of a Messiah and Messianic reign ; and we trace in their differences the varied points of view, in which the same wonderful person appeared to those who saw and heard him. Yet it is here we find the real unity of the books. It is not that of a mechanical work of art, or of a dogmatic treatise on the creed and polity of the kingdom of Christ ; but we see it as it speaks in the incarnate wisdom of the Son

of God, and as his truth shapes itself into the common faith of believers. All these portraits agree in the great features of his character; all unite in the substantial facts of his teaching and mission. It is the invaluable fruit of such criticism, that it has taught us to find more than a formal repertory of proof-texts in the Gospels. The divinity of Christ, his redeeming sacrifice, his gift of the Comforter are no longer theories, but realities, which we know more truly in their historic meaning. We have no difficulty in regard to the lesser discrepancies of the narrative. His life is greater than all books. And it is here we have the best answer to all modern errors. I cannot more clearly illustrate my meaning than by a reference to a weighty question of our day. It is the effort of the school, of which Renan is the expositor, to undermine the authority of the fourth Gospel; and the strength of his objection lies in its difference from the whole tone of the Synoptics, which marks it in his eyes as the work of a later, more speculative time, instead of the simpler Jewish teaching of a Matthew. Yet the very study of the Gospels in connection with the mind of their time reveals the fact, that the lofty truth of the word of God is to be found not merely in Platonic or Alexandrian sources, but in the doctrinal faith of Palestine.¹ The Logos of the fourth Gospel is no more a later conception than the Messiah and Prophet, whom the Synoptics portray. We recognize in the more spiritual insight of St. John, or the more simple page of St. Matthew the same divine man; yet in the last of the Gospels we see the transition from the Jewish faith to the more perfect truth of the Word made flesh. If we thus read the harmony of the book, we need fear no verbal criticism.

But, again, the same method has opened the unity of the apostolic history. Any who recalls the "Planting and Training of the Church," by Neander, one of the first essays in this line, will not forget the clue it gave to the tangled web of exposition. It has been the task of the best scholars since to study in those epistles, so varied in tone of thought, their living connection with the growth of the early body. Criticism has modified the old notion of a *Harmonia Evangelica*, such as Bishop Bull wrote. We can no longer quote that age as if it were one of full-grown theology and church polity. But as we

¹ Nicolas, "Hist. d. doctr. d. Juifs," p. ii., ch. 2.

read there the long strife of Jewish and Gentile opinion ; as, above all, we trace in St. Paul the constructive idea of the time, that question of law and grace, of a narrow tradition and a Christian faith, which must be settled for the unity of the growing church, we gain a real knowledge. It has taught us to find in these epistles all the steps of that first formative age through these mental and moral struggles toward an organic life. This is our positive fruit. And if such a criticism has shaken the validity of a few minor epistles, if we do not now quote the Apocalypse as a literal prediction against the Papacy, we have learned more surely the substantial wholeness of the canon. It is this very study, which in showing us the formation of the early Church, answers the latest rationalism. Its whole fabric rests on the assumption that the differences of the epistles, the Gnostic allusions, the sharp strifes of Jewish and Gentile ideas, prove a later origin. Such an array might well stagger our traditional interpreters. But if we have read truly the character of that age, we have found in it the germs of all the after-errors, and have learned that out of the battle came the unity of the body.

But I cannot dwell longer on the detail of the method. It is enough if I have shown what such criticism means. Nor will it be necessary for me to touch at length on any of the theoretical questions so often mingled with this subject. I have not considered the doctrine of inspiration. If this whole line of reasoning be clear, it will place that question on its real ground ; for it will show that a genuine criticism gives us a conviction of the divine worth of the Bible, far stronger than all others. All theories of mechanical dictation or verbal infallibility were the natural product of the mystical and dogmatic methods. If we have learned the method of a true criticism, we know the inspired, essential truth of the Word ; and if we have not so learned it, no theory will help us against the attacks of a false learning. But it would be a better evidence of what I have said, and a better answer to those who look doubtfully on the growth of biblical science, if I had space to add a sketch of its results. I can only sum it in a few words, and I shall take my example from that country, where the strife of nicology and evangelical belief has had its fullest career. In the church of Luther we can see all the steps

in the history of criticism, which I have described. The neology of Germany began as a revolt against the dogmatic methods of the time ; it ripened from the day of Paulus into the rationalism which followed the critical system of Kant, and narrowed Christianity to a code of ethics. It passed again with the more brilliant Pantheism of Strauss into the philosophic theory, that found in the life of Christ a beautiful myth of the past. Yet step by step there grew within the church the deeper and devout criticism of the Scripture. It was against the facts of Christian history that the mythical theory was broken in pieces. We have to-day the successors of Strauss in the scholars of Tübingen, who claim that they have found the method of historic criticism. Yet it is seldom understood by those who look with fear on their subtle learning, that so far from a step forward, their method was a confession of the failure of the mythical view. They have been forced to admit the historic basis of Christianity. They take now the last ground of assault in an attempt, by a keen analysis of the New Testament books, to overturn their apostolic origin. We need not underrate their skill, but this we can justly say, that a fearless inquiry has only led to a sounder faith. Each step has been nearer to the end. It has been no fruitless struggle, but from first to last the gain of a Christian scholarship. All the rich contributions to biblical knowledge, all the noblest names on the side of German evangelical belief, all that has passed into the thought of our time, is the fruit of the long conflict. And that I may not be supposed to write in this my unsustained opinion, I beg to add the words of Dorner, which sum the whole question. After a full statement of the systems of Strauss and Baur, he concludes that "the negative criticism, beginning with the Wolfenbüttel fragments, hastens irresistibly to round its circle. The mythical hypothesis, even in its more modern form, the moment it sets foot on the ground of the actual history of Christ's words and deeds, begins to destroy its own foundations. Its latest phase must be its last." "Evangelical faith may fearlessly allow its full rights to criticism, and to an exegesis now no longer under tutelage."¹ Such is the position of this great evangelical leader. It may well assure us of the simple truth, which the Christian Church should

¹ Dorner, *Gesch. d. Prot. Theol.* B. 3, Th. 1.

have learned long ago, that biblical study has everything to hope and nothing to dread from the progress of criticism.

With this idea of a biblical science, we are now ready to understand its further influence in the growths of Christian learning in our own time. It is, first of all, in the sphere of theology that I wish to study it, as the weightiest of questions for the scholar. To know the whole result of modern studies, we must look a moment at the intrinsic connection of theology with the sources of revelation. It is the necessary work of the church to set forth in the form of creeds and articles the truths given in Scripture, not only because they are bulwarks against error, but because there is a unity and harmony in these truths themselves. Theology has thus its orderly growth from the earliest time, as each period has studied more deeply the sacred word, and has brought out in some new relation to the mental and spiritual want the central doctrines of the Gospel. There is no shallower mistake than that of the sceptic, who looks back on the gathered systems of the Christian past as an empty word-battle. All the most earnest conflicts between the decaying pagan thought and the truths of God in relation to man, are embodied in the Nicene symbol. All the struggles of the mind and heart of Europe are written in the confessions of the Reformed churches. But while this is true, it is to be remembered, that the great danger of theology is always to mistake the empiric doctrinal system of one age or sect for the Catholic truth. We have seen already the root of this error in the historic sketch of biblical science; but it may be read at large in the history of the church. The doctrine of the Incarnation became at last a metaphysical formula, and the rich theology of Augustin was frozen into the definitions of the schools. The later dogmatism of the Reformed communions, when the original life of the Gospel had been fettered by its schoolmen, led the way to the reaction of neology. And hence the need of the church is always to keep alive the study of the word of God, the divine truth that shall guard it against these idols of the theological cave. If our religion become for the body of teachers or believers a system of doctrinal propositions, it has lost its power. Theology must be a healthy growth, not a fungous deposit that kills the tree.

It is the clear recognition of this principle, which more espe-

cially in our time is working out the truest and largest results. One of its marked signs is the study of doctrinal history, which we may justly call the fruit of the last half century. Our best thinkers perceive, that we have reached the point where the systems of the past must be studied in their historic law of growth, to know the real harmony. Augustin and Anselm, Calvin and Luther, Twisten and Rothe must be measured by the conditions of their Christian time. Yet this is only the herald of a deeper want. It is a biblical theology in its true meaning, toward which both our critical and doctrinal learning aim. I do not mean that mechanical summary of the doctrines of Scripture, which consists in arranging its texts under certain heads. I mean that study of its whole structure, of the essential character of the Gospels, of the growth of apostolic thought in its first formative time, which shall take us back to the unity of Christian faith before the aftergrowths of the church. Such a study will plant us on the foundations. It will not make us prize the less any dogmatic formations of the past, but rather to the Christian scholar the history of theology will be that of a living mind, expounding the divine, inexhaustible mind of Christ. All the articles of our theology will be seen to be the manifold expression of the one truth of Revelation, God in Christ, reconciling the world to himself. This biblical science alone can bring unity into our discordant confessions. We do not want a new formula of concord, which seeks compromise in some more subtle definings. As our divines have learned to study St. Paul's view of justification by its own light more than through the spectacles of Calvin or Arminius, to measure the system of Augustin from the true centre of the New Testament, not force his theory of decrees or sacramental regeneration on the Gospel, they have learned our substantial agreement. We have to-day a renewed discussion of the Atonement. It does not show that this central truth is in danger, but we are only learning not to define by the theology of Anselm alone that mystery of a divine love, which speaks in the sacrifice of the Son of God. And as the theology of the past will thus find its impartial test in such a study of the word, so the true aim of a Christian theology to-day will be clear. Critical learning will not destroy any true doctrinal teaching of former times. But the problems, that now call out the deepest thought of the

church are of more moment than any before, because they come from the special relation of revealed truth to the whole field of science in this age. They touch the life of Christianity. It is for the personality of God, the agreement of a supernatural revelation with law, the need of religion as the ground of moral sanctions, the origin and destiny of the race, the hope of a future existence, that we are called to battle with a Pyrrhonism, which shelters itself under the mask of scientific truth. We must surely know, that if we are to meet the Agnosticism of this day, it can only be by a thorough mastery of the method as well as the true results of science. It should be enough to warn us of our most fatal mistake, when we find Herbert Spencer citing Mansel as an oracle, and building his whole system of denial on the theological ground, which that ingenious champion of the faith thought the stronghold of revelation. If Christian theology will have again its mastery, as in former times, over the minds of men, it will not be by claiming that the "limits of religious thought" forbid us to apply to Scripture even the moral laws, which the author of revelation has written on the conscience. It will not be by defending past modes of scholastic thought with crude exegesis. But it will be by accepting all that a sound criticism has given us, and recognizing the fact that the abiding truths of Christianity have more power than ever, if they speak in the language that convinces the intelligence, the conscience, and the life. This is our want. If we can teach men to read in their Bibles no sealed deposit of our theology, but the plain fact of a personal Creator, a God in history, a revelation of divine love and duty in His Son, we need not fear the atheism of to-day. And this is my earnest conviction, that all our noblest aims are guiding us toward this end. This study of the essential character of revelation shall give the new life to theology, and make it again, as it has been in the past, able to restore the age from doubt to belief.

Yet it is not only in the direct sphere of theological learning that I recognize this influence of biblical criticism. I must pass briefly to its relations with other subjects, of as deep interest to the Christian thought of our time. The history of the church, in its bearing on all the questions of its nature and polity, is one of the weightiest of these. It is indeed among the best fruits of this Christian age, hardly older than the immortal work

of Neander, that we have begun to read in the history of our religion more than the Latin idea of an ecclesiastical state, or the too common one among Protestant writers of a series of dark ages, followed by an anarchy of sect. We see in it now the historic law of a Divine order, a religion linked in every step of its life, through its Nicene period, its mediæval feudalism, its awakening to knowledge and freedom in the Reformation, with all the growths of Christian civilization. But it is only in the more critical study of the New Testament itself we can only find the groundwork of church history. Just as this study leads us back from the manifold, partial systems of doctrine to the living truth of the Gospel, it leads us from the fragmentary politics to the original fellowship of Christ. We learn from it that the church of the New Testament was indeed an organic body, not a mere movement of Jewish religious life, yet, on the other hand, no copy of the theocracy of Ezra, with its priestly caste or temple service, but a divine germ meant to grow, like all institutions, in the soil of the world, and take shape according to the conditions of all social growth. The critical method of our time, as I have proved, has shown us the gradual way in which each visible feature of the apostolic body, its ministry, its creed, its worship, passed into fixed shape from the freer life of the first household. Such a study, then, corrects by the most impartial tests the common error of all sectarian theorists. Romanism is built on the *à priori* notion of a visible *ecclesia*, and can construct the whole supremacy of Peter out of one misread verse in the Gospels. Anglicanism follows the same method. It reasons from its assumption of the need of a succession to the facts, and so can readily turn the brief letter of Paul to Timothy into a treatise on the divine origin and perpetuity of the episcopate. But as no chain is stronger than its weakest link, so the weakest link in this case is where it should be strongest, in the degree of the New Testament evidence. Nor is the error less with the Presbyterian who will find a divine law in parity, the Independent who thinks the kingdom of God a democracy, or the Baptist who insists on immersion or adult baptism, because they were the usage of the infant church. All such theories vanish before the criticism which teaches us to rest no system on a few slender hints, but to apply the laws of history. Yet let none be alarmed at the result, for such

criticism gives more than it takes away. It is argument enough for the episcopate, when we can trace in it the normal growth of the early diocesan church. It is enough that infant baptism was the natural form of a household religion, whether before or after the apostolic age. We can recognize the unity in essential faith and order of the first believers, while we know the plastic character of the time. Our New Testament study is more and more bringing us into the fellowship of the Christian body, as we thus measure the real worth of primitive facts.

And thus we may pass to the last thought, which encloses all in itself. The influence of such a biblical science will be toward the growth of that real Christian life, which is the end of all Christian knowledge. As our studies bring us nearer to that divine yet human Person in whom the Gospels centre, we shall learn more and more that the kingdom of God is larger than any symbolic books or any ecclesiastical order, and can only be fulfilled as the life of the incarnate Lord is embodied in the life of redeemed humanity. Theology is queen of the sciences, but the unity of the spirit is the substance of the symbol. The church is the school-master, but its purpose is to upbuild the "perfect man." And this is the view of Christianity which shall meet the most earnest inquiries of our time. It wants this kingdom of God, which was meant by its Author to be the fellowship of men redeemed in Christ, and which alone can solve the present riddles, more real than all disputes of creed or ecclesiastical polity, the education of the social conscience, the unity of severed classes, the reconciliation of our culture with a reverent faith, the aims of peace and wise benevolence. If we have learned this need of our time, we have learned the noblest work given to the scholar or the Christian man. And as we study our subject in this light, we shall perceive it to be the deepest principle of the Gospel, that this ethical and living result should be the latest. It may seem at first a strange law, but the more we examine it, it will be found to have its correspondence with all history. Revelation has obeyed the order of intellectual and moral growth. It has cost the world its nineteen ages to ripen the germ planted by the divine sower in the soil. There was needed first the period of theological training in Greek and Latin Christianity, until it reached the unity of doctrine and of law. There was needed

next the critical period of a Protestant thought, by which it reached the utmost point of Christian knowledge. There is needed now the outcome from the strifes of system to the positive unity of truth. It is the life of Christ, the living application of the Gospel that He revealed, the real kingdom of a divine humanity, which is now to show to the world the fruit hidden in the seed, but asking all these processes for its growth. The study of the original sources of Christianity is one of the great signs of the time, that we are on the very threshold of this best period.

If, then, my view of the aim and influence of our biblical science be true, if we can see its relations with the most real aims of our modern scholarship, we may surely accept the present state of learning, in spite of all its drawbacks, with faith in the result. I have not hidden its dangers or its defects. It would, of course, be useless to expect that any, who look on all inquiry in criticism or theology as beyond the sphere of science, will agree with such views. But enough if I can aid those who, in a time of much confusion, are seeking the true harmony between the abiding ground of revelation and the changing growths of doctrinal interpretation. Nor can I more fitly close this essay than by a last citation from the scholar, who has written so nobly the history of Protestant theology. "It may be said that modern theology and literature in this country show a riper stage of exegesis than in any former time. Not only have the laws of interpretation been examined and a science of hermeneutics formed; not only are the auxiliary studies of criticism, history, geography in advance, and the text more clearly settled, but the exposition of the New Testament has within these forty years had a wonderful progress. The masters of modern exegesis are thus working together toward a biblical theology, which, though a historical science, by no means displacing dogmatics or ethics, will hold up to these the real and in many regards more complete model, wherein they have their standard." It is enough for me that my line of argument is confirmed by so unquestioned a master; and I can only hope that the growth he has seen in his own land may encourage all Christian scholars, who are working for the same true end.

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NEMESIS IN THE COURT-ROOM.

SEVERAL States of the American Union have recently adopted statutes permitting defendants in criminal cases to be sworn and examined in their own behalf. In some States the change is acknowledged to be only tentative. In other States, as is the case in Pennsylvania, the statute does not reach defendants charged with the higher felonies. In another group of States, and in England, a defendant, though admissible in his own behalf in a civil suit, is still excluded in a criminal prosecution. And even where the change has been made, its policy is an open question, while in England the preponderance of opinion is still against its adoption. The issue being one not merely technical, its discussion may not be unsuitable in these pages.

We should remember, at the outset, that the burden is on those who would exclude from the witness-box any person acquainted with the facts in issue. We do not exclude such persons in social or historical investigations. Our first inquiry, when we desire to make up our mind as to an act towards which such investigations are pointed, is, What do the parties themselves say? We would consider, for instance, if there was a quarrel between two of our acquaintances, and we were required to decide as to the merits of this quarrel, that it would be monstrously unfair for us to hear the story of one side and not that of the other. In historical issues, also, what judgment would be of value which did not take into account the statements of both sides? Who would pretend to impute the authorship of the casket letters to Mary Queen of Scots without hearing and weighing her explanations of these letters?

Who would pretend to decide upon the controversy between Charles I. and the Parliament, without a careful examination of the documents emanating from each? Who would condemn the Federalists for disloyalty in the war of 1812, without studying the papers issued by them when defending themselves on this very charge?

The burden is then on those who would exclude parties as witnesses, and the way this burden is disposed of by them is as follows: They allege, in the first place, that to permit a defendant to testify on his own behalf on a criminal issue, is inquisitorial; that it virtually forces him to testify to his own guilt if he be guilty; and that it therefore militates against the fundamental maxim that no one shall be compelled to accuse himself. And as if to illustrate the odiousness of such examinations, we are turned to foreign trials, in which the defendant is kept for months under oath, and in close confinement, until, after a series of adjourned investigations, a confession is wrung from him; and we are asked whether this is not both cruel and unjust.

Undoubtedly it is, but not more so than the rule of the English common law (a rule that is as fairly to be charged against us as is the old inquisitorial system to be charged against the modern French and German jurisprudence that has repudiated it), that a defendant charged with felony is not to have the assistance of counsel in presenting and arguing his case, and that not only, therefore, is he precluded from testifying in his own behalf, while the witness-box is open to his prosecutors, but he is shut off from professional assistance in preparing a defence to which professional assistance is requisite.

But in point of fact the statutes permitting defendants to be witnesses in their own behalf unite in making such appearance optional with the defendant, and they also provide that in no case is the court to permit the non-appearance to be used as a presumption against the party who declines to appear. And this protection has been rigidly applied in a long series of adjudications in our American courts. Counsel for the prosecution, who have even covertly alluded in their arguments to such non-appearance, have not only been checked, but rebuked in a way to produce a feeling rather in favor of than against the person

assailed. If the suggestion has been actually uttered, and the jury been told that the defendant could have testified, but would not, and that this is an argument against him, a new trial is granted as a matter of course in cases of conviction.

It might be said that all jurymen know the law in this respect, and will presume against a non-testifying defendant without hint from counsel. But is this so? Are not jurors just as likely to feel the wrongfulness of permitting such a presumption to operate as would legislators? So, at least, we have much reason to conclude. One of the most closely contested homicide cases that I can recollect was that of Alley, tried in Boston, in 1874. It was a case in which, had the trial been before the rehabilitating statutes, we would have said that nothing but the rule that guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt could have saved the defendant. The defendant was not called as a witness, though there were several points resting on his own personal knowledge on which his explanations seemed peculiarly called for. Yet he was acquitted, on the ground that his guilt was not shown beyond reasonable doubt; though if the presumption against him for not testifying had been allowed to operate, it would, so delicately did the balance hang, have turned the scale. There are, it is true, cases in which jurors might act less discreetly, and in which convictions, in nicely-balanced cases, might result from an application, as turning the equilibrium, of the presumption arising from silence. But if this contingency is an argument against the admission of the defendant, it is an argument against the admission of any other witness. There is no witness, connected in any way with the parties, the non-calling of whom may not be made use of as an argument against such party. Yet we would scout the idea that because of this contingency all witnesses in any way connected with a party should be excluded from the testifying in his behalf.

The temptation to perjury, however, is advanced as an objection; and there is no question that the temptation to perjury, to a person under trial, is strong. Even an innocent man may be tempted to swear falsely in order to escape an unjust accusation; and few guilty men, so it is argued, would hesitate to add the guilt of perjury to the guilt of other crimes whose

penalties they are endeavoring at the time to escape. The sight of the gallows, also, so it may be urged, will make any perjury appear venial when it is a means by which life can be saved. But are we to exclude testimony because there is a probability that such testimony may be false? Is a witness incompetent whenever there are influences about him which constitute a strong temptation to perjury? If we were so to hold, we would have to exclude from the witness-box not only parties, but the relatives, the friends, the partisans, the creditors of parties. Where could the line, indeed, be drawn, which would divide between temptation to perjury, which we would overlook, and temptation to perjury which we would treat as exclusionary? Partisanship in an election contest might be regarded as presenting a temptation comparatively slight; yet where do we find such masses of perjured testimony as in election contests? In adultery suits, has it not become a maxim that it is as much the part of a man of gallantry to deny, under oath, an intrigue, as it is to engage in it? Have we not, by common consent, abolished the test of pecuniary interest in civil suits, and yet are there not many men who would rather lose their liberty for a few months than their money? Has not the law always permitted children to be called against or in behalf of parents, and parents against or in behalf of children? Unless we reverse our rules admitting witnesses in these several classes of cases, great as may be the probability of perjury in either of them, we cannot exclude defendants because it is probable that they, when examined, may perjure themselves. And as to a defendant on trial, we must recollect that there is an important counter-check. Great as may be his temptation to perjury, he cannot forget that perjury in his case, from the conspicuousness of his position, is of comparatively easy exposure, and that if exposed it would damage his cause more seriously than would the perjury of a mere witness. It is a familiar rule of law (a presumption, indeed, of fact only, but none the less effective) that the fabrication of false testimony in a case affords a strong inference that the party fabricating such testimony is guilty of the charge which this testimony was fabricated to meet. The perjury of a witness cannot be imputed arbitrarily to the party calling him, since this perjury may have

sprung from the witness's own zeal, or from the folly or desperation of those having the party's case in hand. But it is otherwise with the perjury of a defendant. It is imputable only to himself.

We may, therefore, dismiss the current objections to the admissibility of defendants as witnesses for themselves in criminal issues, and view some of its advantages. To illustrate these in the concrete, it may be sufficient to turn to some of our more conspicuous recent trials.

An alleged accomplice, for instance, is called as the principal witness for the government in a prosecution for murder. In Hunter's case, tried in Camden, New Jersey, in June, 1878, if we should strike out the testimony of Graham, called by the prosecution as accomplice, there would not have been sufficient evidence in the prosecution's case to sustain a conviction. The murder was one of peculiar atrocity. Armstrong, its victim, was a musician and printer of music in Philadelphia, quiet, simple, and inoffensive. He had been, down to a few months before his death, in partnership with Hunter, and he was indebted to Hunter to the amount of six thousand dollars, for which he gave notes. Hunter conceived the plan of insuring Armstrong's life in a sum largely beyond the indebtedness, and then causing Armstrong's death. Insurances were effected to the amount of twenty-six thousand dollars, in several companies, Armstrong, who evidently was accustomed to lean on the superior business capacity of Hunter, uniting in the application in the belief that the excess was a mere matter of form. The insurance being effected, the next step was to get rid of Armstrong; and for this purpose a plan was laid so skilfully that, had it not been for the disclosures of Graham, the accomplice, whom Hunter found it necessary to employ, the crime might have been unpunished. Both Hunter and Armstrong lived in Philadelphia. To attempt a murder in Philadelphia, where the parties were surrounded by observers, and where they had many acquaintances, would have been hazardous. For Hunter to have alone undertaken the work might have been also hazardous. A pistol might have done it; but he was unwilling to attempt firearms, because, as was afterwards deposed by Graham, such wounds might be imputed to suicide, and suicide would vacate the policies. Arm-

strong must, therefore, be waylaid and beaten to death ; but for this purpose a place of comparative seclusion was requisite, and a confederate, for Armstrong was a well-built man, stronger than Hunter, and his resistance to an attack by Hunter alone might have been sufficient, if not to repel the assailant, at least to attract attention to the assault. As the scene of the attack, a secluded street in Camden was chosen, to which Armstrong was enticed by Hunter, on the pretence of seeing a person, living in that neighborhood, who was indebted to Armstrong. Graham, who had been hired by Hunter to begin the attack, was to follow Hunter and Armstrong from Philadelphia to Camden, crossing in the same boat, and dogging them until they reached a spot where Hunter was to turn up an alley, which was to be the sign for Graham to strike. As weapons, he was provided with a hatchet, and a hammer on which were marked the initials " F. W. D.," the object being to throw suspicion on another party. Graham struck the blow with the hammer, as was arranged ; but then, either frightened or overcome with remorse, fled for a short distance, leaving Hunter, as he alleged, to finish the work. When he returned, a few minutes after, he saw Armstrong prostrate and helpless, and was told by Hunter that the deed was done. Hunter and Graham succeeded in making their escape without notice, nor was there any evidence produced on the trial of persons who saw either of them at Camden that night.

Hunter was tried ; rightfully convicted ; and rightfully executed ; but it will be seen, from what has just been stated, that there would not have been proof sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, unless either he should have confessed the act himself or Graham should have become a witness for the State. Confess he was very far from doing, and on the testimony of Graham, therefore, the prosecution was forced to rely. On the one hand, it appeared from Graham's own admissions that he was a drunkard and a vagabond ; turned away from place after place for idleness and worthlessness, and considering twenty or thirty " drinks" a day as by no means an extraordinary allowance. On the other hand, in a multitude of points, so many and various as to leave no doubt of the truthfulness of the outline of his story, Graham was corroborated.

So far as concerns the law, therefore, Graham's testimony would have been sufficient to have sustained a conviction. A conviction it did sustain, and abundantly, though Hunter was examined as a witness, and flatly denied the material parts of Graham's story. A conviction it would, of course, have sustained under the old law.

But the conviction, under the old law, would not have been as satisfactory, nor would the retribution have been as just and complete, either in appearance or reality, had not Hunter been allowed to place himself on the witness stand. When confederate in crime is arrayed against confederate, and when it is a race as to whom will be assigned the gallows, and to whom the distinction of becoming "State's evidence"—when it depends sometimes on caprice of the prosecution, sometimes on the superior baseness of the accused, who of the two is to array himself as the dupe and penitent victim of the other's plot—it is proper that both should be heard, and that they should both be called as witnesses, with equal rights. And eminently does this appear just and proper when we contemplate the possibility that the informer may have been the sole perpetrator of the crime, and that he may have instigated the prosecution as a means of screening his own guilt.

What has just been said, so far as it concerns the justice of admitting a defendant to testify in cases where the prosecution depends upon the testimony of an alleged accomplice, is further illustrated by the late trial of Mrs. Cobb, in Norwich, for her husband's murder. Bishop, the chief witness for the prosecution, without whom there could have been no conviction, made it part of his case that under the influence of an illicit passion for Mrs. Cobb, he had contrived with her a plan for poisoning her husband, and had supplied the poison; and when asked as to whether he had not caused his own wife's death, he protected himself from replying on the ground that an answer would criminate him. More malignant and desperate villany is hardly to be conceived of than is displayed in the deliberate poisoning of two unoffending persons, one the wife of the offender, in order to pursue without molestation another criminal act; yet even this villany is intensified by the voluntary betrayal (for he could have refused to answer as to Cobb's death as he did as

to his wife's death) of the woman for whom was professed the guilty passion set up as the stimulus to these atrocious crimes, and by his delivery of testimony the object of which was to bring her to the gallows and to screen himself. Undoubtedly Bishop's testimony was corroborated in so many material points as to justify Mrs. Cobb's conviction, though as to the whole *corpus delicti*, her statements, when she was examined as a witness, were express to her own innocence. But had she not been examined there would have been a sense of unfairness and of one-sidedness which would have materially interfered with the due discharge of the duties both of jury and of court.

In another class of cases, of growing importance, the value of the defendant's testimony is equally manifest. Crimes may be divided into two great classes—those in which a guilty intention is not requisite to the constitution of the offence—*c.g.*, cases of negligence—and those in which it is requisite. In the latter class of cases, by far the most numerous, there can be no conviction without proof of guilty intent. Guilty intent, therefore, becomes, in such cases, an essential element, and who is so competent to speak to this as the defendant himself? He may set up actual non-participation in the guilty act; but in most cases his defence is that he acted in passion or under sudden provocation. If so, who is so well-informed as he as to the issue? It seems a mockery to say, "The question to be determined is what was the condition of the defendant's mind at the time," and yet shut the mouth of the only one who can testify as to such condition. We may not, when we hear him, believe what he says. We may reject his statements as we reject the statements of other witnesses to material facts. But that he knows more than any one else as to the issue as to which we are inquiring there can be no question; and justice cannot be fully done until we hear what he has to say.

There is another and important aspect of the question before us which remains to be considered. We have just argued that justice is most subserved by the admission of the testimony of the defendant. We have now to add that the moral effect of criminal procedure is much impaired by the exclusion of such testimony. Criminal trials are among the most effective instruments for the moral instruction of the community; yet it cannot

be denied that by criminal trials, under the old system, this instruction was imparted in a way calculated often to create a sympathy for the defendant, or, at all events, a sentiment that he had not been fairly dealt with. There is a novel of Dumas' in which, when there is a secret to be divulged which would solve all difficulties, a paralytic old man, who is the sole possessor of the secret, but whose voice and whose hand are alike incapacitated, sits in his chair gazing with agonizing yet speechless interest on the parties whose distress he could relieve by a word, but who look to him in vain for the word by which they could be thus relieved. If, instead of a man silenced by disease, but otherwise competent to tell facts valuable to others, we were to suppose a man silenced by law, but competent to tell things vital to himself, we have a fair illustration of what takes place in most trials under our old practice. A man is charged with crime on the evidence of persons interested in procuring his conviction. The crime is one which draws public attention, and the public eye is fixed on the trial. But what is there gathered in the way of moral instruction? A person on trial, it may be, for his life, with all the power of the government against him, is capable of supplying, by his evidence, a gap in the case, or of offering a solution which would be at least probable. He stands, however, at bay, silenced by the law, and there grows up that sympathy with him which is felt for the weak when arbitrarily oppressed by the strong.

We may explain in this way the failure of trials, under our own system, to act healthfully on public feeling. There can be no better illustration of this than a case which created peculiar public interest in England in 1824. Henry Fauntleroy was an eminent banker, in whose hands large deposits of securities had been placed. The firm of which he was a member became embarrassed, and it was alleged that he forged powers of attorney in the names of the owners of some of these securities, and thus realized their proceeds. The forgeries were adroitly executed, and in such a way as not necessarily to implicate Fauntleroy. The forger, so far as the *res-gestæ* indicated, might have been one of the other partners, or a clerk in the institution; and it was not inconsistent with the facts immediately connected with the utterings of the forged notes that

Fauntleroy, at the time of these utterings, might have been ignorant of the forgery. This question, however, was apparently settled by the discovery of a paper, carefully docketed and filed in Fauntleroy's private box, which was as follows :

"Delaplace, £11,140 consols ; E. W. Young, £5000 do. ; General Young, £6000 do. ; Frances Young, £5000 do. ; Jedediah Kelly, £6000 do. ; Lady Nelson, £11,595 do. ; Mrs. Pelham, £20,000 four per cents ; Earl of Ossory, £7000 do. ; I. Bower, £9500 do. ; M. C. Parkins, £4000 consols ; Lord Aboyne, £61,000 four per cents ; Elizabeth Fauntleroy, £3550 five per cents ; W. Reeder and H. Fauntleroy, £7000 do. ; Peter Marsh and John Marsh, £21,000 three per cents."

The entire schedule contained a memorandum of securities exceeding £170,000, and underneath was the following, apparently in Fauntleroy's writing :

"In order to keep up the credit of our house, I have forged powers of attorney, and have thereupon sold out all these sums *without the knowledge of any of my partners*. I have respectively placed the dividends as they became due to account, but I never posted them.
HENRY FAUNTLEROY."

This paper purported to have been executed in 1816, nearly eight years before the forgeries were discovered ; and if it were genuine, must have remained among Mr. Fauntleroy's papers, subject to the inspection of his confidential clerks, who were not suspected by the prosecution of complicity. Was this extraordinary confession itself a forgery ? Had it been slipped, as the explosion approached, among his papers by the real criminal ? Against Fauntleroy were arrayed, on the trial, not only the crown officers, but the vast moneyed power of the Bank of England. He who for years had been himself one of the most powerful and respected of English bankers, found himself in the dock without friends, and stripped of the means even of employing counsel. Was the confession his ? If so, what were the motives that impelled him, not merely to sacrifice his estate, but his life, for the benefit of his partners ? It came out in the trial that he was under no obligation to them, and that to their capricious course in withdrawing large sums from the bank, he being the sole working partner, were attributable its embar-

rassments. He had been, so it might well have been argued, their devoted, efficient, and self-sacrificing servant for many years, all the labor and anxiety of the enormous business falling on him, and they reaping for a long time great dividends through his successful management. Is it likely that he would have forged to save them from ruin, and then confessed the forgery by a methodical and dry statement such as that produced, when it was impossible, had he really made it, but that he must have known that by so doing he was putting the halter round his own neck? What was the nature of the relationship which could have produced such unparalleled self-sacrifice on his part? Fauntleroy was convicted, and on the evidence, as it stood, rightfully. He was hung, and wrongfully; for though he was concerned in forging the powers, yet there were mysteries about the act which the evidence produced on the trial did not dissipate. It would be absurd to say that the spectacle of his execution was edifying. He had made, on the trial, it is true, an address in which he took all the blame of the forgeries on himself; yet even this address failed to explain why he should have ruined himself for the benefit of others. But even this address was not evidence, nor was it treated as such by the court, nor was it permitted to go to the jury as proving any facts. There was a feeling throughout the community that only part of the case had been heard. It would have been otherwise if, when offering to testify, he had been examined and cross-examined as to the facts pertinent to the issue.

We have a similar feeling of dissatisfaction with convictions in those cases in which the condition of the defendant's mind, and the degree of provocation he was under, at the time of the event, are at issue, and yet in which he is shut out from the witness-box. A homicide takes place, unseen by third persons. Was it premeditated? Did the defendant strike under the stimulus of a sudden and unprovoked insult? Did he act in self-defence? Can any verdict, when such defences are set up, be satisfactory where the defendant was not permitted to say, under oath, what defence he had, and the jury were not permitted to give to his statement credence?

In all other spheres, let it be observed, we are accustomed to resent *ex-parte* condemnations. If even a stranger be at-

tacked, we decline to pronounce on his case until he is heard from ; and if we find others prejudging him on this one-sided case, we are apt to take part with him. Often in this way we may account for the strong sympathy aroused by political or religious extravagances which were arbitrarily punished on an *ex-parte* case. Lord Jeffrey's brutality, in refusing to prisoners even the shadow of the privilege of self-explanation, not only largely contributed to the subsequent revolution, but roused up numerous new advocates, not so much of the proscribed opinions, as of the rights of those by whom these opinions were pronounced. Wilkes was personally detested by Lord Chatham, to whose haughty temper and pure moral tone Wilkes's vulgarity and licentiousness were execrable. Yet when the rights of the people in general were invaded by Wilkes's one-sided condemnation, and by his expulsion from the House of Commons, Chatham bore down upon the field with all his thunders as the vindicator, not indeed of Wilkes's opinions, but of Wilkes's rights. The sentimental yet demoralizing humanitarianism of the "friends of the people," who attempted, during the administrations of Washington and John Adams, to drag the United States into the rapids of the French revolution, was as disagreeable to Jefferson as it could have been even to the most rigid of federalists ; yet when the alien and sedition laws were passed, and when prosecutions for libel were instituted, in which from the nature of the then law the defence could not be heard, Jefferson unhesitatingly entered the ranks to shelter the defendants, though he felt that this might identify him with opinions he disapproved. And now what threatens to break down the moral force of the German Empire is its resort to what appears to be gag law. Communism by itself will always be repudiated by the great body of the people. But if liberty will be imperilled unless communists are protected, so precious is liberty that protection will be given to communists so that liberty may be saved.

We touch, therefore, high ethical issues when by *ex-parte* prosecutions crime is made the object of sympathy. It is important, to enable popular feeling to be properly directed, that the whole procedure of a trial should be so regulated as to produce a sense in the public mind that there is fair play.

There was not this sense under the old system, and this the old system itself confessed. The defendant's mouth was not only closed, but he was, until very recently, subjected to capital punishment in all cases of conviction of felony. The judges felt the unfairness of this, and they undertook to meet one injustice by another. They put in the way of conviction a series of impediments which enabled criminals, when adroitly defended, to escape in cases when on the merits they had no defence. "Better," said Blackstone, in view of the horrors of the old system, "for ten guilty men to escape, than for one innocent man to be punished." To enable the ten men to escape several ingenious contrivances were devised. If there was a variance between a single word of a writing set forth in an indictment and the writing itself; if it appeared that the offence was a felony instead of a misdemeanor as charged; if any one of several barbarous epithets (such as "feloniously") was omitted; if the evidence showed that the offender was an accessory who prepared and arranged a crime instead of actually perpetrating it as averred; if the name of any one of the owners of stolen property was incorrectly spelt so as to make a difference in sound; if the terms of a statute describing an offence were not accurately transcribed; if one of the grand jury finding the bill turned out to be incompetent; in each of these cases there was to be an acquittal, no matter how glaringly convincing the evidence for the prosecution might be. In one scandalous case a woman—guilty of torturing an apprentice to death—was acquitted on her first trial because there was doubt whether the instrument of torture was, as averred, a cudgel, and on her second trial was acquitted because there was doubt whether it was, as then averred, a sword. In another case, equally scandalous, there was an acquittal of abduction because the indictment did not aver the crowning act of guilt to have been committed in the right county. None but the rich or capable were likely to reap the benefit of these technicalities, because none but the rich or capable could employ counsel adroit enough to detect and take advantage of the slips which would work acquittals. For the friendless and ignorant prisoner there was little hope, so far as relief through technicalities was concerned. On the other hand, so far as the merits were concerned, only one side was heard. The

prosecution's case was proved by the prosecution's witnesses, though in most cases involving fraud they were deeply interested in procuring conviction; though in most cases of violence they were animated by passionate family, social, or partisan prejudices against the accused; and though in some cases they might be the real perpetrators of the crime, whose punishment they thus sought to devolve on another. These witnesses were all placed on the witness stand to speak under the sanction given by the administration of an oath. They were "sworn" witnesses; they were appealed to as such; the shield of religion and of the holy book on which they were qualified was thrown over them, and the jury was told that their evidence, if uncontradicted, was to be believed. But the defendant's statements, even if he were permitted to make them, were not to be believed. His vehement protestations, his agonizing attestation of facts which would sustain an hypothesis of all others the most plausible, could it be verified—these the jury was told to disregard as if they were mere wind. If there was adequate inculpatory evidence, there was to be a conviction, no matter though statements of the defendant, averring a probable state of facts which, if sworn to, would have acquitted him, were actually screamed by him in his agony into the jury's ears. This was not fair play. Crime was not exhibited to the community as from its own nature bringing on itself retribution. So far from this the most infamous criminals escaped through technicalities though their guilt glared on the jury at the very time the acquittal was directed, while others were convicted, because through a technicality still more pernicious, their own statements of the case, no matter how convincing these statements might be, were not "evidence." The consequence is that the moral effect of English common law criminal jurisprudence has been positively bad. Instead of this jurisprudence teaching morality, it has taught immorality. It has left on the popular mind the impression that crime, when adroit, ceases to be punishable; and that innocence, which, from its incautiousness, does not protect itself at every step by witnesses, is to be surrendered silent and helpless to the imputation of guilt.

Yet it is a great moral truth that if there be fair play, and if both sides are fully heard, crime will be brought to light and

innocence vindicated. Hence we are justified in saying that if there be a removal of technical exclusionary rules of evidence, only logical exclusionary rules (*e.g.*, those excluding irrelevancy and hearsay) being retained; and if there be such liberty of amendment allowed as will, without taking an unfair advantage of the defendant, square the *alleganda* with the *probanda*; if the absurd technical distinctions between felonies and misdemeanors and between principals and accessaries be swept away, as is proposed in recent projects of codes—then, so far as the machinery of justice is concerned, there will be no impediment to the operation of the law by which crime, from its own nature, leaves tracks by which it can be discovered, and by which innocence is able to offer solutions to relieve it from the pressure of inculpatory facts.

Innocence, indeed, can supply the key by which the cipher can be translated, because at each new point of application will be discovered coincidences between the statements of the innocent inculpated party and the facts already established in the case. On the other hand, guilt, if examined fully and circumstantially, will be led on excursions where there will be no such coincidences, and where discrepancies will be found which will result in exposure. “*Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα,*” says Aristotle, “*τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές.*” In other words, the true solution will fit the facts with which the false solution will conflict. We have a striking solution of this in the Tichborne case. In England, as the law stood at the time of the Tichborne trial, and as it still stands, parties in civil suits may be examined on their own behalf, but not defendants in criminal suits. In the Tichborne ejectment suit the claimant was examined and cross-examined as a witness for himself. In the subsequent prosecution in which he was tried for perjury he was excluded as a witness; but the whole relevant part of his evidence in the ejectment suit was at the disposal of the prosecution, and all such other portions as were explanatory were admissible when offered by himself. The exhaustiveness of his examination and cross-examination on the ejectment trial was such that, the issues being very much the same, he could be treated as if actually examined and cross-examined in the criminal suit. That he was a man of singular adroitness, sagacity,

and presence of mind, there can be no question ; and there can also be no question that he was posted, as far as diligent search and a retentive memory would enable him to be, with the Tichborne surroundings. He had also the advantage of many points of resemblance with the lost baronet whom he personated. How, then, was the case affected by his admission as a witness?

Had it not been for the claimant's own testimony he might have recovered in the ejectment suit. He had been recognized as her lost child by Lady Tichborne. The family solicitor who conversed with him from time to time as to matters of family history, such as the lost son would be familiar with, united in the same recognition. A number of officers and soldiers in the army, with whom the young baronet had been on familiar terms, and several of the family servants, swore positively to the same effect. The time and place of the disappearance of the baronet, and those of the emergence of the claimant matched sufficiently to enable the one to be regarded as a prolongation of the continuity of the other. Had the claimant been at liberty to be silent, his case was one which it might have been difficult to defeat. But he did not choose to be silent. Confiding in his own matchless readiness and shrewdness, as well as on his acquaintance with the history and peculiarities of the baronet whom he personated, he tranquilly offered himself to the cross-examination of Mr. Hawkins. An iron ship, built with a series of water-tight compartments, may have the hull of one of those compartments pierced, and yet continue to float ; and by a like immunity, parts of a defence, which are not vital, may be exploded, and yet the defence may, in the main, hold good. It is otherwise, however, as to vital points, and the parts which make up the *res-gestæ* of a case are vital when they cannot be torn from it without destroying it. Here it was, in particularizing the points that constituted his identity, that the claimant broke down. He had not the faintest reminiscences of the French language, though in France he had lived till early manhood, and he had been educated in French schools. He could not remember the names of his teachers when such teachers had been cloistered in such a way as to shut them off from subsequent inquiries. He could not remember family secrets which, though of a character likely to leave an indelible impression on

a young man's mind, were not known out of the family range. He was deplorably ignorant of transactions which had occurred when he was a young officer in Ireland. And when he came to fill in details, these details were demonstrably false. He attempted to explain the relations of the lost baronet to his cousin, a lady to whom he had been conditionally engaged, by a scandalous fabrication that to the claimant's coarse mind seemed probable enough, but which was felt at once to be villainously false by court and jury, and which was promptly and indignantly stamped as an infamous lie by those whom he mixed up in his charge. He had to narrate details, but when he got out of a certain range with which he had familiarized himself, he could not step out without being trapped. Descriptions that he gave of places were promptly negatived by diagrams, pictures, photographs, and the testimony of experts. Sorties that he made into the region of collateral family history were in like manner promptly repelled. He was caught in his own trap. The key he offered to unlock the mystery of the lost heir not only did not fit, but turned out to be a burglar's skeleton. And he was afterwards convicted of perjury because he had set up a perjured claim.

That to make manifest either guilt or innocence it is only necessary that the truth should be fully brought out, is a conviction which has exhibited itself in every department of literature. The great masters of the drama seem to have viewed it as constructed for the special purpose of illustrating this conviction. It is remarkable with what care Shakespeare has sought to discharge this high moral office, and to show us at the same time the extent to which the materials for the induction may be found. He does this in connection with almost every phase of crime. In the trial scene in the *Merchant of Venice*, for instance, we have Shylock condemned for what we would call an attempt to kill :

" For it appears by manifest proceeding
That indirectly, and directly too,
Thou hast contrived against the very life
Of the defendant."

But this is not reached by proving merely that Shylock stood ready to plunge his whetted knife direct into Antonio's heart.

Whatever in Shylock's history is likely to throw light on his purpose is brought out. Undoubtedly he loved his ducats. But above all, he craved, in the secret chambers of his heart, for revenge. He had been not only underbidden in the market by Antonio, but Antonio had insulted his race and had reviled him personally. Shylock is heard as a witness in his own defence, and he is not condemned until the provocation he received is fully displayed in the lurid coloring given to it by his strong, narrow and vehement nature, intensified by a consciousness of personal as well as of race oppression. Shylock's murderous revenge, subordinating to itself even his avarice, is revealed to us; but we have also revealed to us a temper on his part, which, while not making him less dangerous, causes us to regard him as one to whom grievous wrong has been done; who has been embittered and hardened by this wrong; and who has been impelled by this fierce though trained passion, not to assassinate privately, as he, or hired desperadoes whom he might employ, might readily have done, but to use what he conceived to be a legal means of destroying his foe. We feel that justice is here done by exhibition of the truth on both sides; and that in this way not only will the offence, as it really is, be exhibited, but a punishment commensurate to the offence can be imposed. The same care is exhibited by the great poet in bringing before us what might be called the defences of others who are arrayed before us charged with crime. We have in no case unmitigated villains displayed to us. On the contrary, while the judgment always falls on the criminal, we hear just what the criminal has to say for himself, and, putting aside the objective side of crime, we have exhibited to us various phases of penal amenability;—Macbeth, in defiance of the common-law theory of the wife being under coercion of the husband, submitted tremulously to his wife's coercion over himself—Lady Macbeth stopping at no crime which would help her ambition, and yet, with sensibilities so highly strung that their reaction, like the rebound of the overcharged gun, shatters the case—ment in which they are enclosed—Hamlet's responsibility modified by chronic melancholy self-engendered—Othello, by temporary madness produced by a violent external shock. We have in these, and others of Shakespeare's great creations, not

merely illustrated the rule that we cannot get at the truth in any case of imputed wrong without hearing from the actors on both sides all the pertinent conditions, but we have foreshadowed one of the great themes of modern reformed jurisprudence, that of modified responsibility, *vermindert Zurechnungsfähigkeit*. Punishments, we are thus reminded, are not to be few and incomplex, as they are by the English common law, which makes all felonies capital, and sends all minor offenders to the common jail. So far from this, punishments must be various, assigning death to only very exceptional cases, and in all others apportioning corporal discipline to the peculiar phase of guilt.

Yet the drama, brilliantly as it has been used for this purpose, does not give us the platform on which the rule before us, that if the facts on both sides are fairly brought out the truth will be exposed, is best illustrated. Few dramatists have genius enough to create the vast collection of motley and apparently disconnected facts from which we infer or reject guilty agency in even the simplest of our judicial investigations. Even were this not so, we feel when we study the works of even the greatest master of fiction that the scene before us is fiction after all. We may avoid its moral teaching by saying that it is poetic justice to cause the villain to be disclosed at the right time, or innocence to be at the decisive moment vindicated, but that this is not the justice of every-day life.

Nor can the social arena be the platform on which we can effectively illustrate the great law of our nature, by which facts, when fully explained, become the revealers of truth. We cannot compel reluctant witnesses to tell their story before any self-constituted investigating committee, no matter how high its social authority ; nor could such a committee be found sufficiently disciplined in the logic of examination, sufficiently patient and sufficiently impartial, to conduct such an investigation. Our ecclesiastical trials exhibit to us how impotent even the most upright and scholarly men may be for such purposes. The witnesses who have come before such courts have been only witnesses who came voluntarily ; and few men, unless impelled by a zeal which makes their perceptive, if not their communicative, faculties unreliable, are willing, without the protection of a legal

summons, to expose themselves to the detentions, the misconceptions, it may be the personal responsibilities, attending the publication of inculpatory public statements as to others. It may be that to a consciousness of this infirmity in the testimony adduced before them, we are to attribute another peculiarity of ecclesiastical courts—that the judges vote, in all cases in which there is a vigorous contest, that the accused party did very much as they would suppose, on *à priori* grounds, his peculiar theological idiosyncrasies would have impelled him to do. To no tribunal which is unarmed by the full powers of investigation which the law affords, and which is not divested of personal or partisan prejudices as to the particular parties, can we look for a full disclosure of facts pertinent to a contested case.

The court-room, however, is the theatre where Nemesis, exercising this supreme function of the investigation and disclosure of truth, as well as that of the adjustment of responsibility, has her distinctive throne. From this throne she can compel the production before her of all the proof necessary to the determination of a contested issue. It is necessary for this purpose that she should be hampered by no rules except those of a sound logic. Nothing should be excluded that is relevant ; and that is not secondary, and therefore inferior to a higher order of proof that could have been obtained. It is essential, also, that interest in the result, or even absorption in the result, as in the case when the accused offers himself as a witness, should go to credibility and not to competency, and that it should always be kept in mind that no man can tell more about an act than the actors themselves, and that to construct a false, and at the same time largely circumstantial story, which will square with all disclosable facts, is not within the range of human powers. It is also essential that not only the judges, but the counsel engaged, should be men of capacity and conscientiousness. If this be so, the Nemesis of the Court-Room will take her place among our chief moral instructors. She will not only show, as she has already shown, that guilt, when exposed, will be punished righteously ; but she will also show that when the facts are all brought out the truth is the only hypothesis that fits.

FRANCIS WHARTON.

THE CLAIMS OF REASON, CONSCIENCE, AND AUTHORITY, CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO RATIONALISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM.

RELIGION regards the supernatural as its proper sphere ; yet in presenting itself to mankind it makes its appeal at once to our natural consciousness of right. Apart from this it has for us no *locus standi*. If it came as a mere terror announcing inexorable events, it might perforce exact obedience from our fears, and our conviction of duty and right would perhaps be overwhelmed by an instinct of self-preservation. But religion speaks to us as rational, and rationality genuinely aims at right. If ever we are at all subjected to arbitrary demands from without, we cannot help feeling that we are wronged, or at least are unworthily treated.

But beyond this it may be said, that not only we may not be overawed into abandoning reason, but we may not ourselves, on any pretence, lay it aside, for nothing can abrogate its rights. So whatever comes before us as an obligation should commend itself to our intelligence. Were it otherwise, our nature would seem a hopeless enigma, and the idea of duty be impossible.

2: It is with such preliminary reflections we turn to consider the position occupied by our religion at the present time, confronted as it is by the natural sense of right and duty in mankind. On its first appearance eighteen hundred years ago, it had a large and enthusiastic reception by many, in certain central homes of civilization—Jerusalem, Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, Antioch ; from them it began to pervade the world ; and for some generations it increased its hold on the reason and conscience of

those to whom it appealed. Later on, it necessarily encountered the political changes of the East and West. New positions were inevitable, "side issues," as they may be called, were opened, and the onward progress of the religion was qualified. If the natural conscience were not less responsive, yet the conditions of civilization were so greatly disturbed that the clash of social elements often rendered inaudible the still small voice. Sometimes Christianity, while accepting the facts in the midst of which it had to move, was able to coincide with the world's changes; but at other times it found itself unavoidably in hostile collision with the current policies and customs all around. We cannot pause to give even an outline of these transitions from century to century. Passing through them all, and influencing them variously, Christianity has reached our own time. In the West, among the most educated nations, it has, in some sort, undisputed possession. No rival religion, at least, has appeared, since Mahometanism was driven out of Spain. Yet in all Europe, a large and increasing number of thoughtful men are doubting and denying the special teachings and claims of what once was hailed as the Gospel of our race.

3. The explanations commonly given of this unquestioned fact are far from satisfactory. Some allege that the "evidences" of our religion are not sufficiently known; a kind of defence which, after so many ages, sounds rather like an accusation; for, a true religion concerns multitudes to whom evidences, either historical or philosophical, must be inaccessible. Its literary and archæological examination are full of interest; but the world at large has to do with the substance of the religion; and that ought to speak for itself.

It is quite an inadmissible assumption of some defenders of the faith, that Christianity is a set of doctrines arbitrarily demanding assent on external grounds. Not a few supposed believers, dismayed at the present state of facts, and fearing that the intellect of the world may be against them, even refuse the appeal to "evidences," as implying a right on man's part to "verify" Divine truth; and they blame what they call the "pride of reason;" forgetting that the pride of reason is not reason, but is a moral perversity. No doubt our relations to our Moral Ruler, and a future life, could not all be discovered

by reason ; but they must commend themselves, when properly ascertained, to all who have responsibility respecting them.

There is a class of believers whose complacency, quite undisturbed by growing infidelity, almost makes it an "evidence" for the truth of a supposed prediction about our religion, that decay of faith was to be a sign of the spiritual decrepitude of the "latter days." The unethical character of such a rejoinder is evident from the fact that Christianity still goes on appealing to men's natural conscience, which it could hardly do if unbelief were to be thus reckoned on and acquiesced in. Such systematic decriers of fallen humanity would, at least, scarcely confess that their own form of Christianity is irrational, or that their conscience revolts at it. Other men, then, have an equal right to satisfaction, without being told that they are a kind of predestinated misbelievers. The facts must be faced, far more thoroughly and fairly than by such alarmed subterfuges as we thus refer to.

4. All who surely know that their religion is Divine, and that it cannot be in real opposition to "the light that lighteth every man," must feel bound to deal very differently with the resistance to Christianity presented at this time in educated countries. They must insist on distinguishing what they believe from all mere opinion ; for until this is done, there will always be the danger of the multitudes mistaking theories connected with Christianity for Christianity itself. There can be no doubt that much which passes as Christian truth is but imperfectly defined opinion ; and this fact is commonly dealt with by an appeal to "authority" as to what Christianity is and demands ; which means, perhaps, an entire appeal from natural reason and conscience to some *dictum* which demands submission, whether it really satisfies reason or not. With a majority of Christendom, at this time, it is the Bishop of Rome, speaking *ex cathedrâ*, who is the "authority" to which reason and conscience is said ultimately to defer. With others it is the authority of Scripture, which, they think, is absolutely to be bowed to, even when it seems opposed to what men feel to be right in principle and true in fact. This idea of "authority" is essentially the same with both sides, and is based on the

supposition that Divine truth must come to us in a form of external infallible certainty, even in detail.

Here it is obvious to remark, that both these standards of "authority" have existed among us for some centuries side by side, and that they have not succeeded in persuading men that any such standards take the place of reason or conscience among responsible beings. To what position they have brought Christianity in our times, we may learn from the acknowledgments of failure which meet us on every hand ; to which we must now more fully point, distressing though they are. We may afterwards see what "authority" has to say for itself.

5. The organ, *c.g.* of Cardinal Manning and the staunchest Roman Catholics, seeing that all which distinguishes Christianity from natural religion is being gradually eliminated from public opinion, surveys the state of the Continent, once outwardly of the same faith, and exclaims :

"At this moment we may truly say, there is no Christendom." (*Dublin Rev.*, April, 1875, p. 488.) "No one will say that there is now any nation which retains as a nation, or approaches to retaining, that pervasive endemic faith, penetrating to the very core the people's whole moral convictions, which characterized the Europe of the Middle Ages."

The testimony of another witness, the Archbishop of Canterbury, is equally explicit. Being in the chair of the "Christian Evidence Society," and surrounded by prelates and men of distinction in Church and State, his grace lately sanctioned the official avowal, "that it is impossible to disguise the fact that throughout Europe, as well as in this country, there is a rising wave of scepticism. Unbelief pervades the ranks of the educated and uneducated ; and the doubts suggested by the highest intellectual culture filter through the social strata." (*Report*, May, 1878.) Two months after this, the Archbishop of York, preaching before the "Lambeth Conference of one hundred bishops of England, Scotland, Ireland, America, and the colonies," describes the present Christian position as emphatically a "conflict of opinions."

Of course the public journals comment on this state of things. The *Morning Post*, wont to take the side of orthodoxy, strikingly connects the European Christianity with the prospects

of European politics, and urges that the prolonged disputes of statesmen and churches, Catholic and Protestant, are issuing in Germany in a growing abandonment of religion. We then are told that a band of more than a quarter of a million of adults there is united for the entire "overthrow of religion, government, morality, and property;" also that the coming war of unbelief is to be no mild "conflict of opinion," or "wave of scepticism," rising only to subside, as some may hopefully imagine. Its uncompromising intensity may further be tolerably estimated by Strauss's¹ recent call "on all men of science, or who affect philosophy, to throw off with frankness the name of Christian, too long maintained, since every one knows that none of them believe even the Apostles' Creed."

Is France better than England or Germany? We saw last year (1878) that in the land of De Maistre and Montalembert, the country of Chateaubriand and Dupanloup, as well as the Coquerelles, the centenary of Voltaire was with difficulty restrained from becoming a national literary repudiation of our faith. It was just limited to the public assurance of the atheistic *litterati*, "that Christianity no longer commends itself to the intellectual culture of the age." At the same time in Rome, the Freemasons also were leading the Voltairean festival.

6. What is it, let us ask, that these denials all mean? Is it that our age is rejecting the claims to "the supernatural," put forth by our religion? No, men go further than that. Such writers as the painstaking author of "Supernatural Religion" do not stop there. The historical truth no less than the Divine character of our faith is disputed. They could not be separated long. Not that the supernatural depends on any history of it, nor that any history, written by the most gifted of the sons of men, is the guarantee of the supernatural, or is guaranteed by it: but that they go together; so that to adopt either is soon to admit both.

Can any one seriously persuade himself that the remedy for an unbelief which thus insists on having a basis historically true,

¹ For fuller extracts reference may be made to a recent work of the present writer, "The Church of all Ages." London.

and also appeals to the human conscience, is to be found in pure submission to any external "authority"? It would simply mean, so far as yet appears, the suppression of thinking, the persecution of investigation, and the silence of some of the best emotions of the heart of man. Such an attempt to arrest conscience has, thus far, but increased and angered the free thought which it meant to crush, leading it frequently to retaliate unjustly on the spirit of reverence, which unnatural forms of rationalism abhor. It is quite unreal, in looking back, for instance, as some do, to the sixteenth century, to regard the Reforming movement as essentially evil and irreligious; or, on the other hand, to profess that the Catholics were then just defending an irrational and tyrannical superstition. Perhaps we should confess that neither saints nor reasoners had their way at that time. The postulates of the controversialists on both sides were very imperfectly examined. The previous conditions of moral and religious action were little considered; and so long as this is the case anywhere, truth, reason, and conscience have but prejudiced treatment.

Nor let us deceive ourselves into imagining that, even now, things are philosophically much better. A large proportion of nominal Christians would gladly keep things quiet, and secure peace at the price of truth, not perceiving that the growth of civilization has made this impossible. We may be, and probably are, in the mere infancy of social and political philosophy; but the Divine right of the human mind to struggle for all attainable truth will never now be abandoned, or even suspended. We know, indeed, that we have to learn from all quarters. Our "rationalism," no doubt, has to learn modesty, and our "traditionalism" has equally to acquire sincerity. But there can really be no truce.

Our nature is being educated towards an ideal. The past has brought us to the present, and (though much has to be left behind) we have brought something with us thus far. In all this, an *à priori* is implied, and the relation between it and man is to be more and more cleared as he advances. For mere empiricism is but a "hand-to-mouth" kind of thinking, haphazard and unprincipled. The thorough desire to be right, the steady aim to be right, must accompany every step of our real

progress. The great controversy between human thought and unreasoning dictation has gone on in all ages under different forms. In Europe (with which we are now concerned), from the middle ages down to our own, the fires have alternately blazed and smouldered. But the former, at least, attempted a philosophy of the subject ; the present age is but slowly perceiving that it ought to do so. Meanwhile, the course of the higher education among us tends towards the sciences of facts, rather than thought.

7. We are bound, now, to endeavor to mark more precisely the present condition of the religious problem in our own day. There is an ominous philosophical agreement both among Catholics and Rationalists—alike abandoning the *à priori*—that Christianity cannot be “proved,” as the phrase is ; and that if admitted at all, it must be so, right or wrong (as we have said), on the authority of the Pope or the authority of the Bible ; and that, too, without asking what the Bible is, except a venerable Book, or what the Pope is, “when distinctly speaking as Pope.” This controversy had long been inevitable, and now has forced itself on attention, by the “Syllabus,” in which Pius the Ninth so lately challenged the social, political, and religious position of the modern rationalism, “all along the line ;” and by the acceptance of the challenge by both statesmen and men of literature throughout Europe.

No more noticeable exponent of the Papal view of the different parts of the whole problem could be found among us than Dr. Newman of the Oratory, and none so likely to be listened to. In a letter addressed by him to the Duke of Norfolk, a nobleman who of right stands at the head of the Roman Catholic laity of England, Dr. Newman replies to an “Expostulation against Vaticanism,” by Mr. Gladstone, our late Prime Minister, who had regarded the Roman Syllabus chiefly from a political point of view. The discussion of such a subject, between such men, could not be wholly political ; though it was natural for the statesman so to approach it. Dr. Newman (p. 39) could not but turn aside “just to say one word on the principle of obedience itself—that is, by way of inquiry whether it” (obedience) “is or is not now a religious duty.” This is really the point (as Mr. W. H. Mallock endeavors to put it once more,

in a recent number (December, 1878) of the *Nineteenth Century*).

Mr. Gladstone had said in his "Expostulation,"

"that the Pope claims infallible authority, demanding all obedience in faith and morals; that there are no departments and functions of human life which do not and cannot fall within the domain of morals;" that "he claims also the domain of all that concerns the government and discipline of the Church, and, moreover, the power of determining the limits of those claims, and that he does not sever them by any acknowledged or intelligible line from the domains of civil duty and allegiance." Dr. Newman does not refuse this statement of the case, but thinks it sufficient to urge first in reply, that this is no more than we all affirm 'of the supremacy of law among ourselves, and may (p. 42) in some respects seem less.'

8. It is here overlooked that, if this were really so, the Papal supremacy needed no such formal announcement as has now been given it after the hesitation of ages. It is not conceivable, for instance, that an act of Parliament, or Congress, or a Royal Proclamation, should now come forth newly informing us that the "Law is supreme" (nor could we be persuaded that "its domain extends to every department of faith and morals"). That many overwrought minds may have accepted, as Dr. Newman for a moment may have done, such a view of the Papal theory for quieting all doubt, may be true; but it could not bear reflection. Considering the subject-matter of all grave religious doubt, such acquiescence could not ultimately be thought, even in the least, to be ethical. Nor, merely as a "practical" proposition, could it be long maintained that there is any parallel to be drawn between a law which declares itself, as that of Rome does, infallible and perfect, and the "Law of England," which is always open to correction. No one could fail to see, on any very serious consideration, that to lower the Pope's infallibility to the *de facto* supremacy of human law would be to unhinge the whole theory.

But Dr. Newman is evidently sincere; and he attempts to follow what he has said into its consequences. He says plainly, that so far from Papal infallibility having so wide a sweep as commonly supposed by us, its definitions are of rare occurrence. He regards "Father O'Reilly as one of the first theologians of the day," and thinks he is right in holding that "Papal in-

fallibility is comparatively seldom brought into action," and he asks, "What is the use of dragging in the Papal infallibility in connection with Papal acts with which it has nothing to do . . . acts in which the pontiff is not commonly mistaken, but in which he could be mistaken, and still remain infallible in the only sense in which he has been declared to be so?" (p. 124). Is it then, we ask, after all, for the enjoyment of the benefit of such a dim theory that converts are invited to leave "Protestant" variations and uncertainties, and join the "Roman obedience"?

Dr. Newman, after this, goes on to quote with approval from the Pastoral of the Swiss Bishops :

"It in no way depends upon the caprice of the Pope, or upon his good pleasure, to make such and such a doctrine the object of a dogmatic definition ; and the Pope is tied up, and limited, among other things, by the fact that alongside the ecclesiastical hierarchy there is the power of temporal magistrates, invested in their own domain with a full sovereignty, and to whom we owe obedience in conscience, and respect in all things morally admitted, and belonging to the domain of civil society" (p. 126).

We take these sentences, as we are intended to do, in their ostensible sense, not pausing to point out phrases of equivocal meaning. But the summing-up sentences of Dr. Newman himself are more distinct and telling, of course, than those which he quotes.

"The Pope's infallibility, indeed, and his supreme authority have in the Vatican *capita* been declared matters of faith ; but his prerogative of infallibility lies in matters speculative, and his prerogative of authority is no infallibility in laws, commands, or measures."

Certainly the claims thus "minimized" are not those which alarmed Europe when the Syllabus was issued. Whether they are those which suffice for the satisfaction of thoughtful converts, they may even yet have occasion to consider.

But to compare the claims of authority even so "minimized" with the duties of the individual conscience, Dr. Newman with his usual and at times paradoxical thoroughness proceeds as follows :

"On the duty of obeying conscience at all hazards, Cardinal Gousset quotes from the Fourth Lateran Council, that he who acts against his con-

science loses his soul. This *dictum* is brought out with singular fulness and force in the moral treatises of theologians. The celebrated school of the Carmelites of Salamanca lays down the broad proposition that conscience is ever to be obeyed, whether it tells truly or erroneously, and that whether the error is the fault of the person thus erring or not. Aquinas, Bonaventura, Cajetan, Vasquez, Durandus, Navarrus, Corduba, Layman, Escobar, and fourteen others, are quoted as holding this to be certain; and two of them as *de fide*. The French Dominican, Natalis Alexander, is approved as saying, 'If in the judgment of conscience, though a mistaken conscience, a man is persuaded that what his superior commands is displeasing to God, he is bound not to obey.' To this Dr. Newman adds, 'The word "superior" certainly includes the Pope.' And he concludes what he has to say on conscience with these words: 'Certainly if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts (which indeed does not seem quite the thing), I shall drink—to the Pope, if you please—still to conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards' (pp. 64–66).

Could we here accept Dr. Newman as the acknowledged spokesman on the Roman side, it might almost be supposed that some practical advancement towards an understanding was to be looked for. He has, to his own mind, bridged over the chasm between authority and conscience. But, unhappily, we are forbidden to take his exposition as true. Mr. Gladstone had by no means supposed that there need be hopeless hostility between conscience and authority, as, indeed, he soon had occasion to show; but he takes pains to assure us that the *Voce della Verità* of the ensuing 21st of January complains very seriously of Dr. Newman (p. 102, "Vaticanism"). Mr. Gladstone then points out that, while Dr. Newman makes such large exceptions to the rule of "obedience to authority," the Vatican Council (as we shall see) has absolutely made none. "The Church by the Council imposes 'aye'; the private conscience reserves to itself the right to say 'no.'"

9. This gentle kind of criticism, however, is far from satisfying the Roman Catholic body. *The Dublin Review* (April, 1875), edited at that time by Dr. Newman's friend and honorable admirer, Dr. Ward, disclaims all sympathy with these views of Dr. Newman: "On no other question of the day do we find ourselves so irreconcilably at issue with Dr. Newman as in his view of the Döllingerites. But it would be ungracious if we made this our opportunity of speaking our full mind (p. 456)

on the subject." Differing entirely from the "wise and gentle minimizing" which Dr. Newman advocates, the writer adds, "Increased reflection has but increased the doubt, which we ventured to express in our last number, whether Dr. Newman's 'conscience' is precisely the same with the *conscientia* of theologians; and we demur to his decision, that in cases similar to those mentioned by him (p. 65) disobedience to a Pope's official and deliberate command could be defensible on grounds of conscience." We fear that the editor of *The Dublin Review* is right as a Roman Catholic. The meaning of the word "conscience" in the Roman theology is more subtle and complicated than Dr. Newman recognizes in the argument he is conducting. The "*sindere*" of the schools (*συντήρησις*) nearly corresponds to that self-watching "instinct" which is part of our nature as moral beings, and does not correspond to the *συνείδησις* of St. Paul, though often simply called "conscience." (See *Aquinas*, Dist. 24, who refers to *St. Jerome* in the Gloss., *Ezek.* ch. 1.)

The editor of *The Dublin Review* could have said and ought to have said more. This equivocal term deceives and multiplies disunions in the Church of Rome. Thus, such a sentence (see *ante*) as "he who sins against conscience" (as part of his nature) "loses his soul," is wholly equivocal, if read in the scholastic sense. But we must not linger; we only ask, are questions so grave as these to be thus smothered in phrases? It cannot be; and if attempted, rather if now persisted in, we shall find that while the rationality and conscientiousness of Roman Christianity are undefended, Christendom is ceasing to believe. If there be any vindication forthcoming at this crisis of religion as in itself true to conscience, it now should appear even among competent Roman theologians themselves, men, for example, like Mochler, could they be found.

10. But we must not imply that such defence of pure submission to authority in religion devolves only on Rome. "The religious duty of obedience" (as Dr. Newman touchingly, and perhaps despondingly, puts it) is almost the "question of the day" for all. But "obedience to *what*?" is of course the first point to settle. The great majority of Protestants believe in the "necessity to salvation" of what, on "authority" of some kind, they regard as "fundamentals of the Gospel." These

may be stated differently in the various "Confessions," but with confidence some authority that as to certain essential and inscrutable doctrines there must be really "submissive faith;" in other words, that reason must not resist even what seems unreasonable. The previous question as to the possibility, *à priori*, of serving or pleasing the Supreme and All-Perfect against our reason has been as little considered among the asserters of "private judgment" as among its deniers. If the one side says, "You must bring your reason and conscience to our conclusion," and the other insists, "You must take our conclusion as infallible, whether you can bring your reason and conscience to like it or not," the philosophical difference between them is but little.

It may be supposed by some, that the weight imposed on conscience by the Church of Rome is so much greater than among other Christians that the demand is altogether different. But surely, if true, this is an impossible plea. There can be no compromise as to the *amount* of "belief on authority" against conscience. The Catechism of Trent and the Westminster Confession admit the same principle of a formal authority commanding a dead acquiescence on certain points as "revealed," whether we can think them true or not. The Pope may be more moderate and "constitutional" than even a Bossuet could own; or the turning point of adherence to a sect may be but one brief Bible dogma; but if we are called, in consequence of either, to surrender our responsible sense of right and wrong, in faith or practice, the principle is the same: the demand is unethical, and fatal.

II. The appeals often made to the Divine Scriptures as the practical authority to which reason must surrender, after a certain amount of examination and criticism, are *co modo* as difficult to reconcile to the rights of conscience as any put forth by Rome. The diverse Scripture-conclusions arrived at by careful and thoughtful men among us are claimed for freedom of conscience, and are attributed, at times, to different "schools of thought"—a somewhat profane phrase, denying the really definite character of the "Revealing," or "Revelation," and reducing it to a half-formed human philosophy, or else likening it to a Rabbinical tradition running in various grooves with little or no

thought at all. True these many expositions claim one formal origin, the inspired Old and New Testaments, criticised or uncriticised ; but we who complain of Papal infallibility, that it clashes with reason and conscience, cannot wonder if we are called to give a rational account of our own views of Bible authenticity and inspiration, on which quite as much is made to depend as on the Syllabus itself (though that extends to very practical matters). The truth is that dogmatism in us is self-contradictory also when it is uncatholic ; and is unethical when, in any direction, it is unreasonable. But here we pause awhile, for another range of both non-dogmatic and non-catholic opinion glances before us for our notice.

For were we at this point to sum up the case of conscience *v.* authority, we might seem to discredit the just claims of authority in certain of its own departments, and permit a notion of the intellectual and moral sufficiency of every man, at variance with all the facts of life. But no man, after all, is eager to claim intellectual freedom so far as to dispense with *all* authority. Responsible agents have not merely private and free spheres of their own, but they develop *together* ; and such is their diversity that their mutual relations in society must be determined, externally, by some practical "authority" held to be binding on all. It is indispensable that the State should see that men's responsibility to society and their responsibility to their own moral and religious convictions do not publicly clash ; and statesmen are rightly anxious to understand the grounds on which public opinion can permanently repose, for it becomes, rightly or wrongly, an "authority" to many in most things. Reserving awhile, then, what we have to say further in comparing religious allegiance, as claimed specifically by some of the alleged authorities, with the inalienable rights of conscience asserted by ethical philosophy, it is proper, at this part of our subject, that we should refer to what is so very important as what may be called the statesman's view. It will be found, in the civilization of the future, that a social Syllabus cannot be omitted : and this may be the place to notice it.

12. A treatise put forth by one of the most thoughtful of modern statesmen, Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, entitled, "*On the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion*," was published some

years ago. Attention has lately been recalled to it by Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Fitz-James Stephens, and others. We may take it as a *résumé* of the political view of our subject, so far as it has been thought out in our times ; and it further may serve, at the same time, to show the incompleteness and danger of all unethical treatment of it.

The writer begins by even declining to examine the moral grounds of human responsibility, and takes the rough facts of life as he finds them. Admitting, of course, that all men are not competent to form opinions, yet that we know they will and must form them on many subjects, as well as they can, and rightly lean on some "authority," Cornwall Lewis feels that men ought to have what we may call manageable opinions. Men are held responsible to conscience by one another, as well as by themselves, all along. Both these facts have to be dealt with in society ; and the statesman's suggestion naturally perhaps is, as we here find, a *consensus omnium* in morals, for the generality, while reserving for a minority "a faith in experts." There is something that looks ethical, at first, in the *consensus omnium*. It assumes that nature does not go wrong on so large a scale as the denial of so general a fact as *consensus* would imply. But there is nothing ethical in the alternative idea of leaving moral facts to the judgment, ultimately, of "experts." Mr. Gladstone pointed out that we might go further, if we admit the *consensus* principle at all, and might introduce Christianity on authority, by something like the "*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*," of Vincentius. Sir James Fitz-James Stephens' reply, "that that is not the precise meaning of Cornwall Lewis's argument," is not to the point, if it is fairly included in the principle ; and it forgets, too, that in most subjects, and not least in religion, *consensus* actually is the authority most relied on by the many : though the question may still remain as to the origin of *consensus*.

Cornwall Lewis's opening statement is, "Whenever in this essay I speak of the principle of authority, I shall understand the principle of adopting the belief of others on a matter of opinion, without reference to the particular grounds on which that belief rests" (p. 7) ; that is, irrespective of its being recognized, either as divinely authorized, or supernaturally accred-

ited, or even as felt to be in itself really right. Here we must ask every one to consider whether this is not often beyond our competence in very grave matters of responsibility?

13. In reference to the distinction asserted at this point by Cornwall Lewis, as to the more elaborate opinions formable by a minority, we also detect, as we have said, the serious lack of the ethical element. He bases such opinions on the testimony "of experts," without facing the fact that this "testimony" of experts must also depend in them, though scarcely in us, on something *beyond*; unless we are to surrender to a final scepticism as to the truth, or eliminate all that depends on the "experts" from moral responsibility. Internal consciousness of right must in every department of life and action predominate in a true moral agent. Our phenomena, experiences, or conditions may often be to us of the nature of authorities, but still such authorities as imply the *à priori*. The authority of experts only would seem often to stand apart from this. The authority of generally-approved habits, or of certain witnesses, or of some judges, may have a moral element, and command us rightly at times; especially when modesty and truth oblige us to confess our own incompetency, or when we are not bound to judge and act immediately on our own responsibility. But "experts" take us, after all, into a region where we are supposed to be blind, and have to be led. It is a shelving of responsibility, in whole or in part, to lean thus on "experts."

We must evade nothing in this part of our subject. Of course, being all of us in a state of advancing education, moral and intellectual, there is such a thing as partial responsibility, in which such authorities as have been glanced at come to our aid. In the case of all children, for instance, and variously immature persons, time must be allowed for growth; yet the conviction of right must even in their case be encouraged to feel its way.

Conceding that intellectual and well-reasoned convictions cannot be universally expected, we must not disguise from ourselves the fact that just in proportion as we limit the decisions of intelligence, we enfeeble and dilute responsibility itself. Truths certainly commanding and eventually receiving universal acceptance (as we believe those we are considering cer-

tainly do) are never mere opinions, but have constant internal coherence. The details of interpretation will no doubt be various if finite rationality has to apply such truths ; and it may not be always easy to draw the line between what is vital to conscience and what lies beyond ; but principle and opinion cannot really be confounded. Even in religion, as well as in simpler ethics, there are certainties which express themselves in a tone of peremptoriness, and if we refuse them we cannot avoid the consequences. Men are able, as they are free, to defy any truths ; but the realities remain. The rough rejection of a principle by an impatient empiricism may throw into disorder the philosophy of an age ; and of this, the generations from Locke to J. Stuart Mill may furnish illustrations. But, as Cudworth finely says, " Truth is the most unbending and uncompliable, the most necessary, firm, immutable, and adamantine thing in the world."

14. There is one further reflection, however, to be here added, in reference to the practical apprehension of truth and right by the non-intellectual classes, the omission of which would be unreal and unjust. There are hazy estimates of things in the generality of men, as society advances, which they cannot themselves reduce to logical form and proportion, and which yet are not commonly unreasonable. They enter very largely into the almost unconscious action of most men, and help the formation of habits. Similar in some respects to the instincts of the animal, they are still of a moral nature, variable in their working, and sometimes special to classes and even to individuals. They form a kind of "unconscious reason" on which conviction may be strongly grafted. It is no disparagement of this to say that it may be abnormally perverted in very weak persons ; this would be a diseased rather than a natural state of things. It is thus when feeble persons turn sceptics in morals, or at times in religion ; or when any suffer from alienation of reason. Their instincts or wishes may have put them first astray. But indefinite ethics may still, in multitudes, be full of the conviction of right, and it would be dangerous to true philosophy to overlook this. The true statement of the facts thus referred to seems to be that a common-sense estimate of the probabilities around us is as much a part of our conscious-

ness as intuition is of our personal reason in its cognizance of facts.

Considering the very wide scope of human responsibility insisted on by all, the vaguest power of appraising probabilities is far more ethical than any following of experts can often be. If, indeed, we took authority for any belief as nothing more than "the evidence of experts" (which Sir James Fitz-James Stephens says is the position of Cornewall Lewis), we should leave no reasonable place for any *consensus*. (See *Nineteenth Century*, April, 1877, p. 287.) And if we admit the evidence of experts in matters beyond our reach in any case, there seems no reason why we may not admit the evidence of the theologian in matters theological, as well as of the chemist in chemistry, the astronomer in astronomy, and so on. Whether this resting on experts would always lead to further scientific advancement may be much open to question. At any rate it would need much guarding; and if it should make some men to appear for a time intellectual, scientific, and theological, by proxy, it would not be an ethical achievement. Experts probably could not have been suggested, but for the absence in Cornewall Lewis of the poetry of *à priori* thought, to a degree quite surprising. His perceived need of sound general opinion among citizens seems to have obliged him, as a statesman, having nothing else, to rest it finally on this "faith in experts."

But it cannot rest there even intellectually. He confuses the ideas of "acceptance" and "faith" in his whole statement as to the reliance on experts. He says (Essay, p. 25),

"The distinction between testimony, argument, and authority may be briefly summed up thus:

"In questions of testimony, I believe a matter of fact, because the witness believes it.

"In questions of argument, I believe the conclusion to be true, because it is proved by reasons satisfactory to my understanding.

"In questions of authority, I believe a matter of opinion, because it is believed by a person whom I consider a competent judge of the question."

These three propositions ought all to begin, "I believe it is true" (implying an *à priori*), otherwise they simply mean, "I believe that I believe;" for believing implies an object. But,

even then it would be difficult to surpass the looseness and inaccuracy of these sentences. The word "belief" is used in different senses in each paragraph; and not in its real sense (as a perception of the substantially true) in any of the three. For, as to the first, no man believes a matter of fact, simply because "his informant believes it." He may *accept* it, because his informant affirms it; but he can be sure of nothing beyond that. Again, it is not true that the "conclusion of an argument" is simply believed on the ground of "reason satisfactory to the understanding;" though they may make the argument credible. Belief, as an act of the "Ego," is far more complex, and is made up of conditions antecedent, and accompanying, and of the character of the believer himself. And thirdly, it is not true that a man "believes an opinion" because a competent judge believes it (Kepler's laws were for some time believed by him, and, competent as he had shown himself, not believed by others). Sanguine hopes, or abstinence from denials, are not "belief." The complicated grounds of real faith, and the sense of prior obligation to right faith, are unnoticed by Cornewall Lewis. As a statesman, again, he rightly feels that there is a mixed social-moral responsibility which needs to be ascertained; but he does not ascertain it. And every philosophic statesman knows that until it is ascertained, the world cannot be quite reasonably governed. The facts of moral responsibility will not consent permanently and altogether to lie outside the sphere of human government.

We return, then, from the statesman's view of the relations of reason and conscience to truth and right and human responsibility in society. Statesmen have not yet thought out the problem; and it remains, at present, in the hands of parties, and their really reactionary or anarchical leaders; but only for the present. The quasi-rational attempts to establish an "authority" by massing or by averaging conclusions, or by urging the untaught majority to submit to the minority, or by asserting an arbitrary tribunal to be treated as above reason, equally fail to provide a solution of the difficulty of our times. In the presence of all absolutism, secular or spiritual, the moral agent knows that he is not free and not satisfied.

15. We must go back to the beginning if we would now ap-

preciate our position ; think, that is, of the beginning of conscience and responsibility, and the beginning of the idea of a revelation. Without this, we shall be open to the suspicion that supernatural revelation may yet be an intrusion in the sphere of human duty. The need man is seen to have of revelation, as the supplement of his natural aspirations after the truth and the right, is one ground, at least, if we "go back to the beginning," on which the claim of Christianity must first rest. "The championship of conscience is," says Dr. Newman, "the *raison d'être* of religion." He shows in a passage of extreme beauty and refinement (equalled by another quoted by the present writer from another work¹) that the insufficiency of natural light is the justification of revelation.

The passage is this :

"The sense of right and wrong, which is the first element in religion, is so delicate, so fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressible by education, so biassed by pride and passion, so unsteady in its flights, that in the struggle for existence, amid various exercises and triumphs of the human intellect, this sense is at once the highest of all teachers, yet the least luminous. . . . Natural religion, certain as are its grounds and its doctrines as addressed to thoughtful serious minds, needs, in order that it may speak to mankind with effect, and subdue the world, to be sustained and completed by revelation."

Such an estimate of our sense of ethical right, as well as of natural religion, will scarcely be questioned. But then it obliges us to own that we are held responsible for right-doing, by some direct, though dim, discernment that we possess, and not in consequence of elaborate definitions. Something anterior to itself is owned by every conscience. Our knowledge of it is confessedly imperfect, and must be enlarged ; but it is not peculiar to any individual, for we expect others to recognize it. We only here would call it the "absolute," because it depends not on our own special conditions. We cannot ethically own even an "authority" which does not aim to harmonize with this "absolute." There may indeed be a pause in growth of conscience when, in its own inscrutable way, it is verifying what

¹ See "The Apologiâ pro Ecclesiâ Anglicanâ."

newly comes to it as probable authority, and temporarily submits. Were this, however, to last long, it would threaten responsibility altogether, and surrender that special function, in relation to the *à priori*, which distinguishes the man from the beast.

16. Such would be the position of conscience at all times when fresh approached by what claimed to be the authority of a revelation as to right and wrong. As an arbitrary imposition, conscience can never accept it. It is a false and incredible notion, and one pregnant with all unrighteousness and unbelief in goodness, that man, having a nature whose prime duty it is to aim at what it feels to be right, is afterwards required to aim at a technical end, which he does *not* feel to be right ; and this to test his obedience ! The test of a real man both as to thought and action is, that he does the "felt-right," and avoids the "felt-wrong." If we think, we must inquire whether we think rightly, not merely whether we think obediently. If we act, we desire to be right, and not merely obedient to command ; and that to the full extent of our responsibility. Even during a tentative obedience, when we are growing to newly-known duties, the sense of right must be so enlarging itself as to make obedience wholly moral. Why watch our experiences, as we do, with reference to their being right, if we suppose no absolute ?

If we have no communion with the right, as right *per se*, we have no large sympathy with manhood itself. Without the absolute more or less discerned, there would appear no reason why we should be reasonable. Our moral discernment must indeed be reverent and modest, yet it must not be too deferential to be honest, or too blindly reverent to be true ; but it must be free from the demoralizations both of selfishness and of authority. If we admit, then, on the one hand, that we have need of help for the clearer discernment of truth, and right, and reason, we must own, on the other, that religion must not confuse our responsibility by putting before us anything which our conscience condemns. We retain enough of our moral nature, however great be our need of help, to be responsible still. The *prohibitions* still uttered by conscience are more imperative, too, than its actual directions. There is

more of discomfort in disregarding the presentiments and warnings of our moral nature than of peace in taking its guidance.

But in speaking of the prohibitions of conscience, it must be remembered that they sometimes are spurious. Objections, for example, to revelation, which take the form of "conscientious" resistance, cannot properly proceed from those who deny in their theories the very existence of absolute right and truth. Neither have they any validity if they are directed against a caricature of our religion, and not the religion itself. That misrepresentations of Christianity are very widely spread, and are popularly identified with it, no thoughtful believer is unaware; nor can he doubt that they are one cause of the increasing alienation of Christendom. Examples alone will show how deep this alienation from this cause alone is become. Men of "education," but uneducated in philosophical thought, and with no knowledge of revelation as the enlargement of our perception of the *à priori*, not unwillingly accept the most illiterate revivalism as Christianity, and all the more readily as it falls in with their own too careless doubts of absolute morality and personal responsibility.

17. So considerable a scientist as Professor Clifford, writing in the *Fortnightly Review* (No. 202, New Series, p. 780), thus describes, and it is right we should know it, "the popular and received 'theology'" (*sic*) "of Christian communities," as he understands it:

"The condition of men departed this life depends ultimately on the will of a being who, a long while ago, cursed all mankind, because one woman disobeyed Him. The curse was no mere symbol of displeasure, but a fixed resolve to keep his victims alive forever, writhing in horrible torments in a place which His Divine foreknowledge had prepared beforehand. In consideration, however, of the death of His son, effected by unknowing agents, He consented to feed with the sweets of His favor such poor wretches as should betray their brethren, and speak sufficiently soft words to the destroyer of their kindred. For the rest, the old curse survives in its power, condemning them for the manifestation of His glory. To the dead, then, if this be the future life, there is left only the choice between shame and suffering. How well and nobly soever a man shall have worked for his fellows, he must end by being the eternal sycophant of a celestial despot, or the eternal victim of a celestial executioner."

This, though expressed with a savage venom for which there is no excuse, is the popular Calvinism, working no doubt in the uneducated masses as a religion imposed by imagined biblical and (with some purgatorial modifications) traditional "authority." But for a scholar and a thinker to call this "Christianity" is disgraceful. If persons of the lower order of faculties will "interpret" the Divine but difficult and imperfectly translated writings of former ages (extracting a cosmogony, a theodicy, and eschatology, adding heathenish traditions, of "expiation" here, and of a physical state hereafter), and call the outcome their "religion," we may not be able to help it; but a man with any nobleness of nature should surely occupy himself with remedying this mingled ignorance, malignity, and selfishness, and not attempt to fasten its ignominy upon "that name which is," at least, "above every name" in the moral history of mankind. The core of this fanaticism lies, however, in its mechanical predestination, which is equivalent to universal materialism, and is easily admitted by the imperfectly-ethical multitude, educated or not. Unhappily, it is found in the systems of many, who veil its coarseness as "mystery."

A more widely known name than Professor Clifford's (and from the same class), we mean Professor Huxley's, will furnish another example of the revolt of conscience against the prevalent Calvinism of the uneducated. Writing in the *Nineteenth Century* (May, 1877, p. 538), he says: "Who shall exaggerate the deadly influence on personal morality of those theologies which have represented the Deity as vainglorious, irritable, and revengeful, as a sort of pedantic drill-sergeant of mankind, to whom no valor, no long-tried loyalty, could atone for the displacement of a button of the uniform, or the misunderstanding of a paragraph of the regulations and instructions?" The "uniform" is here apparently meant for the Creed, and the "regulations and instructions" for the Scriptures, if we rightly interpret the metaphors which Professor Huxley prefers to reasoning. We would remind him that things that look sometimes very small—e.g. Davy's safety-lamp in a mine—may be important, and the non-observance of some "paragraph in the regulations and instructions" may be so serious that no "valor or loyalty" could atone for it. As we are content to be reasoners

on this subject, and not rhetoricians, we may not have caught the whole meaning of the passage. We are not at all anxious to deprive Professor Huxley of the rewards of heroism which he thinks his "drill-master" might deny him (though scoffing is a questionable "heroism" as yet, in a world that listens longer to reason); nor would we refuse to Professor Clifford any praise he may rightly crave for "well and nobly working for his fellows." We agree with them, that such "theologies" as they condemn in these places are abominable. But we know they are not Christian; and any one who supposes they are shows that he has given no time or attention to exact theology. Professor Huxley's "plain rule of not pretending to believe what men have no reason to believe," is good. It is what we have long labored to enforce. (See "The Bible and its Interpreters," etc.) We have also another rule, which we recommend to his notice, and it is this: "When calm reasoning and clear speaking are possible, men need not resort to hinting and mocking."

18. One more illustration. It shall be taken from the writings of one who has come probably into closer relation with the "theologies" complained of by these scientific professors than they ever have, and whose testimony courageously bears in the same direction. The well-known and intelligent Rev. R. W. Dale, a Congregational minister at Birmingham, gives us, in the *Nineteenth Century* (August, 1877, p. 54), an interesting examination of the character of the late Mr. George Dawson; and we have thus a double testimony, all the more valuable for the evident restraint of Mr. Dale, as to the uneducated substitute for Christianity, which is so fatally spread among the populace. Mr. Dawson had been distressed by the unreality of some religious teachers, who shrank from the popular language, and yet half-clung to the ideas, and could not find other words in which to express them. Mr. Dale represents George Dawson as saying to them, "Since the language in which you express your creed does not represent your real thought, the poison of unreality will consume your very life." George Dawson then continues, "The position of many evangelicals has been in some respects ludicrous, in some respects censurable, in some respects pathetic. It was 'ludicrous,' for many of them felt that the language in which they were expressing their deepest convictions

was indefensible ; and yet they had no other language in which the convictions could be expressed." "The phrases represented a theory which they were discovering to be intellectually untenable. Their position was 'censurable.' The right course would have been to say frankly, we have given up the theory which suggested the language about 'total depravity' . . . and 'imputed righteousness,' . . . though we believe still that man cannot live for God except as he receives life from God" (a truism which no one could dispute). But "the position" (he adds) "of the evangelicals was also 'pathetic.' The language they had been wont to use had been created by human speculations ; and to part with the old way of speaking was as if their theological system was fast breaking up."

This is a very unmistakable hint that it really must "break up." It owns that the public form of so-called gospel is not translatable into the language of human reason. Mr. Dale himself is far, however, from explicit : "Frankness," he says, "is unpopular." No alternative to the "phraseology" is suggested, because the hope is in some that the thought may be retained ; though it is that very thought, express it as you may, which is helping to flood educated Europe with infidelity.

The position with which we began (Sec. 4) is now made plain, that the popular substitute for our religion is what cultivated conscience rejects. But we must, in closing this estimate of the "religion" which does not hold its ground in the conscience and reason of Europe, revert also to the Vatican Decree, which would enforce simple obedience to any proclaimed dogma as the remedy for all the resistances of conscience. Its results (like those of rationalism) have been, and most surely must be, a more thorough loss of conscience to the cause of Christ than come of any of the crude specialties referred to, which might at length be unlearned. It expresses itself finally in these unswerving words—words of intended terror and challenge :

"We teach and define the divinely revealed dogma to be that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedrâ*, that is, in the exercise of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, does of his supreme apostolic authority define by the Divine assistance promised him, in the person of the blessed Peter, the doctrine of faith and morals to be held by the whole Church, to have force by that Infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer designed His

Church to be armed in defining faith and morals. And therefore definitions of that kind by the Roman Pontiff, and *not* by the Church's consent, but of themselves alone, are irreformable. If any one presume to contradict this our definition, which God forbid, let him be accursed."

What such solemn words can practically mean, when Dr. Newman and Tessler are allowed to say "the Pope is not infallible as a man, or a theologian, or a priest, or a bishop, or a judge, or a legislator," will puzzle most people. We take them to mean that the Papal Infallibility extends only to objective declarations of Catholic truth: but even so, there is something bewildering in the exclusion of the "consent of the Church," as if formally annulling its conscience. Explain, however, as they may, this unprecedented effort of Rome to assert the principle of "belief on authority," in its baldest form (as the only preservative of public Christianity), the fact remains, on their own fullest confession (Sec. 4), that it has not succeeded.

19. If we were to pause here, the unbelief of this age might possibly persuade itself, with little difficulty, that its triumph was assured, and timid Christians be ready to ask whether the Church had not, after all, been prevailed against by "the gates of Hades." But the fact that the unbelief which advances on us has nothing to offer to conscience, reminds us that we need not despond; and, indeed, any despondency could only arise from our totally misstating to ourselves the problem before us. We have been inquiring into the historical reception of our religion by the conscience of the world as to the external system of civilization, and as to the inner life of rational responsibility. But the supernatural claims of the Gospel of Christ, its Divine vitality in itself, and its essential relation to conscience, remain to the Christian just what they ever are. It is even conceivable that the whole historical condition of Christianity might have been quite other than it has been. In the East it has, indeed, been very different, *ab initio*, from what it is in the West; and it has touched the civilization of the West, in the various kingdoms, in very various ways. There has been a sameness in the supernatural life, not in the historical, which is ever changing, intellectually and socially. Our fullest and most regretful admissions as to the de-Christianizing of European civilization, at present touch not that Divine "revelation" which ever takes

its own lofty current, and mingles with the reason and conscience of the higher souls. That enlarged knowledge of the *à priori* which the Gospel gives is the same wherever it has reached. It is as universal as the ethical sphere into which it moves ; and it is felt and known far beyond the limits of intellectual definition. While we affirm that the outward presentations of formally-expressed Christian truths *should* be in harmony with the reason and conscience of the world, the vast multitudes (who yet are affected in the best way by our religion) may long remain incapable of high rational development. And if we are told that their reception of the Christian *à priori* must needs, as we put it, be very indistinct, we reply that that is the case also in respect of even the simplest ethical beginnings, but such intellectual indistinctness does not at all supersede the real responsibility which all men recognize in one another. False and unintellectual statements as to Christian doctrine no doubt are to be deplored, and are widely mischievous, but they have natural limits. They may hinder the present advancement of the kingdom of truth among men—hence our grave responsibility in respect to them. But that which is true holds its place in the absolute, and in the conscience that has risen and is rising more and more to discern it. The intellectual proof of any truth at first is but for the few : but the consentaneousness to human nature itself is a fact, and so it is the proof for the many ; since the facts of nature open to us gradually the science, both morally and physically.

In examining the intellectual and moral aspect of religious difficulties, it is obvious that we have no right to regard as peculiar to Christianity those which pertain to the entire idea of responsibility. These must be eliminated, or at least can only be mentioned as unremoved by the “revelation” thus far. But this would only mean that our education is gradual as to the *à priori*, as it is in the *à posteriori*. Questions, again, of ontology are common to Christianity with all philosophy, and must be so regarded. And so, too, as to the historical demands sometimes made on us as believers in Christ : they are not to be exaggerated, as if we based Divine revelation on human history, as such. . Such a supposition not only would require a very close continuity of the history, but needs that it should be always

accessible to all who are interested in the religion—that is, all the world.

20. With such limitations, which reason at once suggests, the intelligent believer in Christ is bound to make no doctrinal assertions in His name which affront the conscience of men. He should be prepared to state his doctrinal belief reasonably and morally, or else be silent, and live in that unseen region in which the fountains of moral life are ever found. Since the first problem of Christianity, "What think ye of Christ?" (which involved the whole conception of HIM whom we adore) was adequately settled in the fourth century, reason and conscience have acquiesced. Later on, the speculative thought of Christianity, in all its special crises, has been mainly in the direction of morals and human responsibility. Only thus is the world now deeply stirred. The questions of the sixteenth century were eminently questions of human responsibility. So Luther succeeded against indulgences, because they were immorally sold. All the disputes about grace were disputes about "right and wrong." At the present time no greater service could be rendered to Christianity, externally, than by showing that, in its main doctrines, it is in harmony with those same human perceptions of right and wrong.

The great advancing power of Christianity lay at first in baptism, which demanded moral preparation, and in the sacrament of Christ's body and blood binding men together for "eternal life." The intellectual distinction, or "belief," of the Christian community came from these two rites; which again issued in the "Creeds," and the same faith was educated by the Peschito Scriptures in the East, and by the Itala in the West; supplemented by the care of Origen and Jerome. Having these—the Divine sacraments, creeds, and Scriptures—a threefold supernatural growth, the Church, of course, asserted herself outwardly the "pillar and ground of the truth." But there was also the work of the interior life, which went on in individual moral agents, and constituted everywhere the indestructible essence of Christianity in man. Ages moved on, but with no definition of the canon, or of its inspiration, or of the atonement of Christ, or of the work of God's grace in man's moral nature, or of other and more numerous points, the correct

confession of which men often consider "necessary to salvation." But ordinary inheritors of the old Christianity really do not require theories or definitions as to all these, nor yet minute information. What St. Paul called "Christ in you, the hope of glory," is better known by them (and by the whole line of the saints, we may add) than the Christ of history. And this is no mystic dream; for a celebrated Jewish opponent of our faith, Mr. E. Benamosegh, expresses himself with amazement at what he calls the success of the greatest and boldest of "fictions," the inner "Christ of which St. Paul has persuaded the Christian world for so many ages;" and with which, we are glad to remember, the pious M. Landriot, Bishop of Rochelle, has lately almost startled the Jesuits, in his "*Le Christ de la Tradition.*"

It is not to be denied, however, that the world is now asking for an intellectual and moral hold of the doctrines publicly professed as Christianity, and the explanations or excuses given are too often like "stones to those who ask for bread." It is not every one's work, we grant, but it is some one's, to give the intellectual defence, in the name of reason and conscience, to every doctrine of which we demand belief or even rational tolerance. Of course such defence of the substance of our religion will be conducted at a disadvantage, until thinking is more the fashion. The discouragement even of all attempts at a true ontology, and the prolonged incapacity which dreads "metaphysics," must still be expected, in an age passionately interested only in experiment and discovery, and glowing with a really grand enthusiasm to know the facts of phenomenal being. But intellect and conscience exist, even though their education be neglected. To force men to consider the relation of Christianity to reason and conscience will oblige, at last, a deeper thinking as to conscience and the absolute. But begin where and as we may, this must be done. Men who are stumbling at the doctrines of probation, pardon, expiation, mediation, retribution, must be made to see that they stand well with reason and conscience, as read in the nature of man. Without this, the darkest crisis of human civilization is before us now.

21. There is danger, indeed, of previously descending in

civilization, through sheer vacancy of thought, to a pagan level, unlike the past indeed—for history never repeats itself—but destructive. The Renaissance of the fifteenth century was not less creative than our own, but it was pagan in its character, and found its climax in the French Revolution. A new point of departure is now taken ; but the eighteenth century, or its predecessors, will not be repeated. Conservatism, when it reaches its goal, may see something more akin to the attempt of the old Alexandrian Eleatics—a revision of human relations, in a social system without public Christianity.

At the Christian era, many were the fundamental questions of society which were reopened, and afterwards very gradual settlements were arrived at. There has, since then, been no reverting to the past, with any success. To break now with what we may call, in some sense, the Christian settlement, will cost the world another reopening, whatever that may imply. Some there may be among us who, with the obtuseness of too many reformers, will hope that after some modifications things may go on ordinarily as before. They do not see how much men change when they change a principle.

It must be ours, as Christians, to be ever on the side of reason and conscience—where the saints of past ages, explicitly or implicitly, will be found. We shall show the meagre rationalist that the grounds of Christianity, as of conscious reason, lie in the absolute and eternal ; and we so must meet the syllabus of error and absolutism with a syllabus of moral freedom, reason, and truth.

The conviction that the great truths of our revelation are in conformity with reason and conscience has pervaded the best minds of the whole Church, from Clemens Alexandrinus and Origen, to Jerome and Athanasius, and from them to Damascenus ; and, among our own countrymen not the least, from John Scot Erigena at Oxford, it is said, in the days of our Alfred, to St. Anselm with his *Proslogium* after the Conquest, and Robert Pulleyn, in the “*Concord of Reason and Religion*,” for which he pleaded, as afterwards did the best of the schools, Albertists, Thomists, or Scotists. We are taking no new position. But in challenging, as we unreservedly do, all men of intelligence to a comparison of our doctrines, as Christians, with Reason and

the Natural Conscience, it would be useless to proceed without asking, not only *what kind of Christianity* is true? but what we mean by "responsible" action, and what "truth" it is we aim at?

Whether responsibility implies a freedom of action in a conscious agent? This must be the first inquiry before us; let it not be superficially undertaken. It is here that parties must divide. If there be no alternative action, this is but a kind of mechanical universe after all; and man is morally responsible for nothing. Our challenge is, and can be, for those only who believe in conscience, and are willing to examine what that implies, as well as what revelation is. It is mere hollowness, when men affect to reason without defining the issue that is raised.

WILLIAM J. IRONS.

POSTSCRIPT.—The general applause with which Dr. Newman's elevation to the cardinalate has been greeted is a fact of much significance in the controversy as to receiving "on authority" that which conscience rejects. The Cardinal, on the occasion of acknowledging the Pope's formal communication to him, made a special address to a distinguished party of English friends, "Protestant and Catholic," in which he repeated that all who abstain from submission of conscience to the Pope are without religious "truth," and have nothing but "opinion" to rely on. This "address" also has been described in the public press as admirable. The chorus of approval seems unhappily to seal Cardinal Newman's view (nor will he avoid seeing it), that *truth is here left out of consideration* by his various critics and admirers; for they must mean by it either that they do not care for truth, or that they intend to do as the Cardinal has done, viz., give up the personal struggle for truth and submit formally to the decisions of the papal authority, of which, however, as yet we see no signs.

It seems hard to think that this is Cardinal Newman's "last

word " to us whom he thus finally leaves. Yet there is a plaintive tone in his phrase about "waiting the end" (as he had himself wished to do, it seems, more silently, instead of so very prominently), which almost sounds like a last doubtful adieu. But it is right that he should know how we—some of us at least—feel, on our side, the alternate of "truth or opinion," which he places before us. To us it seems to change the whole basis of human probation to say, that we must not struggle for ourselves to *know* the truth, but simply submit to "an authority" which says it knows it. To us it is equivalent to affirming, that *submission to the Papacy* is the practical outcome of the Incarnation; so that *for this* the Eternal Son of God took our nature on Him, and lived, and died, and rose and ascended, and sent the Spirit of Promise!

While fully conceding the many sacred claims of authority, in departments of alleged truth to which our present conscience makes no demur; and, more than this, acknowledging that an instinct or perception of the true and right (rather than intelligent ascertainments of truths) is all that the great mass of men can possibly have; we yet profoundly feel that without such perception, or against our clear conviction of right, it is entirely destructive of the foundations of human responsibility to surrender to any authority, however august.

And this is what his Eminence himself has previously admitted, in his letter to the Duke of Norfolk above referred to.

W. J. I.

THE ORGAN OF MIND.

THE Brain and its functions have been claimed as their especial province both by Physiologists and Psychologists, and indications have not been wanting of the existence on either side of a sentiment of hostility to the other as intruders or poachers on their domain. A similar feeling of exclusiveness is evident also in the medical profession. Those who are called Alienists or Medical Psychologists more or less covertly assume that mental disorders, or diseases of the brain involving mental derangement, form a distinct department ; and they regard as an encroachment on their legitimate province any interference with mental disease on the part of those who deal with general medicine or ordinary bodily ailments.

It would not be very difficult, if the subject were worth pursuing, to trace the origin of this jealous exclusiveness ; but, however originating, its results have been eminently unsatisfactory as regards real advance in knowledge of the brain and its functions.

For when we consider that all the various manifestations which occupy the attention of the psychologist, alienist, and physiologist have for their substratum a single organ, it is obvious that an exclusive separation of provinces has no justification in the order of things, and that a scientific study of the brain ought to include and correlate every form of manifestation of its activity, whether healthy or morbid.

Life is so short, however, that here, as in most departments of science, specialization is more or less unavoidable. What is to be deprecated is that kind of specialization which ignores all other aspects of a subject but its own limited field.

A division of the study of cerebral functions must, however, always exist, and for the following reasons: The brain is the organ of the mind, and without the brain no mental manifestations are possible in human beings. But the brain is also necessary to the movements of the limbs, etc.; and we see as the results of diseased conditions, convulsions, paralyses, and a host of bodily disturbances which fall under the care of the ordinary physician.

There are, therefore, manifestations of the activity of the brain objectively, and to others; while there are others perceptible only to the individual, or subjectively.

But the facts of consciousness, or subjective manifestations, are as much real facts as objective facts, and the observation of these and the laws of their association ought to rank as a natural science equally with the so-called physical sciences. The two methods, the subjective or psychological, and the objective or physiological, are both necessary to exhaust the study of cerebral activity, and the facts of the one are incapable of being expressed in terms of the other. But the followers of the subjective method have too frequently fallen into the error of regarding the facts of consciousness as independent instead of correlative, and, aided by a fatal facility of language, have constructed systems of mere nominalism, which have tended to perplex and obscure rather than elucidate the phenomena of mind, such alone as we find it in man, viz., mind incorporate or incerebrate.

Though mere practical applicability is not the true criterion of the value of a subject of study, it cannot be denied that until psychology is capable of practical application in the pathology and treatment of a mind diseased, its value is extremely limited, and to be measured mainly by the degree of mental satisfaction on the part of the student.

It is remarkable how little influence psychological speculation has exerted on the interpretation and therapeutics of mental diseases. Many of the most successful medical psychologists have been innocent of school psychology; and the same is true of the great majority of physiologists and physicians. This is to some extent a set-off to the charge of ignorance of physiology which is capable of being made against so many

speculative psychologists. The remedy for this unsatisfactory state of things is for the psychologists and physiologists to join hands. While psychological and physiological analysis should be pushed to the fullest extent, the results must be ultimately combined in a physio-psychological synthesis. Hitherto psychological analysis has far outrun physiological analysis. The explanation of this is not far to seek.

The phenomena of consciousness requiring no laborious investigation beyond the individual, and easily approachable without the aid of scientific instruments of precision such as are required for investigation of the phenomena of the external world, have been as accessible to exploration from the earliest days as they are at present, and it may be questioned whether in psychological analysis the philosophers of the present day have surpassed those of ancient Greece.

How different, on the other hand, as regards physiology. Physiology as a science is not yet a century old. Founded on and altogether dependent on anatomy, physics, and chemistry, its progress has necessarily had to wait on the perfection of scientific instruments and methods; and owing to the complex nature of the phenomena of living beings, the progress of physiology has been far from commensurate with the achievements of any of the sciences on which it is based.

Hence, even though the cultivation of physiology had been pursued with the same ardor as psychology, its progress might have been greater than it is but relatively immeasurably behind a science purely speculative.

Of late years, however, there have been many signs of the abandonment of the exclusively subjective method on the part of psychologists, and a growing tendency to correlate the facts of mind with those of physiology and anatomy. It will be the chief object of this paper to indicate some of the more important results of recent physiological and pathological researches into the functions of the brain and their bearing on psychological questions. To some, however, notwithstanding their admission that the brain is the organ of the mind, inquiries of this kind are looked upon with some disfavor, as attempts to obliterate the important distinctions between mind and matter. But questions as to the intimate nature of mind and matter

are altogether irrelevant and foreign to the subject of inquiry, which is to ascertain the anatomical substrata and conditions of manifestation of the various forms of cerebral activity. We are concerned here merely with phenomena and their laws, and not with metaphysical questions as to the nature of substances.

Apart from mere speculative, or vague inferences, founded on the complicated phenomena of diseased conditions of the brain in man, the experiments of Flourens may be regarded as the first important attempt to define with precision the functions of the various encephalic centres. As regards the cerebral hemispheres in particular, Flourens concluded, from the results of injuries of greater or less extent inflicted on these ganglia, that the hemispheres are the organs exclusively of intelligence, as distinct from those of locomotion and its co-ordination. And, further, that there is no differentiation of function in the hemispheres, but that the brain as a whole, and in each of its parts, provided only a requisite quantity be left uninjured, forms an indivisible substratum of every variety of mental manifestation. The indivisibility of the brain, therefore, and the indivisibility of mind were thus, according to him, mutually established.

There is now no room for doubt that Flourens' views as to the functions of the cerebral hemispheres are utterly erroneous, but the value of the facts on which he based his conclusions remains unshaken. Flourens experimented only on the lower classes and orders of animals, such as frogs, pigeons, etc. Had he restricted his conclusions respecting the functions of the cerebral hemispheres, to the animals on which alone he experimented, it would have been more difficult to shake his position; but extending them without due qualification to the higher animals and to man, he fell into serious error. This is at once rendered apparent by a comparison of the effects of removal of the cerebral hemispheres in different classes and orders of animals. When the cerebral hemispheres are removed in the frog the consequences are not such as to indicate any very striking alteration in the powers or capabilities of the animal. For it can still maintain its normal attitude, and regain it, if turned on its back. It can adapt its movements so as to maintain its balance if the basis of support be

tilted. It will hop away if touched, and even clear obstacles placed in its path. It will swim if thrown in the water, croak if its back is gently stroked, and indeed perform a number of the most complicated and apparently most intelligent actions in response to different external stimuli. The great difference, however, between the mutilated and unmutilated frog consists in this, that while the latter varies its action under apparently the same external conditions, the former acts only in direct response to some form of sensory stimulation. If this is entirely absent, the animal remains forever still on the same spot, and dries up to a mummy. The one possesses internal springs of action, not the immediate result of external impressions; the other acts only in obedience to external stimuli, including under this term peripheral impressions generally, whether arising on the external or internal surface. To this may be added variations in the excitability of the tissues, induced by nutritive changes, conditions of the circulation, and the like.

The main point here insisted on is that removal of the cerebral hemispheres produces little or no effect on the motor powers, or on the power of adaptive reaction to sensory impressions.

What is true of the frog is, *mutatis mutandis*, applicable to fishes deprived of their cerebral hemispheres.

In the case of pigeons, also, the phenomena are essentially similar. The animal can stand, walk if pushed, fly when thrown into the air; reacts to loud sounds, bright light, pungent odors, cutaneous stimulation; but when the external stimulation ceases, it subsides into a state of profound repose or indifference, exhibits no instincts of self-preservation, and, unless artificially fed, perishes, without the slightest manifestation of suffering or effort to save itself. Here also we observe the defect of spontaneity, as in the frog, while the motor powers and capabilities of reaction to various external stimuli remain practically unimpaired. When we pass to mammals, however, we observe effects somewhat different from those seen in the classes of fishes, reptiles, and birds; and the differences become more and more pronounced as we advance from the lowly rodent up to monkeys and man.

The dangers to life from lesions or complete removal of the

cerebral hemispheres also increase as we rise in the animal scale. Hence the direct results are more difficult to arrive at, and we are obliged to vary our methods in order to obtain in mammals the equivalents of complete removal of the hemispheres, so easily carried out on the lower classes of animals.

In rabbits, the destruction of the cerebral hemispheres causes one very marked divergence from the phenomena previously described in the case of frogs, fishes, and pigeons. Whereas the motor powers in these animals did not appear appreciably affected, here they are impaired to a very marked extent, and more especially in the fore-limbs. These are so enfeebled that the animal can scarcely support itself on them, and sprawls on its abdominal surface. The hind limbs, however, are affected to a much less extent. The animal also reacts less readily in accordance with external stimuli; for though it can spring if its foot be pinched, there is a headlong impulsiveness and helplessness in its reactions, very unlike the well-balanced and apparently purposive adaptations of the brainless frog or pigeon. Some improvement may, however, occur if the animal does not speedily succumb to the secondary effects of the operation.

In cats and dogs, destruction of the cerebral hemispheres in their entirety causes such extensive shock and prostration, that it is difficult to estimate the exact influence, directly attributable to the absence of the cerebral hemispheres, on the motor powers and capabilities of reaction. But when we compare the results of comparatively restricted lesions of the hemispheres in these animals with those consequent on similar lesions of the brain in rodents, we observe that the degree of paralysis is much more marked, and affects both limbs on the opposite side—though the fore-limbs are again those in which this is most clearly manifest. A considerable improvement may however occur, in so far as the use of the limbs for mere purposes of locomotion is concerned, though this is never so complete as in the rodent.

In the monkey, again, paralysis of the limbs from lesions of the hemispheres is still more complete and permanent. Here, again, the paralysis is most marked in respect to all movements which involve the greatest independence and complexity, as contradistinguished from those concerned merely in associated

and bilateral actions, such as locomotion, equilibration, and the like.

In man, the annihilation of the functions of the cerebral hemispheres, such as we observe as the result of certain diseases, not only abolishes consciousness, and all the powers of mind, but so paralyzes all the muscular powers that only the vegetative functions remain, and the reactions to external stimuli are comprised mainly in mere simple reflex response to cutaneous stimulation.

The degree of paralysis in consequence of partial lesions of the hemispheres varies with the complexity and independence of the movement, and as in the lower animals, it is most marked in the fore-limb, or arm and hand. It is, however, much more complete, and is likewise permanent in duration if the part has been completely destroyed.

The above comparison of the effects of destruction or lesions of the cerebral hemispheres in different classes and orders of animals is sufficient to demonstrate the danger of generalizing universally as to the functions of the cerebral hemispheres from experiments or observations on one class or one order in a class. A wider comparison of instances, instead of supporting Flourens' views that the cerebral hemispheres are the organs of subjective as distinct from objective functions, serves rather to show how intimately the two are bound up together. We might indeed, having regard merely to the influence of the cerebral hemispheres on the motor powers, draw the conclusion that the intellectual capacity is proportional to the degree and duration of the paralysis resulting from lesions of the hemispheres.

Or, reading the facts in another way, we may say that the lower we descend the animal scale, the more complete and independent is the organization in the centres situated below the cerebral hemispheres, of those modes of activity variously described as reflex, automatic, instinctive, or responsive, including all the sensory and motor adjustments concerned in locomotion, equilibration, and emotional expression.

I do not propose to discuss here the mechanism of these so-called responsive reactions. It will be enough to state that they have their centres in the spinal cord, medulla oblongata, cerebellum, mesencephale, and basal ganglia.

It has been much debated whether these manifestations involve sensation or subjectivity. But the dispute mainly turns on the meaning we attach to sensation. If by sensation we mean not merely physical impressions on the organs of sense, but the consciousness of such impressions, further defining consciousness as the personal consciousness or consciousness of the individual, then we have reasons, founded mainly on the phenomena of disease in man, for asserting that sensation, as above defined, is a function of the cerebral hemispheres, and that, therefore, the responsive actions of the lower centres do not involve subjectivity. But if with Mr. Lewes we suppose that all neural manifestations connote sentience, then we must necessarily admit that these responsive actions do involve sensibility and sentience. But as the only form of subjectivity of which we can have any proof or disproof is personal consciousness, and as there is ample pathological evidence to show that this is possible only through the cerebral hemispheres, it seems to me preferable to avoid speaking of the functions of the spinal cord and lower centres in terms which are generally understood to apply only to the subjectivity of the individual. Otherwise there is no reason for restricting sentience to neural action only, for we might with equal propriety speak of the sentience and subjectivity of a white blood corpuscle or a vegetable cell. Those who prefer to do so may, but their terms should be free from ambiguity.

But to return to the cerebral hemispheres. I have already pointed out the error of generalizing from one class of animals to others, without due qualification. Another source of fallacy in researches into the functions of the brain has arisen from the neglect of due discrimination between the objective and subjective manifestations of cerebral activity. Thus it has been considered as a valid argument against the localization of cerebral functions generally, that, notwithstanding the existence of extensive lesions in one or other hemisphere, there has been no impairment of intelligence or loss of any mental faculty. This is taken as a proof that the parts not diseased have been sufficient to carry on the functions of those which have been lost, in accordance with Flourens' views of the indivisibility of the cerebral functions.

Admitting, for purposes of argument merely, that the facts are as thus stated, they only show that the mental powers may survive extensive lesions in one hemisphere. But when we consider that the same absence of mental impairment has been observed even when a *whole* hemisphere has been destroyed by disease, the conclusion is obvious that for purposes of mind one cerebral hemisphere is sufficient. In order, therefore, to disprove localization of function it is necessary to show that bilateral lesions are likewise unattended with signs of mental impairment. But of this there is not a shadow of evidence. Nor do I, from my own observation and study of the phenomena of cerebral disease, admit that even unilateral lesions are without effect on the mental powers. It is, however, very difficult to gauge the extent of damage, or to specify its exact nature; but, in popular and expressive phrase, the individual who has suffered from cerebral lesion is never again "the man he was." But whatever be the exact nature of the deficiency, it is not necessarily a loss of any particular faculty; and we may regard it as established that all the fundamental operations of mind, sensation, emotion, volition, and intellect are possible with one hemisphere only. Subject to certain qualifications, presently to be mentioned, we may assert therefore that as an organ of mind the cerebrum is double. And, indeed, if we look away from the organic or vegetative functions of the organism, and consider merely the animal structures and their functions—the organs of sense and the organs of motion—we see that they are distinctly bilateral, and more or less independent; so that each individual may be considered, in this respect, as *two*, more or less intimately joined together. Each half of the body being thus looked upon as a more or less complete and independent individual, and possessing all the organs of sensory experience and volitional action, the opposite cerebral hemisphere which is the organ of its subjectivity may likewise be regarded as equally complete in itself.

This, however, is only theoretically true, for practically the two hemispheres are very intimately associated together, and one hemisphere gets perhaps more than its own share in the work of the copartnership.

This, however, does not affect the potentiality of each

hemisphere as a complete organ of subjective life. While, therefore, mental operations in their entirety are possible through only one hemisphere, it is obvious (assuming for the time being the complete cross relations of the hemispheres) that the mind can only be affected by, or react upon, the side which it represents ; and that therefore the other must be in a state of inactivity or paralysis. Though the brain as an organ of subjectivity is thus potentially double, in its objective aspects it is composed of two halves, each acting only on the opposite side of the body. Destruction of one hemisphere therefore paralyzes the opposite side.

Hence all theories respecting the question of localization of cerebral functions require to observe this difference between the objective and subjective results of cerebral lesions.

We may now proceed to the consideration of the question whether different functions can be allotted to different parts of the cerebral hemispheres. It has already been mentioned that there are numerous cases on record of diseases and injuries of the brain, which have not been accompanied with paralysis either of sensation or motion. But, on the other hand, these cases are few in comparison with those in which paralysis has been observed. The question is whether there is any constant relation between the situation and character of the lesions which are associated with paralysis, either of sensation or motion, and those which have no such results.

It might be supposed that this question should not have remained so long undecided, considering the great frequency of cerebral diseases. But the phenomena of cerebral disease involve so many factors, that the problem is an exceedingly complicated one, and not easily solved by mere comparison of instances, apart from experimental methods. For, inasmuch as the functions of organs may be seriously deranged, without such structural changes as can be discovered by our most advanced methods of research, there was always room for the hypothesis that the effects observed were not directly due to the lesion as such, but were dependent on some indirect perturbation of the functions of the organ as a whole.

The discovery of new methods, however, leads to new discoveries, and gives shape and form to the apparent chaos of

former experiences. In our investigations as to the functions of the peripheral nerves we have been able not merely to observe the effects of section, but also the effects of excitation of the nerves whose functions we seek to determine.

A similar precision has been introduced into cerebral physiology by the discovery of the electric excitability of the cerebral hemispheres. By combining the method of functional excitation with that of destructive lesion we are enabled to define and localize the individual relations of different parts of the cerebral hemispheres as compared with those of the hemispheres as a whole. And, by so doing, we succeed in eliminating, to a large extent at least, the direct from the indirect effects of cerebral disease, which mere clinical observation was unable to cope with successfully.

It has been established that there are centres or areas in the cerebral cortex more or less distinctly circumscribed, stimulation of which by the electric current gives rise to uniform and definite movements of the limbs, head, facial and lingual muscles, mainly on the opposite side of the body. These movements are not mere muscular contractions of an irregular character, but are definite combinations, corresponding in all particulars with the purposive actions ordinarily manifested in the volitional activities of the animal, and varying accordingly in different animals. It would lead me too far into technical detail to describe the exact position of these areas or centres; but there is a remarkable topographical homology in their function in different animals. When these regions are destroyed, in whole or in part, paralysis of motion or hemiplegia ensues on the opposite side, or of that movement only of which the centre, as indicated by the electrical stimulation, is destroyed. As has already been mentioned, the degree of paralysis and its duration vary much in different animals in accordance with the extent of independent organization in the centres situated below the cortex. The paralysis is strictly limited to voluntary motion, as distinct from automatic, responsive, and reflex action. In man the paralysis of motion is so great that even automatic or instinctive movements, though possible and frequently observed, are very much restricted. But we often see a patient who has facial paralysis from cerebral disease, and

unable to move one side of his face voluntarily, under the influence of emotion move both sides of his face equally well. And an individual who cannot voluntarily move his hand may do so under the influence of emotion, or in the instinctive effort at yawning, stretching, and the like.

But, however much the automatic movements may be affected by cortical disease, we should regard paralysis of voluntary motion only, or movements involving conscious discrimination, as the real and essential feature of lesions of the hemispheres. Even the lower animals, which apparently completely recover voluntary motion, after the motor centres of the hemispheres have been destroyed, do so only in so far as the movements have become automatic or organized, such as the movements of locomotion. But though a dog's paw is not permanently paralyzed as an organ of locomotion by lesions of the hemisphere, it remains permanently paralyzed for all those purposes in which it is employed as a hand. Therefore a dog, which has been capable of making unusual, and, for a dog, unnatural movements with its paw, as the result of education, loses all this power when its cortical motor centres have been destroyed. These are not hypotheses, but facts which have been established by actual experiment (Goltz). It is again to be remarked in reference to the degree in which the various motor powers suffer, that those which are most complex and independent suffer most, like the hand; while those which are more or less bilaterally associated suffer least. Hence the movements of the legs and the bilateral movements of the facial muscles are still possible on both sides, more or less through the agency of one hemisphere. This is more especially true of the movements of the tongue, which are almost completely bilaterally organized in each hemisphere. Hence destruction of the lingual centre in one hemisphere does not paralyze the lingual movements. To effect this requires destruction of the lingual centre in both hemispheres. These differences are accounted for by the intimate connection subsisting between the motor tracts and nuclei of the bilaterally associated movements, in the spinal cord and lower centres. Such are the main facts concerning what is termed the motor region of the hemisphere.

Behind the motor area, and, anatomically speaking, in the parieto-temporal region of the hemisphere, there are more or less circumscribed centres, stimulation of which by the electric current gives rise to certain reactions, which resemble those consequent on stimulation of the various organs of sense. Some difference of opinion still exists with reference to the exact localization of special sensory areas. But apart from the question of the exact position of these areas, which is unimportant in reference to the subject immediately before us, it has been established in the lower animals that there are distinct cortical regions specially in relation with the various organs of sense.

In the case of the sensory centres, however, it is an exceedingly important fact that they are in relation, more or less completely, with both sides of the body. Hence unilateral destruction of the sight-centre does not cause complete or permanent blindness of the opposite side, and in process of time the effects at first visible pass away. Therefore, to produce total loss of any special sense, it is necessary to destroy the sensory centres completely on both sides. In man this principle of bilateral representation would seem to prevail, if the facts of clinical medicine can be thoroughly trusted, even to a greater extent than in the lower animals; and hence, owing to the fact that we rarely get lesions accurately corresponding on both sides in man, clinical observers, while admitting the facts of experimental physiology, reserve their judgment as to the exact position of the sensory centres in the human brain. For my own part, however, I do not entertain the slightest doubt that evidence will be forthcoming, establishing, as in the case of the motor centres, the exact homological correspondence of the sensory centres in the monkey and man. The motor and sensory regions thus defined, constitute the greater portion of the cerebral hemispheres in the lower mammalia. In the monkey and man they occupy the middle portion of the hemisphere on account of the special development in them of the frontal and occipital lobes anteriorly and posteriorly respectively. These lobes are merely rudimentary in the lower mammals. Respecting the physiological signification of the frontal and occipital lobes we are still in a state of uncertainty, inasmuch as they

neither give positive outward reactions to electrical stimulation, nor does their removal affect the faculties of motion or special sense. This is abundantly proved also by the phenomena of disease in man, and many of the cases on record of cerebral lesions without evident symptoms have been instances of disease in these regions.

Though the physiological signification of these regions is thus only negatively indicated, anatomical considerations justify us in considering the occipital lobes as specially related to the sensory tracts, and the frontal lobes as related to the motor tracts of the brain.

The hemisphere would therefore seem to be composed of a motor or anterior half and a sensory or posterior half ; and thus we have in the brain a repetition of the arrangement which prevails in the spinal cord and lower ganglia and tracts.

And indeed, apart from physiological and anatomical demonstration, it would be difficult to conceive of what the brain, even as an organ of mind, could be composed, but of sensory and motor elements and their combinations. For these exhaust all our capabilities of receptivity, action, and reaction on our surroundings.

Hence we may say that mental phenomena are the subjective aspect of the functions of sensory and motor substrata, and that in the last analysis mental phenomena, however complex, should be reducible to correlation with the activity of certain simple motor and sensory elements, their accompaniments and combinations.

It is necessary, however, in reference to the question of the influence of mind on body, and *vice versa*, to have a clear conception of what is meant by sensory and motor centres or substrata.

Sensory and motor nerves and centres are frequently spoken of as structures essentially distinct and possessing properties peculiar to themselves. There is, however, no anatomical difference between a sensory and motor nerve or cell ; nor is there any physiological difference whereby one nerve is capable of transmitting impulses or generating energy only in one determinate direction. The properties of the nerves and the nerve-cells are the same everywhere, and we cannot with strict accuracy speak

of nerve-centres or nerves as sensory or motor, except in reference to the whole apparatus of which they form merely a part, though an integral one. A motor nerve, therefore, cannot be understood apart from the muscle which it excites, nor can a sensory nerve be understood apart from the centre which undergoes what are termed sensory modifications.

We have no reason to suppose that there exist chemical or other differences in the constitution of special sensory nerves. The specific function depends on specific collocations and arrangements of structures whose properties are identical.

As every thing which forms a part of our subjectivity must be represented in the cerebral hemispheres, and as this extends to most of our tissues and organs, we may consider the brain as the subjective projection of the organism. Cerebral states projected outwardly on the organs with which in reality it is integrally connected, as part of a complex apparatus, include our volitions, bodily expressions of thoughts and emotions, and all the various manifestations of what is termed the influence of the mind on the body. Viewed in this light, it will appear that it is not merely the brain which thinks, but the brain in connection with the whole sensory and motor apparatus of the organism, and that therefore our thoughts may thrill to the tips of our fingers. That thoughts and feelings do not always manifest themselves outwardly, does not constitute any valid objection to this mode of representing the facts. For it is not necessary that every central agitation or wave should extend to the periphery in such a way as to be obviously perceptible. But it does to a greater extent than is commonly supposed, even in ordinary circumstances, while in others, classed as more or less morbid on account of their rarity, the peripheral manifestation of the central wave or commotion is pronounced. The problem of the influence of the mind on the body, and *vice versa*, is simplified when we consider the brain merely a part of the corporeal apparatus, and that its subjective and objective manifestations are correlated ultimate facts, susceptible of no further simplification. And we may regard the brain, whether in its objective or subjective manifestation, as subject to the same laws which regulate the functions of nerves and nerve-centres in general.

The brain being the organ of consciousness it is necessary that impressions made on the organs of sense should reach or affect the cerebral hemispheres before sensation, or a consciousness of the impression, can be experienced. This is amply demonstrated by the facts of disease in man. These are the best evidence in a question of this kind, for it is by no means always easy to discriminate in the lower animals between mere sensory reaction and true sensation. But we know from human pathology that when the sensory tracts which lead to the cortex are interrupted, sensation is abolished more or less completely on the opposite side of the body, though all the centres and tracts situated below the cortical grey matter are uninjured. And that these sensory tracts are distributed to individually differentiated areas or centres in the cortex is proved experimentally by the fact that localized lesions may abolish sensory perception as regards one class of impressions, while sensory perception as regards others remains intact. Thus, by lesions of what is termed the visual centre, we may produce blindness, while the senses of hearing, touch, taste, and smell continue unimpaired.

We conclude, therefore, that each centre is the organ of sensation or consciousness of impressions made on the peripheral organ of sense with which it is connected. Hence the organs of sensation are as numerous as the sense organs. We do not know what is the exact nature of the molecular changes in the peripheral sensory organs, nerves, and centres which constitute the physical basis of a sensation, but we have arrived at many important generalizations as to the rate of transmission and relations between the intensity of the impression and the intensity of the sensation. Though some molecular change in the cortical gray matter is an indispensable condition of sensation, it does not follow, as has been very erroneously and illogically argued from this proposition, that all modifications or molecular changes in the cortical substance are correlated with modifications of consciousness. And indeed on other grounds we have reasons for believing that very important changes may occur which do not rise into consciousness. Therefore, though all consciousness implies cerebral activity, all cerebral activity does not imply consciousness.

It is obvious, however, that the mere fact of consciousness of impressions of the moment made on the organs of sense with which these centres are connected does not exhaust the functions which they subserve. It is necessary for perception that there should be a registration of sensory experiences by which alone it is possible for present impressions to be compared as to identity or difference with former ones. Arguments will be adduced to show that this registration takes place in the cortical centres, and that in the cells of these centres modifications are produced which are the representatives or equivalents of sensory impressions. These are capable of re-excitation or revivification in consequence of which the original impression rises up again in idea. These organic modifications of the cortical cells are the physical basis of memory and ideation, and constitute the very foundation of all knowledge and thought. We do not yet know what are the physical characters of the molecular changes corresponding to the memory and revival of former sensory impressions, but there is reason to believe that a careful study of the microscopical characters of the wonderful network of cells and processes of the cortical gray matter will yet lead to valuable knowledge on this head. By careful comparison of the structure of the cortex in fœtuses when as yet the brain is a *tabula rasa*, with the cortex in healthy and morbid conditions, we may reasonably hope to arrive at much that is at present unknown or mere matter of speculation.

It is a question whether what has been at one time clear in consciousness is ever forgotten. This entirely depends on the permanency of the modifications of the cortical cells which form the basis of these facts of consciousness. That they may remain long after they have ceased to be revivable under ordinary conditions of cerebral activity, is proved by some forms of disease in which what has long ceased to form part of the ordinary working material of thought may again be brought to light.

There is a tendency, however, to effacement and probably, therefore, ultimate disappearance, unless the materials acquired are more or less constantly used in ordinary ideation. We find that those who have become blind at an early age cease after a time to be able to form visual ideas; and so with the sense

of hearing. This period corresponds pretty closely with the progress of atrophic changes in the respective sensory nerves. And in accordance with what has been stated, that the more the materials enter into ordinary ideation the longer they are likely to endure, it has been observed as a curious fact in regard to amputated limbs that the memory of the hand remains longer than that of the arm. Thus a man who has had his arm amputated at the shoulder may still continue to remember it, and apparently to feel in it. But there is a tendency for the hand to apparently approximate the shoulder, so that the individual comes to feel his hand immediately connected with the trunk. The explanation of this curious fact is, that the memory of impressions derived from the hand is much more vivid and important in ideation than those of the arm, so that they remain after the arm has been entirely forgotten, and hence the intervening distance between the hand and point of amputation is lost. From this it appears that in order to keep alive or revivable past experiences, it is necessary that there should be a more or less continuous incoming of similar ones ; tending to show that the process of re-presentation of the past is directly associated with immediate presentation. On this re-presentation depends the perception of identity or difference and the relations of coexistence and sequence. Of the simple sensory elements of ideation and their relations, stored up in their respective centres and all organically connected together, there is every conceivable permutation and combination ; but however complex the combination may be, it never transcends the original elements. And if these have never been stored up in the cerebral centres, as in cases of absence of the organs of sense from birth, or if the centres have been destroyed, ideation is correspondingly limited. A man blind or deaf from birth can never have ideas of sight or sound, either in the waking state or in dreams ; and the same is true of those cases in which the visual or auditory centres of the cortex have been completely destroyed. In the one case special sensory experience has never been gained ; in the other it has been irrevocably blotted out.

Before applying these considerations on the functions of the sensory centres to the actual facts of disease, it will be well to

turn our attention to the motor centres. As has already been stated, there are cortical motor centres for the individual and combined muscular movements employed in volitional activity.

These centres may be stimulated to action by sensations and ideas of all kinds, but their activity is always accompanied by certain sensations conditioned by the act of muscular contraction. This association is frequently spoken of as a special sense—the muscular sense. Theoretically there is no great objection to this mode of representing the facts. But it should be understood that this depends on the associated physiological activity of centres which are anatomically distinct from each other. The motor centres as such are distinct from those which perceive and register the sensations of muscular action. We may, in fact, in certain pathological conditions have the power of muscular action without its usual accompaniment of the sense of muscular contraction.

As the sensory centres are the seat of sensation and sensory memory and ideation, so the motor centres are the origin of motor stimulation and the organic basis of motor memory and motor ideation. Motor experience forms no less an important part of our mental function than sensory experience, and the motor factor enters as largely into ideation as the sensory.

There are few facts of our experience or ideation which do not contain motor as well as sensory elements, and in that which gives to man his special predominance over all other animals, viz., articulate speech and its equivalents, the motor element is the most conspicuous and important.

This point is worthy of particular attention.

It is in fact the pathology of speech which has furnished the connecting link between the physiological and psychological aspects of the cerebral functions.

Cases are almost of daily occurrence in medical practice in which the following phenomena are observed: An individual formerly in good health is suddenly deprived of the power of expressing his thoughts or desires in articulate speech. His mental faculties are otherwise unaffected, and he can see, hear, taste, touch, and smell, and comprehend intelligently what is said to him. Usually also there is greater or less degree of paralysis of the right side of the face, and, it may be, of the right side

generally. But he can move his tongue and make the movements of articulation and deglutition without difficulty. He knows and can signify by gestures what is the use of an object, but he cannot name it, even when the name is pronounced in his hearing. He, however, knows the right name from the wrong one when it is uttered among others.

Usually also he is unable to write, even though he can move his fingers. Generally it may be said, that all utterances which have not become automatic, like interjections, "yes," "no," etc., and all writing which has not also become mechanical, like a signing one's name, are impossible. Cases differ in particulars, but it is unnecessary for my present purpose to describe all the variations which are observable. The above may be taken as typical phenomena. It has now been demonstrated by an irresistible body of evidence, and accepted almost universally, that these phenomena depend on lesion of a part of the cerebral hemisphere—usually the left—which physiological experiment has proved to be the motor centre for the muscles concerned in articulation. Here, then, is the interesting problem. What is the relation between the faculty of speech and the motor centres of articulation, and why is speech lost though the power of articulation is not paralyzed? Why should aphasia be associated with lesion of the *left* hemisphere particularly?

Two of these questions have already been answered by implication. That there is no paralysis of articulation by unilateral lesion of the centres of articulation, is explained by the fact that each centre has bilateral influence, so that in the absence of one, the other is sufficient. Hence the right motor centre remaining intact, the mere articulatory movements are still capable of being effected. That loss of speech should specially result from lesion of the left hemisphere is an illustration or proof of the unsymmetrical distribution of function in the two hemispheres. Though we have two brains theoretically, yet practically we find that for certain functions we use one hemisphere more than the other. And the rule seems to be that we use that hemisphere for speech which goes with the hand most commonly employed in volitional action. And as most people are right-handed, and therefore left-brained, so it

is with regard to speech. The rule, however, is not absolute, and there are rare cases where the speech centre is in the right hemisphere. But it is a significant fact that in some at least of the recorded cases of loss of speech from lesion of the right hemisphere the patients have been left-handed. This unequal distribution of function in the two hemispheres seems to hold also, as will be shown presently, in reference to sensory perception and ideation, more particularly in connection with language.

The connection between speech and the motor centres of articulation is not difficult to understand when we consider that words are the mere articulatory symbols of ideas. The memory of words is the memory of acts of articulation, and the reproduction of words in connection with sensory impressions and ideas is merely the revival of certain motor acts of articulation. And as the acts of articulation are mainly performed by the left centre, so this is the organic basis of the memory and reproduction of the same motor acts. Hence aphasia or loss of speech when this centre is destroyed. But though the ideas connected with certain articulatory acts cannot revive these motor acts when the centre is destroyed, yet the ideas continue potentially, and can be called up, to a certain extent at least, by the sounds accompanying these acts of articulation. Hence an aphasic individual connects certain sounds with certain ideas, and thus understands the word uttered, though he cannot repeat it. But comprehension of language is very defective, and in proportion to the complication and abstract nature of the propositions. Simple words—substantives—are readily understood, but a proposition involving abstract terms is unintelligible. This is due to the fact that we by practice come to use words not so much as mere symbols of ideas, but almost independently of the ideas they connote. Hence abstract thought and trains of reasoning, necessitating the algebraical symbols of ideas, are beyond the powers of the aphasic individual.

Consecutive thought is to a large extent carried on by internal speech which tends to express itself externally by the corresponding movements of the mouth and tongue. These are actually carried out in some individuals, in whom thought amounts to whispering or even talking; while in most there is a slight initiation of the movement with the tongue, as will be

readily perceived by any one who pays minute attention to his own thinking processes.

As speech precedes writing, and as the setting down of manual equivalents of articulatory processes, in the form of written symbols, involves a more or less continuous co-operation of the articulatory centres, the destruction of these centres impairs or completely abolishes the expression of ideas in writing, in proportion to the extent of dependence of the one on the other.

Something must, however, be ascribed to the impairment of the motor centres of the hand used in writing. For, as these are generally affected in the brain which specially causes aphasia, the motor memory and ideation of the right hand are also directly impaired. And, indeed, we can conceive cases in which speech may be entirely manual, the movements symbolic of ideas being of the hand instead of the tongue. In such cases aphasia would be the result of lesion of the manual centres instead of the articulatory. But besides aphasia or actual speechlessness from cerebral lesions, we not unfrequently meet with examples of another class of cases, in which, though speech is possible, words convey no meaning when spoken, though written language is understood; and others again in which, though spoken language is understood, written language formerly understood is unintelligible, and visible things in general fail to call up names.

In the former the cause is lesion of the auditory centre; and in the instances recorded the lesion has been found in the auditory centre of the left hemisphere. The essential phenomenon is the abolition of auditory ideation in connection with language. There is no real loss of hearing or deafness on one side or the other; a fact explicable by the bilateral relation of each auditory centre already discussed. But auditory ideation in relation to speech thus seems to be specially the function of the left auditory centre, *i.e.*, on the same side as the speech centre.

Auditory ideation, however, is not entirely abolished in these cases, as the right auditory centre still remains. If this also were destroyed, there would be loss of auditory sensation as well as of ideation.

Similarly, the inability to connect written or visible sym-

bols with words is due to lesion of the visual centre. Here again the lesion has been found especially in the left hemisphere. The individual sees, but what he sees he cannot *say*. What has been said of the relations of the auditory centres is applicable—*mutatis mutandis*—to the visual centres. But though here the individual cannot associate what he sees with language, he can do so with what he hears. Similarly, in the former case, though sounds do not call up names, things seen, written symbols, are capable of being understood and connected with words. These facts are practical demonstrations of the functions we have ascribed to the sensory centres. They are not merely the substrata of their respective sensations, but registers in which they are stored up and capable again of representation in connection with their respective associations, whether these be sensory or motor, simple or complex.

The association between the auditory and visual centres and those of articulation is specially effected and organized in the left hemisphere as a rule. Hence lesions of these centres in the left hemisphere cause word-deafness or word-blindness respectively.

Whereas, when the centres of articulation are destroyed, words cannot be reproduced in connection with any form of sensory impression or ideation whatever.

The differences depend on whether the motor or sensory factor of the sensori-motor cohesion is destroyed.

These facts also show that the cerebral hemispheres are not symmetrical as regards their psychical functions, and that it is not a matter of indifference, *quâ* mind, which hemisphere is diseased. There does not, however, seem to be any reason beyond heredity and education for this difference between the hemispheres; and good reasons might be assigned for regarding this specialization as on the whole an advantageous one.

With the sensory and motor regions of the brain alone, sensation, ideation, and volitional action are possible. This is shown by the intelligent actions of those animals which practically have no frontal or occipital lobes, as well as by the results of experimental removal of these lobes in the monkey. But we find that intelligence increases in proportion to the development of the frontal and occipital lobes, particularly of the

former. In man the frontal lobes are developed to a relatively greater extent than the occipital lobes, when we compare the human and simian brains. The exact physiological relations of these regions are, however, not as yet clearly made out, though data are not wanting for more or less profitable speculation.

My own opinion, founded on experimental and other considerations, is that the occipital lobes are in special relation with the viscera, and as such are important substrata of our feelings and emotional states. Under ordinary circumstances we are not conscious of our viscera as such ; but in morbid states we are distinctly so, and can localize the feeling more or less accurately. But though discrimination is at a minimum in the nerves and centres of the viscera, feeling is at a maximum. The state of our viscera has a very important massive influence on our psychical tone, and conversely our feelings powerfully influence our organic functions.

The particular character of the emotion, however, will depend on the quality of the sensation or idea with which it is associated. Impressions on sensory nerves do not affect consciousness merely as facts, but have certain qualities which express themselves subjectively as feelings.

But as we are yet ignorant of the nature of the molecular changes in nerves and nerve-centres which are the basis of sensation, we are of course unable to determine what particular change coincides with the pleasurable or painful quality of the sensation. We are justified, however, in believing that those forms of stimulation are most pleasurable which harmonize most with the conditions of healthy and continuous activity of nerves and their organic connections, and those most painful which are the reverse. And, in fact, we do find that the most painful forms of stimulation are those which are just short of annihilating function altogether.

Each form of sensation has therefore its own quality, and as the quality is based on the molecular changes in the sensory apparatus, the fact of sensation and its quality must be given in essentially the same parts. Hence the sensory centres must be the centres also of the feelings which accompany the activity of the special senses.

And as the properties of the cerebral tissues are the same

as those of nerves and nerve-centres in general, we may conclude that the revival of a sensation in idea must possess essentially the same quality and produce the same corporeal manifestation as would be caused by immediate or direct stimulation of the same sensory apparatus. Hence the natural outward expression of the emotion or feeling, as contradistinguished from acquired or ingrafted forms of emotional expression, will be the natural reflex expression of direct sensory stimulation. And this is borne out to a very large extent by examination of the modes of emotional expression. It is possible to induce the feeling by affecting the corresponding bodily expression, and the maintenance of this tends to exclude the opposite feeling. So much are the feelings and their corporeal expression linked together, that we may succeed in arriving at the exact seat of the feeling from a careful study of the parts involved in its outward manifestation. When, however, we consider how numerous may be the combinations of the primary elements of sensation and their qualities, we can see that feelings may become as complex as the harmonies which are capable of being constructed out of a very limited number of fundamental musical notes. To analyze the various feelings and emotions into their primary elements in correlation with their physical substrata is worthy of the most searching philosophical analysis, and will prove of incalculable advantage to a practical science of mind.

Though the regions of the brain included in the parieto-temporal and occipital lobes suffice for the manifestation of sensory and motor ideation and their accompaniments, they do not appear sufficient for the exercise of that power which consists in concentration of thought and that control of the current of ideation which forms the basis of the highest intellectual operations. We are capable not merely of ideation and of association of ideas, according to certain well-known laws, but of attentive ideation, by which consciousness is kept concentrated on certain phenomena to the exclusion of others. This power is variously developed in different individuals, but on it depends the profundity and productiveness of thought, and the discovery of relations between ideas which are not manifest on the surface. By the power of attention we intensify the consciousness of certain ideas and impressions, and

actually diminish the excitability of the brain to others, as has been proved by direct experimental research. These facts justify the assumption that, in addition to the centres of sensory and motor ideation, there are others still higher which can exercise a restraining influence on them, and modify their excitability and activity. An idea in the mind which we desire to retain and follow out in all its relations and associations is kept there by the restraining or inhibitory influence which through these higher centres we can exert upon the other centres and channels through which it may tend to diffuse itself. This seems to be the essential basis of the faculty of attention. The active exercise of attention is felt as an effort; and viewing it as an act of inhibition, we are justified by the analogy of physiological inhibition in associating it with motor centres. We have many reasons for regarding the frontal lobes as the substrata of these controlling influences. Anatomically they are specially related to the motor tracts of the brain, though they have no objective motor functions, and may be removed without causing objective motor paralysis. But their removal in monkeys, and disease or non-development in man, as is especially seen in idiocy, coincide with a condition of mental degradation, characterized mainly by a purposeless incoherence and vacillation and total inability to pursue any definite or connected train of thought. Beyond these general indications, however, it must be confessed that much has yet to be learnt respecting the exact relations of the frontal lobes and their different parts to the other cerebral centres. It would be easy to speculate, but speculation in cerebral physiology should be the handmaid only of experimental and clinical research. In the prosecution of these we must, therefore, wait for further light.

But if the conclusions at which we have arrived respecting the elementary substrata of mental phenomena are justified by the various anatomical, physiological, and clinical facts which have been adduced, it is evident that even in the apparently most simple mental operations the whole hemisphere must be engaged, some parts perhaps more than others, but all more or less. Hence the physiological and psychological absurdity of looking upon the brain as a collection of organs each complete in its own sphere.

The sum of all our states of consciousness actual and potential in the cerebral cortex constitutes our personality or ego. As this is constantly receiving new accretions and undergoing novel combinations, it is incorrect to say that it retains its identity. There can be no identity when our personality changes every moment. The term personal continuity would be more in accordance with the actual facts. Though our surroundings and our states of consciousness are ever varying, we are conscious through all of a direct continuity from the first recollection to the last presentation. This is possible only through the continuous registration of our conscious experience in the cerebral cortex, and the revival of the past in connection with present states of consciousness. We can never be conscious of the whole of our personality at any one moment, but only of a continuous succession reaching back to the earliest period in our memory.

Should the orderly succession and continuity be interrupted by morbid states of the brain, so that present states do not appear in proper relations with the past, delusions as to identity will be the result; one of the most common manifestations of disordered cerebral action, as well as of dreaming.

As it is through the brain that we live subjectively both in the past and present, and live more or less in the past when we live in the present, and as our subjective life past and present is indissolubly associated with states of our corporeal organs, it follows that the pleasurable or painful quality of an act or state of consciousness will depend not merely on its harmony or the reverse with present physical or psychical conditions alone, but also with our whole personality or cerebral representation of the individual. The satisfaction of our ideal wants or desires is as much a necessity of healthy subjectivity as the satisfaction of our corporeal wants, and indeed the same physical conditions underlie both.

The want of food will produce bodily distress, and the non-satisfaction of a mental desire, or mental hunger, will produce mental distress, and in proportion to the intensity of the desire will the non-gratification be mentally painful.

And just as certain external conditions are incompatible with physiological harmony and healthy nutrition, so certain

actions and states of consciousness disturb the psychical harmony. In the one case there is physical distress and in the other psychical pain, manifested according to the nature of the act or idea and its relations, as grief, sorrow, remorse, etc.

But these feelings vary with the individual. For as the system may gradually accommodate itself to influences which in the first instance caused great irritation and disturbance, so the personality may gradually accommodate itself to actions and ideas which were at first accompanied with intense mental pain. But in all cases, whether the cause of pain be psychical or physical, its corporeal manifestations are essentially the same. *Mens sana* and *corpus sanum* are indeed, if looked at in all their relations, essentially correlative terms.

It is a remarkable fact that those diseases of the brain which produce manifest objective effects, as paralysis, are as a rule less injurious to mental health, or, in other words, are less frequently associated with insanity or mental derangement, than those forms of degeneration of the cerebral tissues and blood-vessels which do not altogether annihilate functional activity. It is in most instances better that a certain portion of the brain should be altogether destroyed, than that it should, partially diseased, remain in gear with the rest of the cerebral machinery, and like an impure source pollute the whole current of ideation and feeling.

Given such an active source of disturbance, the subjective manifestations which it induces are, to the individual, more real than all other phenomena, and the delusion will resist the most convincing logic. It may be silenced for the time, or expelled by an argument, as with a fork, *tamen usque recurrit*.

How desirable, from a practical point of view, it would be for us physicians to be able to lay our finger on the primary source of mental disturbances, scarcely requires to be insisted on; but this would be only insignificant in comparison with the other important issues which depend on an accurate knowledge of the brain and its functions.

DAVID FERRIER.

MUSIC AND WORSHIP.

THE first and noblest use of music was said of old to be the offering of praise to the Immortals; the next the purifying, regulating, and harmonizing of the soul. Worthy of Plutarch, to whom it has been attributed, this utterance is surpassed by that in the Book of Job, upon the creation: "The morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy;" for thus is seen not only the natural and pleasing but also the divinely ordered union of music and worship.

Spiritual song and angelic and divine life are revealed close to our mundane being, so that notwithstanding our material environments, God is not very far from each one of us. Around this dim and disordered world, music is sounding from the stars, and the accompanying voices are those of the sons of God.

Not matter merely moved by soulless laws and forces, but circumambient soul-life is disclosed, realm on realm of spiritual being, all centering in God. Not a spiritually void and lifeless universe is this; not a reign of mere law with motion in fixed orbits, and exact, remorseless forces; not a series of mathematically inevitable processes alone, but a world with attendant spiritual life, a universe replete with expressive music, rousing God's sentient sons to responsive songs of praise. "The heavens declare the glory of God" in that "their sound is gone out into all lands and their speech to the ends of the world."

First heard at the laying of the corner stone of the creation, the song has sounded on, until, at Christ's advent, clouds open and mortal ears are quickened to hear a multitude of the heav-

only host, with the announcing angel, now celebrating the laying of the Everlasting Corner-stone, the birthday of the re-creation. It is a sublime thought, a universe vocal with the praise of God, from planets and stars and systems well as as from the answering voices of the sons of God.

This assertion of the connection of music and worship in the on-going of the universe is apparently much older than the most ancient literature. Sages among Chaldeans, Babylonians, and Egyptians, whose systems of music, worship, and astronomy were the result of traditions and of long contemplation, re-affirm the ancient idea that the motions of all heavenly bodies are regulated by musical intervals, and that thus they make everlasting harmony. The music of the "ever-during" spheres is no poetic figment. Originally Asiatic, it passed later with many principles of knowledge and civilization by way of Phœnicia and Egypt into Greece, and became part of the ancient thought and worship of Europe.

The doctrine of the music of the spheres was accepted, according to Plutarch, by all the philosophers; "for the universe," say they, "was framed and constituted by its author on the principle of music." Why then does not the ear perceive the resounding song of the morning stars? Because, was the reply of classic philosophers, of the vastness of the concussion of the air, or because of the distance of the stars or the delicacy of their music, for receiving which the ears of mortals are not adapted. As in many instances, ancient philosophers, ignorant of the Baconian method and of our latest experimental processes, here reach conclusions resembling those of Helmholtz and Tyndall and the inductions of modern science. According to the Greek Archytas, our ears are like narrow-necked phials into which, if you pour too rapidly, nothing will come. The relation between slow vibrations or movements and a low note or between rapid movement and high pitch was anciently understood. Nicomachus, treating of the scale, gives the lowest note to Saturn, because of his apparently slow movement and greater distance from the sun, while the highest note (as with the shortest string of the lyre) was ascribed to the moon as nearest to the earth and apparently fleet of movement. The telescope annihilates distance; the microscope reveals marvels

of beauty and utility all about us. If there is a medium, however ethereal, sufficient for waves of light, must not motion through it produce sound waves or vibrations of sound? As there is a medium for the transmission of light from distant stars, is it not probable, nay, in the light of modern discovery certain, that there is a sufficient medium for the transmission of sound? The fact that the ear is dull of hearing is no proof that by inventions already suggested, or by the nobler powers of the spiritual body, the soul may not become conscious of glorious sound which as yet mortal ear hath not heard nor mortal heart conceived. The Egyptians ascribed twenty-eight notes to the universe, that being the number of notes in the scale ; while in ancient treatises, mathematics and astronomy are so mingled with statements as to music that he must study them who would possess all the treasures of thought and speech concerning melody and harmony and symphony. Perhaps it was the lack of such research that led De Quincey to wonder that upon a subject so sublime as music there had been so few worthy utterances. Without such research, how marvellously has Shakespeare caught and reproduced this ancient thought in the familiar but exquisite lines :

“ Look, how the floor of Heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold ;
There's not the smallest orb which thou beholdest
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubims.
Such harmony is in immortal souls ;
But whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close us in, we cannot hear it.”

Pythagoras held that the glorious sounds were audible only to the gods ; and Milton but re-echoes a sentiment seemingly as old as human thought, when he exclaims of—

“ Yonder starry spheres
Most regular when most irregular they seem ;
That in their motions, harmony divine
So smooths her charming tones, that God's own ear
Listens delighted.”

Music and worship then were divinely married in the temple of the universe. From the first Scripture utterances concerning music, to the last, the lesson is the same. In the Apocalypse,

worship by means of adoring music is the attitude of the saintly soul delivered from the burden of the flesh ; not feeling solely ; for although as music is the idealized language of the emotions, some of its votaries have asserted that feeling is that into which all else fades in the future life ; yet there is clearly narrated the continuance and enlargement of thought as well. "Thou art worthy !" is the acclaim of the redeemed, "for thou hast ransomed us out of every kingdom and people." History is revived while emotion and adoring song accompany the most elevated use of knowledge, and express the loftiest achievements of thought. Thus as earth's history opens with celestial music when morning stars together hymn its advent and sons of God responsive shout their joy, it is also revealed that it will close with a doxology : "And I saw as it were a sea of glass mingled with fire, and them that had gotten the victory ; and they sang the song of Moses and of the Lamb. After these things, I heard a great voice of much people in heaven saying, Alleluia ! And a voice came out of the throne saying, Praise our God !"

From the earliest times, instrumental and vocal music have advanced hand in hand. If to the hymn of creation, planetary systems sounded their accompaniment, a union not less significant is seen in the whole musical history of our race between instrumental and vocal music. If the voice and vocal music were among the earliest means of expressing emotion and passion, so at the dawn of the arts, where Tubal Cain was an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron, there stands his brother Jubal as "the father of all such as handle the harp and organ." Stringed and wind instruments are thus designated ; for while the word organ is used from earliest times in the Bible, the instrument intended (as where the Psalmist exclaims, "Praise him on the strings and pipes" !) is a tube of wood or metal, and later several pipes extending to an octave or two joined together to be held in the hands and played by fingers and lips.

Although the Egyptians had a limited but suggestive form of keyboard, and although their hydraulic organ, admired by the Greeks, was quite like a Yankee notion in its clever construction and use of water in regulating the pressure of air from

the bellows, yet it was of very small capacity. The primitive organ is seen in representations of the heathen god Pan ; and Raphael has portrayed St. Cecilia, "inventress of the vocal frame," holding the pandean pipes as the Christian patroness of music.

As the earliest musical progress was in the Orient and in Egypt, the Jews may have brought instruments and a knowledge of their use from Egyptian bondage to be consecrated to the worship of Jehovah. The Te Deum, which celebrated their triumphant passage of the Red Sea, was "sung by Moses and the children of Israel ;" and while the last notes of lofty praise were yet sounding, Miriam the Prophetess took a timbrel in her hand, and all the women went out after her with timbrels and with dances, and Miriam answered them, "Sing ye to the Lord, for he hath triumphed gloriously !" Resounding from camp and tabernacle during their wanderings, songs of praise were to find their highest form, when, after the promised land was gained, the temple was reared, to be the ever memorable abode of worship and music. As the simple organ of Jubal may be called the father of the modern magnificent church organ, so some lineal descendant of his harp soothed the madness of Saul and was a vehicle of the inspiration of David, while the ideal which its primitive form dimly foreshadowed is found now in that most popular instrument of our time which with reverberating strings and brilliant keyboard adorns almost every American home.

For the temple's service, the inspired psalms and their instrumental accompaniments were, it would seem, alike composed under divine guidance. Members of the tribe of Levi were selected by the Psalmist to praise Jehovah upon instruments, and a great musical college was thus founded. It consisted of four thousand musicians, of whom nearly three hundred were "cunning" performers, capable of educating the remainder. They were divided into bands of from one hundred and fifty to one hundred and seventy performers, each band being under the leadership of a competent conductor. Asaph and other leaders, it appears from the statements in the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of First Chronicles, marked the time by sounding the cymbals ; the singers going before, we are else-

where told, and these performers upon instruments, following, in the midst, were damsels playing upon the timbrels. So from the sixty-eighth Psalm and other passages, we infer that both sexes participated and that voices of singing-men and singing-women, accompanied with many hundreds of instruments, made up the mighty chorus of the temple service. Stored in its treasury, it is said, were various trumpets to the number of two hundred thousand, with some fifty thousand harps, psalteries, and other like instruments. So musical were the people that joyous songs were heard at weddings and festivals ; and wailing dirges sobbed in responsive sorrow over the loved remains of the departed.

The art had its highest culture and use in connection with worship. David, welcomed with jubilant songs after his early and memorable victory, became the inspired master of sacred compositions so cherished that the chants which he composed and dedicated to his singers and minstrels, sung in the temple and on the field of battle, resounded from age to age even down to the foundation of the second temple, and again at the signal victory of the Maccabean Army, and not improbably when " Great David's greater Son " fulfilled all righteousness by frequenting the temple's courts. Perhaps its traces linger yet in synagogues and in Christian chants and ancient hymns.

To the attempts to prove that a musical service of worship is divinely ordered because of the divine ordering of the temple service, it is often replied that the temple and its service have passed away.

Synagogues exist now as of old, and although a musical service with chant and hymn and anthem seems inseparably associated with Hebrew worship, yet it is agreed that the service of the synagogue was not of divine appointment.

But music and worship need for their union no such formal argument or literal sanction ; that union exists in the nature of things, has its recognition throughout the Scriptures, is the burden of prophecies of the Apocalypse, is felt in the depths of the soul and proclaimed in the highest efforts of art, and is to be realized in heaven.

It is not necessary to discuss here the character of the musical instruments known to the ancients and especially to

the Hebrews. But with a body of four thousand trained musicians, with a collection at the temple of tens of thousands of instruments, with singing-men and singing-women and "cunning" leaders and inspired composers, teachers, and directors, and a song-loving people, let who can believe that their music was enriched by no *harmony*, and consisted only of melody or notes in unison.

Of Egypt, whence they came out a musical people, Plato tells us in his Laws that the same sacred hymns were sung for thousands of years. Egyptian harps had several octaves of strings. Drop such an instrument accidentally, and inevitably the sounds would suggest concords.

God gives human voices in different parts, treble, alto, tenor, bass, calling for harmony. The wind sighing in an æolian harp or sweeping through a forest tells of more than melody. On every hand in nature from the first, elements of harmony proclaim their presence to the sensitive musical ear. And if the ear and brain be now more highly developed, the difference is one of degree, not of kind. While the ancients had, it is safe to assert, no such melody as the aria, "I know that my Redeemer liveth," and no such harmony as that of the Oratorio of the Messiah, they had, we may believe, the rudiments of both. I have always found it difficult to credit the statements reiterated by so many musical authorities, that the ancients possessed melody but not harmony. As Ritter traces clearly modern harmony to its source, so Chappell, to whom I am herein also indebted, is convincing as to the existence of ancient harmony. From Egypt, where ancient instruments and musicians are so marvellously portrayed, he gives many interesting instances and illustrations. Harps and pipes with many notes, and so held and played, it is said, as of necessity to make harmony; the hydraulic organ with keyboard; the evident cultivation of music for worship and social life; the representation of fourteen performers making up the vocal and instrumental establishment of an Egyptian gentleman of the older times; the curious caricatures in which Rameses the king, as a noble lion, leads with the lyre, while one courtier figures as a clumsy crocodile playing a sort of guitar, another as a seemingly deceitful and slinking animal playing the double-

pipes, and the fourth member of the quartette, awkward and lumbering, as a donkey with enormous ears, performs subserviently bass to the king's treble—from this and much more, Chappell reaches his conclusion. In answer to the question, Did the ancients practise harmony? he says, "Undoubtedly they did, even at the time of the building of the pyramids; it is not a matter of doubt, but a mathematical certainty."

Recalling passages in the Greek and Latin classics, there is much to strengthen the conclusion. The declaration of Aristotle in his thirty-ninth Book of Problems is explicit: "All consonances are more pleasing than simple sounds; the sweetest is the octave." Such figures of speech as the following suggest an acquaintance with the intricacies of harmony as well as with the clear movement of melody. In the second book of his Republic, Cicero writes: "For as in strings or pipes, so in vocal music, a certain consonance is to be maintained out of different sounds, which, if changed or made discrepant, educated ears cannot endure; and as this consonance, arising from the control of different voices, is yet proved to be concordant and agreeing, so, out of the highest, the lowest, the middle, and the intermediate orders of men, as in sounds, the state becomes of accord through the controlled relation and by the agreement of dissimilar ranks; and that which in music is by musicians called harmony, the same is concord in a state." Seneca thus alludes to the mental influence of music in portions of his eighty-fourth and eighty-eighth Epistle: "When the array of singers has filled up every passage between the seats in the amphitheatre, when the audience part is girt round by trumpeters, and all kinds of pipes and other instruments have sounded in concert from the stage, out of these differing sounds is harmony produced. Thus would I have it with our minds." "You teach how voices high and low make harmony together, how concord may arise from strings of varying sounds; teach rather how my mind may be in concord with itself and my thoughts be far from discord."

Music and worship of old were associated not only with the melody and harmony of voices and of instruments, but also with the movement of human forms and with the light of sacrificial fires and feasts with pyrotechnical display; so that, should

we have the color symphonies and motion symphonies, which art prophets promise, it would still be true that there is nothing new under the sun.

The definitions of musical terms among the Greeks, like their musical scales and their use of music, differ widely from ours. The orator, as we all know, took his note, "*tibiis dextris et sinistris*," from the musician, and intoned rather than spoke his oration. You may hear something of the same sort among preachers in Wales, or in the preaching tone into which, despite his disapprobation of music, a good Friend preacher often falls. Symphony was the expression for concords, while harmony included both theory and practice, both poetry and its musical accompaniment. Melody with the Greeks indicated inflections or undulations of the voice, whether in speech or rhythm; music included the science of numbers, mathematics, astronomy, and so much of education as to be called the cyclopedia of knowledge. The young Greek was taught music that he might learn also obedience, since in melody, harmony or symphony, all is disordered and displeasing unless the laws ordained of God are faithfully followed. Plato held that the influence of music in the education of youths was as a gale bearing from all sides health from blessed regions and wafting them on imperceptibly from boyhood into a likeness and love and sympathy with all fair and right reason; since more than all things does it penetrate into the innermost recesses of the soul, bearing along with it the love and perception of beauty and order and rhythm in whatever forms presented. Some years since, one of our greatest American scholars, in commenting upon Plato's conceptions, spoke of the importance of the early cultivation of music, since it is not only the most perfect of the arts but the most spiritual of the sciences, belonging to the three grand departments of knowledge, pervading alike the physical, the metaphysical, and the mathematical, and being in close alliance with the believing spirit; so that the neglect of music as an art and as a science is, he exclaimed, "one of the most serious defects in our modern system of early education; and we do verily believe that if the time occupied with puerile Peter Parley treatises on natural theology was devoted to Haydn and Mozart, it would furnish to our children a far more effect-

ual security against infidelity ; for whatever aids in the cultivation of a believing heart precludes those objections from ever obtaining an effectual lodgment in the soul." Among the ancients, music found alike its earliest and its noblest use, as we have intimated in connection with worship. The severe chant, the more melodious hymns or prayers, and the dirges and choral songs, all were sacred to religion. According to Plutarch, the art at first subserved only religious purposes. "Theatres were unknown, and music consisted of those sacred strains which were employed in the temple as a means of paying adoration to the Supreme Being." Anacharsis, the younger, in his "Travels in Greece," in the fourth century before the Christian era, states of the sacred hymns sung by choruses of youths, "that they are so harmonious, and so well seconded by the art of the poet, as frequently to draw tears from the greater part of the audience."

But the music of the past is one of the lost arts.

The downfall of the Roman Empire, the deluge of barbaric invasion, would have whelmed it utterly but for the Christian Church. From ancient shrines and synagogues, from the temple, and, as we love to think, supremely from the "hallel" or paschal hymn sung by the Redeemer with his disciples at the last supper, primitive Christianity caught up and perpetuated the faint and fading sounds of sacred melody. Pliny in his well-known letters speaks of the hymns which Christians sang to Christ as God. Eusebius writes that "there was one common consent in chanting forth the praises of God. The performance of the music was exact, the rites of the church were decent and majestic, and there was a place appointed for those who sang psalms, for youths and virgins, old men and young."

At Milan, toward the close of the fourth century, rose the school of Ambrose. He collated or composed hymns and tunes, and fixed, it is supposed, the four diatonic scales called the Ambrosian ecclesiastical keys. His friend Augustine, after hearing the music in his church, exclaimed, "The voices flowed in at my ears ; truth was distilled into my heart, and the emotions of piety overflowed in sweet tears of joy." The close of the sixth century was made musically memorable from

the more extended and enduring efforts of Gregory the Great, who added four more scales and his Gregorian chant, laboring ardently for musical education and progress. Schools in which music was taught were rapidly established in all parts of western Christendom. The biographer of Gregory declares that of all unpromising pupils, the Gauls and Germans were the worst ; " their rough voices roaring like thunder are not capable of soft modulations ; for their throats, hardened by drink, cannot execute with flexibility what a tender melody requires ; their tones are like the rumbling of a baggage wagon jolting down a mountain ; instead of touching the hearts of the hearers, they only revolt them."

Charlemagne, as the eighth century was closing, rose to become the great patron of music ; but still the singing was in unison, and simple melody was the substance of the music cultivated. True, Isidore of Seville, the friend of Gregory the Great, had written of harmony as the unison of simultaneous sounds, and gives rules for the use of harmony. Lines for musical notation were gradually introduced, instruments were improved, and at the opening of the tenth century harmony was brought into use by the good Flemish monk Hucbald.

But we may not follow further in this paper the growth, from its sacred cradle upward, of modern music, which is peculiarly the child of the Church. There was an early protest against it from a non-Protestant source. Pope John XXII., at Avignon, in the year 1332, writes as deeply displeased with those who " are captivated with the new notes and new measures of the disciples of the new school, and would rather have their ears tickled with semibreves and minims and such frivolous inventions than hear the ancient ecclesiastical chant." The Great Reformer later on was of a different mind, declaring that by the Gospel, art should not be banished as some zealots desired, for all arts and principally music should be seen in the service of Him who gave and created them ; since, as His greatest gift, music sets the soul at rest and places it in a most happy mood, thus proving that " the demon who creates such sad sorrows and ceaseless torments retires as fast before music as before divinity." " It is beneficial," continues Luther, " to keep youth in the continual practice of this art. A school-

master must know how to sing, otherwise I do not respect him." With a musical education and a musical ear, he felt that not only church doctrine, discipline, and morals, but that church music also needed a reformation. His opinion of the old church music as rendered by drowsy monks and choristers found vent in the characteristic explosion, that it was "a diabolical ass's bray." He was untiringly devoted to translating and collating suitable hymns and tunes. Words and music of his own composition have come down to us, such as the noble hymn, "Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott." He demanded that the words "be worthily expressed, not babbled or drawled, and that the masses join in the singing and pay devout attention." What a sententious summary for congregational singing! Luther was also right in attaching great importance to the words and thoughts of hymns, and also to the popular character of the music. For the Reformation as a popular movement demanded that its hymns and tunes, like its translation of the Bible, should be so rendered as to be "understood of the people."

The chorale was a combination both of the old Gregorian and Ambrosian tone and also secular melody and harmony. By degrees the sacred song of the Protestant churches takes on its distinctive and popular character; simple secular tunes as well as old hymns tunes being often adopted or adapted. A great step forward was made by assigning to the people the treble, as the more distinct and leading part, while other voices, until the organ came into general use, sang the chords or harmony.

Luther had a hand in the preparation and wrote the preface of the first Protestant hymnal, put forth in 1524 by John Walter. Lucas Osiander rendered great service in 1586 by his book of "fifty spiritual songs and psalms set in counterpoint for four voices in such wise that a Christian congregation may join in the singing throughout." "I know well that composers are in the habit of assigning the chorale to the tenor, but if this be done, the chorale or tune cannot be distinguished from among the other parts, the common people cannot tell what psalm it is nor join in the singing. For this reason I have placed the chorale in the treble, so that it shall be recognized distinctly, and every lay member can sing too." In England and Scotland, in the reign of Edward the Sixth, metrical

psalms and hymns are found in general use. Brought in with the Reformation wave from Germany, they bore with them German chorales and other grand old tunes, vastly superior to much of our modern sentimental or machine-made ecclesiastical music. This power of music over the hearts of the people has made it, in all great popular religious movements, the prevailing element in both public and social or family worship. At the Reformation, the singing of psalms, begun in one church in London, "did quickly spread itself not only through the city, but sometimes at Paul's Cross there will be six thousand people singing together." Genius, whether that of a great composer or of common sense—which Guizot has called the genius of humanity—catching and making vocal the aspirations of the popular heart, gives us "volk" song; and the best chorales, in clear and simple tones of regular cadence and movement but of tender and melting or of rousing and inspiring power, may well be called Christian "folk" song. The word *chorale*, a modification of the word *chorus*, suggests in its Greek derivation a vast volume of simple measured melody grandly accompanied. Should the science of music become so advanced that musical phrases, like the root forms of words, will disclose history, ties of lineage perhaps may then be traced between the Greek chorus and the German chorale, or between the song of bondsmen in Egypt and the weird hymns of bondsmen in America. Who has heard the resounding plantation chorus, "Tell ole Pharaoh, let my people go!" without a mysterious feeling that the refrain was much older than our late "patriarchal institution?" Many such tunes, if rude in form, have the rare merit of naturalness, and are full of power and pathos. The defect which strikes the ear is often that of unskilled rendering. The vociferous plantation bawler who, when checked, uttered the answer, "The good book says, *Hollard* be Thy name," but expressed the apparent sense of duty of many estimable and misguided persons as to congregational singing.

The lack of a musical ear, like color-blindness, is a great deprivation. Early musical education will, however, in great measure supply the defect, and instruction in singing in many parts of the Union has been the invariable associate of the day-school and the church. In the earliest days of colonial history,

it is said that the "sounding isles of the dim woods rang with songs of lofty cheer," in which the Pilgrim fathers found utterance for faith and hope, undaunted by difficulties. The first publication of the New England free press was a psalm book; and upon the solid basis of Sternhold Hopkins how many an enduring musical edifice has been reared, until the Oratorio Society has taken the place of the winter singing-school, and the great organ of Boston's Music Hall that of the old-time tuning-fork, by which the hymns in the meeting-house were "pitched" in more senses than one. The popularity from Maine to India of music such as that of the Moody and Sankey hymns is, I believe, susceptible, did space here permit, of an explanation which, without sacrificing principles of art, yet justifies the use of whatever will bring the Gospel in music home to those to whom better music is as yet unintelligible. Is not simple congregational singing one of the greatest of the undeveloped powers of Christendom? Sir Henry Cole not long since made a valuable suggestion to his vicar, somewhat as follows: "Doctor, the people are very fond of music, and I think if you were to invite them to come to the church once a week and allow them to take part, giving them as much simple music as they can well sing and understand, you will find they will come. Let all the seats be free; let there be a sermon, but not to exceed ten minutes; let them have five or six hymns or psalms to good old tunes; and if the hymns be accompanied by instruments properly administered, I am sure it will produce a good effect." "So," says Sir Henry, "we had silver trumpets, two trombones, and two kettledrums, and, I declare, if they were the last words I had to speak, I never heard anything more solemn. My friend, the doctor, was the one who disturbed the regulations by preaching seventeen minutes instead of ten. The church was crowded, they sang their hymns, and each week the crowd increased. I met a member of Parliament at the church, and he said to me, "I have been shedding tears all the service; I never heard anything more affecting." The offertory paid the expenses. If you wish to take the people away from public houses and perhaps fatally uncomfortable homes, you might do it by a very simple process in your church, if you tried it."

Imagine such frequent services of song in Washington with members of Congress in tears ! Surely to a much more general extent than at present, those responsible in great measure for the prosperity and righteousness of the nation need to humble themselves before God in his house, that they may receive divine illumination.

Why is not the Christendom of to-day guiding the art of the world, crowding canvas with noble productions, producing works of sculpture surpassing the master-pieces of heathen art, erecting cloud-piercing spires and long-drawn aisles and vast cathedrals, gathering into noble monumental and useful structures the scattered wealth of our needlessly multiplied churches and of our feeble or questionable church architecture ? Because, without Christian unity, the heart of Christendom languishes, being "divided against itself."

Piled up in the principal cemeteries of our cities, you may find monuments of marble and carved stone and metal unartistically designed and wasting a wealth of material which, were we Christians united, would have built cathedrals all over the land and endowed colleges and memorial hospitals and schools, dwarfing the architectural achievements of the past. For we have added resources of engineering and construction and material, just as the multitude of modern musical instruments opens up a new world, as it were, for the progress of music ; while the inspiration of the artist would not be lacking, were Christendom united. For this, time is not ripe, and we, like our forefathers, are not worthy to see that day ; we might be tempted to do as they did who used the strength of unity for purposes of religious oppression and persecution. Better perish Christian unity and united effort and all triumph of sacred art, than that liberty should again be lost ! The world must wait until music, teaching us harmony despite diversity, and liberty as consistent with law, can pave the way for the restoration of Christian unity. Then, united patronage and wealth and the true Christian "time-spirit" will make the Church, mistress of all the arts as she has been already the nursing mother of music, which is supremely the art of the nineteenth century and of the future. Music and worship cannot be divorced nor left to live but coldly together, without injury alike to art and to religion.

Winterfeld dates the decline of sacred art from the time when it "contracted that fatal taint" which degrades it to the service of sensual pleasure.

If music and its sister arts owe much to the fostering and ennobling influence of the Christian Church, it is equally true that, in view of popular religious movements, and of exalted services of worship, the Church also owes a debt to music which it should endeavor to repay by every means in its power. Let the Church then seek to advance musical culture and to encourage the production and execution of the greatest musical works. Since as a nation we are neither Anglo-Saxon nor Oriental nor Occidental exclusively, since all peoples gather here to become one under one government, the church music of the future cannot be exclusively of any one of the old schools, but must combine their excellences, and grow from its own soil as they did from theirs. Even now, but in the infancy of its Christian civilization, for this nation in this broad land and in the illimitable future, what triumphs may not sacred art achieve !

To pursue the subject of music and worship further would lead us far beyond our limits into the great tone-world of modern life and thought. The marvellous progress of modern music presents one of the most brilliant and fascinating chapters of art history. The achievements in the range and compass and multiplication of instruments and in the knowledge and application of the laws of sound form a grand and startling chapter in the revelations of science. While treating the relations of the fine arts, and especially of music as an art, to Christianity, we have yet another topic worthy of a separate paper. Of Christianity it has been well said that while no art is more fit emblem of her work, none can more efficiently aid that work in the present day than music. What, then, ought to be done, and done at once, for music in its relations to worship? As conducive to true progress in this matter, a principle should be enforced which is not new but which has been greatly neglected—that church music should express the worthiest worship which we can render to God, and should tend to the highest edification of the worshipper. In proposing practical measures, the suggestion most commonly made is, to

abolish the quartette choir. Not the number of performers but the spirit of display often seen in quartette and similarly constituted choirs, and the unseemly music generally chosen, are the objectionable things. But the quartette choir has been often deserving of the highest praise for the painstaking and devout fidelity of its members. At worst, it is but one of the steps from a defective past to a better future. That which we deprecate is the tendency to exhibit individual talent rather than to exalt worship. The effort and the outlay seem oftenest directed, not to the edification of the hearer, but simply to the performance of elaborate music, generally unskillfully composed and defectively rendered. I have heard at the close of a sermon on the last judgment the beautiful hymn, "Nearer, my God, to Thee," in which the whole congregation could have joined and thus have deepened the impression of the sermon, rendered as a solo to a flippant secular melody.

By the adoption of a good hymnal giving both words and music ; by frequently using a few of the noblest hymns till they become beloved and familiar as household words ; by leading the melody clearly and distinctly either by a trumpet or by the human voice ; by making the Sunday-school in some measure and in the best sense of the term a Christian singing-school, congregational singing can be developed. Psalm or hymn singing is a mode of worship in which Christians of every name can unite. We lament the lack of Christian unity. There is ample room for an effort towards its restoration on this broad basis of co-operation. Choir unions or great gatherings for culture in the art of spiritual song are almost everywhere practicable. And Christian unity would thus secure incidental influences of no slight value ; for while in melody we have the succession of single sounds in obedience to law even as individuals and churches follow some particular rule or use, so in harmony we have the blending of all in one as in the universal ever-living Church of Christ, in which, without the surrender of individuality, all may harmonize in love to one another and in filial obedience to the perfect will of God. Thus music in worship conduces to Christian unity.

Yet other Christian uses of music as connected with worship, together with practical suggestions as to musical training and

the development of correct musical taste, are too numerous and varied to be mentioned even with a passing word. I am convinced that much more rapid and satisfactory progress would be secured if, taking a lesson from what has been well done by others at home and abroad, we should give systematic attention to church music, not only in our schools and colleges, but especially in our theological seminaries, so that the clergyman should enter upon his professional work furnished not only with the authority but with the educated ability to criticise with judgment and to improve by his own intelligent influence the music of his cure. With God's blessing here as elsewhere, true progress depends upon man's effort, for man is the crown of things, and at his best estate he is the embodiment of harmony, as Dryden so eloquently sang :

“ From harmony, from heavenly harmony,
This universal frame began.
When nature underneath a heap
Of jarring atoms lay,
And could not heave her head,
The tuneful voice was heard from high,
Arise ! ye more than dead.
Then cold and hot and moist and dry
In order to their stations leap
And Music's power obey.
From harmony, from heavenly harmony,
This universal frame began :
From harmony to harmony
Through all the compass of the notes it ran,
The diapason closing full in Man.”

E. N. POTTER.

CHRIST AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY.

THE question we intend to investigate is this, What relation does the Christian religion bear to our belief in a future state? It may seem a very late stage of the day to propose such a subject of inquiry. The Christian pulpit has long since relegated the doctrine of immortality to the outer court of the tabernacle. It has long since been regarded as one of those first principles which evangelical experience should leave behind, as a truth whose foundations are laid in the law of nature, which every Christian should assume, but which no Christian should waste time in contemplating. To those who think thus, the field of inquiry which stretches before us must indeed appear a profitless and a meaningless journey. If in Christian experience we have already stood on the transfiguration mount, why should we go back to climb the mountain slope? If in the full participation of the new life we have entered the holy of holies, why should we return to pace the vestibule of the temple? If in the height of spiritual development we have comprehended a mystery which passes natural knowledge, why should we revert to a puzzle of our spiritual infancy and to those mean and beggarly elements which are fitted to nourish only the opening mind?

And yet, if we are not greatly mistaken, all this reasoning is founded upon a vast delusion. Is this doctrine of immortality indeed the rightful property of the incipient mind? does it in truth belong to the outer court of the tabernacle? If we open the Pauline epistles we shall be arrested by a very different view of the question. If there ever was a man who allowed full scope to the laws of nature, that man was Paul; so intense is

his respect for natural theology that he considers the God of nature to be to the heathen an anticipation of the God of revelation. But when Paul comes to the doctrine of immortality his language is slightly changed; it is no longer the invisible revealed by the visible, but something which the unseen and eternal alone can declare. The same man who is willing to admit an analogy between Christianity and Hellenism claims for the Christian faith two points of absolute origination: the one is the doctrine of the cross, the other the light of immortality. It is still more remarkable, and it is still less to be denied that in the mind of the Gentile apostle these two are one. "Our Saviour Jesus Christ, who has abolished death and brought *life* and immortality to light." To him immortality is revealed just in proportion as life is revealed. Life, sacrificial life, the life of the cross, of abnegation, of unselfish devotion, is the organ by which he sees it, the organ by which he would have every man see it. To be rooted and grounded in love is to comprehend with all saints; to have the charity that beareth all things is to see face to face; to be endued with the Christian spirit is to be possessed of a higher sense, penetrating where eye hath not seen, where ear hath not heard, where imagination hath not conceived. If this be Paul's doctrine, and it seems to us unanswerable, there must follow a conclusion more important still. This belief in immortality, which we place at the threshold of religious experience, can no longer be suffered to occupy a position so humble. So far from being the entrance to the outer court, it is itself, in the Pauline view, the very holy of holies, the innermost sanctuary of the temple of sacred truth. Immortality is here not the first but the last object to be fully recognized, an object which can only be perfectly seen when all other lights have been combined to behold it. It must appear henceforth not as the foundation, but as the pinnacle; not as the root, but as the flower; not as the morning-star, but as the meridian day. If the vision be the product of the Christian life, it will shine more clearly in proportion as that life is unfolded and will be felt more widely in proportion as that life is diffused. A man's belief in immortality will be commensurate with the value of his soul, his disbelief in immortality with the smallness of his spiritual experience. His vision

of the future will be the measure of his hold on the present, and the larger be the grasp of his spiritual instincts and mental possessions, the clearer will be his conviction of the imperishable nature of the soul.

There have been two extreme phases of opinion regarding the relation of Christianity to the doctrine of a future state. The eighteenth century was emphatically a century of nature-worship. Its watchword was the glory of humanity; it was built upon the pillars of despotism and culminated in the crown of kings. The English deists contended with the English apologists, but they both occupied glass houses, and the line of demarcation between them was very thinly marked. To Collins, Tindal, Chubb, Morgan, and Bolingbroke the light of nature was sufficient; to Warburton, Cumberland, Conybeare, Sherlock, and Paley the light of nature was nearly sufficient. The deists, where they denied a future state, denied it on the testimony of the soul; the apologists, where they defended a future state defended it on the testimony of the soul. The orthodox churchman claimed nearly as little for Christianity as his heretical opponent; he was everywhere victorious, but he made moderate demands and exacted slight tribute. He, like his vanquished foe, believed in the majesty of human reason; Christianity was only a supplement to that light of nature which was already almost complete. Man wanted little to perfect his hope in the future; the problem was more than half solved by the unaided instincts of the mind, and one historical manifestation would confirm the verdict of humanity. Let a man rise from the dead, and the evidence would be complete. Let an actual message be borne from the silent land, and aspiration would become reality. Let the eye gaze but for a moment upon one visible proof of vanquished death, and in that instant the human soul would know how true had been its reasonings and how just had been its aspirings; the resurrection of Christ was but the seal and attestation to the unerring dictates of the natural mind.

That century passed away, and from the flames of the French Revolution a new world arose, a world in every sense the antithesis and antagonist of the old. The eighteenth century had worshipped the light of nature; the nineteenth century

strove to leave nature behind it. In every department of thought the spirit of transcendentalism arose—in the speculations of Hegel, in the poetry of Goethe, in the dreams of Coleridge, in the utopian visions of a thousand political seers. Over the atmosphere of the religious world there came a corresponding change. The evangelical wave which began to break over the shores of England and America had some tones harmonious with the transcendental wave. It was pre-eminently a movement of life and freshness, but its course was sweeping and reactionary. The immortality of the eighteenth century had been a popular immortality—a visible house with many material mansions, whose existence was prefigured in nature, whose reality was confirmed in Christ. But to the reviving life of the nineteenth century such a future was degrading. Would men be content with idealizing the mere product of nature? Had Christianity nothing new to communicate on the subject of man's future destiny? Was this continued life of the eye and of the ear, of the heart and of the brain, the acme of human dreams? Ought not this immortality of nature to be superseded, or if it remained should it not remain only as the hell of the wicked? For the pure soul, for the regenerated spirit, was there not reserved a higher, a nobler goal? Was it not to be translated into a new heaven and a new earth, into a mystical life undescribed and undescribable, into a world independent of beautiful sights and natural sounds and mundane affections? Was it not in ascending to drop its earthly mantle, to bid farewell to material pleasures, and to be absorbed into communion with that still, calm life of God where the winds never blow, where the waves never beat, where the passions never play.

Here then are two extreme phases of opinion—one making Christianity a mere supplement to the popular instincts of the soul, the other practically regarding it as a correction of those instincts. What is our own position in relation to these opposite views? To say that it is contrary to both would not express our meaning; it is essentially and radically different, it stands on another plane. For we would call attention to the fact that these two opinions, opposite and irreconcilable as they are, are yet based upon one vast and one common assumption: they both take for granted that the popular notion of immortality

prevalent throughout Christendom is derived from the light of nature. We hold, on the other hand, that this popular notion is itself the direct product of the Christian consciousness, that instead of being supplemented by Christianity it is created by Christianity, that it is nowhere to be met with outside the limits of the cross, and only to be found where Christian culture has preceded it. Let us just ask at the outset what is this popular notion of immortality which men claim for the unaided light of nature? That question resolves itself into another—what is the popular notion of death? If we were asked to frame a definition which would at once be brief and exhaustive, we should say that death in the popular sense of the religious world is the immediate transition of the soul into heightened conditions. Let it be observed that in this definition, brief as it is, there are involved four distinct particulars which are nowhere found united in any pre-Christian system. First, it asserts that the principle of life does not perish at death, but simply makes a transition from one state into another. Secondly, it declares that the new state into which the soul passes is not impersonal but *conditioned*—that is to say, environed by an outward form and embodiment, or, as Paul puts it, “Not unclothed, but clothed upon.” Thirdly, it maintains that the new conditions are higher than the old—that is to say, that the embodiment affords greater scope for the expression of the soul’s character, and this is equally true of all states, whether beatific, penal, or purgatorial. Finally, it affirms that this transition is an immediate process—not the result of a long sleep or temporary cessation of being, but the direct accompaniment of the very act of death. We have said that these four particulars will not be found united in any system of antiquity; their union, in truth, begins with the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. It is in the resurrection of Christ that for the first time in history we are brought face to face with the assertion of an eternal harmony between matter and spirit, the body and the soul. We do not speak merely of an isolated historical fact; the doctrine of Christ’s resurrection is in its deepest sense the doctrine of Christ’s life. The historical act which forms its climax is but the consummation and the illustration of that perpetual harmony between the body and the soul which constitutes the music of

his whole earthly history—a harmony which justifies the statement of the fourth evangelist, that even while on earth the Son of man was in heaven. The Christian doctrine of the resurrection professes to be more than a fact; it claims to be a gospel, a life, a continuous experience, and the very fact that it is not exhausted in one historical manifestation has enabled it to permeate the world with an atmosphere wholly new. It is through the breath of that atmosphere that we have inhaled our modern thoughts of immortality, and it is by the fresh life it has imparted to our human nature that the light of nature itself has been able to aspire so high.

The resurrection of Christ was to the heathen world the first historical vision of a complete personality; the earliest harmony of a body and a soul. It is not too much to say that throughout the life of heathendom these two were constantly disjoined. If we cast our eye down the long vista of pre-Christian speculations we shall be struck with the fact that these speculations seem to move on two separate lines of thought, opposite yet almost contemporaneous; in the one the body sacrifices the soul, in the other the soul sacrifices the body. If we look more closely we shall be struck with a fact more remarkable still. We shall perceive that these lines, opposite as they are, are yet not parallel; they are ever converging nearer to each other, the body is struggling towards the spirit, the spirit is struggling towards the body. We see materialism starting from its grossest form and enshrining itself within the earthly and the sensuous, yet ever increasingly, though almost unconsciously, becoming discontented with its own shrine and striving to renew its youth by simulating the life of the spirit. We see spiritualism starting from an intense, an overweening estimate of the absolute majesty of mind, and striving to exclude from its dominion all objects and all conceptions which bear not the stamp of abstract thought, yet ever and anon growing weary of its tenantless empire and struggling to break the solitude by the admission of material forms. We see these opposing lines of thought ever more and more losing their opposition, looking towards one another, struggling towards one another, and yet withal unable to reach one another. At last, in the fulness of time, we behold the solution of the problem; heaven and earth meet

together, matter and spirit embrace each other. The long antagonism between the body and the soul is reconciled in a life which exalts spirit without depressing matter, and which exalts matter without debasing spirit. Those claims of the sense and of the reason, which Brahm had pronounced irreconcilable, and which Plato had failed to solve, are adjusted in one grand historic deed, which harmonizes the reason with the sense and lifts the sense to the very door of reason. In the Christian doctrine of the resurrection all things at last consist ; the opposing lines stand side by side, the divergent philosophies melt into unity, and the reconciling power of a re-established harmony gathers into one the fragments of the past.

Such we conceive to be the scientific place in history of the doctrine of Christ's resurrection. Within the limits of a periodical review we can only sketch the outlines of a vast subject, and must be content to point out the path without describing the way. We begin with the material line, and we begin with it in its grossest, most materialistic form. It rises in that Dead Sea of the human intellect the empire of China. The modern inhabitants of that empire have recognized a future state by worshipping the souls of their ancestors, but the Christian atmosphere has penetrated further than the Christian consciousness. The creed of ancient China, in both its early forms, was the worship of a material principle, underlying the images of all things—a principle whose one attribute was its changelessness, and whose one glory was its perpetuity. This indeed was alone perpetual. All else vanished into the inevitable abyss—men and the lives of men, things and the forms of things, times and the fashions of times ; they perished, but this remained ; they all waxed old, as a garment, but this was the same. The loves and the hatreds, the hopes and the fears, the joys and the sorrows of humanity faded before it ; it was when they were not, it would be when they were no more. Such a creed stood at the furthest remove from any doctrine of immortality, personal or impersonal ; its one gleam of comfort was the motive which prompted it. Whence this reverence for the changeless ; was it not that the immutable was the symbol of the immortal ? Whence this veneration for a stolid material principle ; was it not that its very stolidity held out the hope that it would be changeless ?

* Thought must develop, feeling must consolidate, passion must exhaust itself, life itself must fade, but inert matter grew old and gave no sign, its impassiveness protected it from corruption, and its lifelessness exempted it from death.

And now for many centuries and through many lands we lose sight of the material line. It is submerged in the waves of a new civilization, and when next it appears it is in the heart of Ionic Greece. The old world has passed away and another world has dawned—the world of Thales, Anaximenes, of Heraclitus. Materialism, too, has put on a new aspect. It is no longer the worship of dead, inert, stolid matter, it is the worship of matter in its most living and life-like forms—the water, the air, and the fire. It is difficult within the same line of thought to conceive a more complete transition. Ancient China had worshipped matter for its changelessness, Ionic Greece sought it for its flexibility, and sought it only in its most flexible aspects. Water is the symbol of vital freshness; the water of life, the living water, the laughing water have become almost proverbial expressions. Air is the symbol of vital freedom; the very word spirit means breath. Fire is the symbol of vital energy; we speak colloquially of the spark of life. When the Ionic school of Greece deified the water, the air, and the fire, it uttered its protest against a dead materialism. It made one step nearer the conception of a living nature, an animated frame of the universe. Its object of worship was still matter, but it was matter transfigured on the mount, adorned in the likeness of the soul, and glittering in the vesture of human intelligence. The eye of its adoration soared not beyond the natural, but it was the natural in that aspect which simulated most the spiritual, not the movelessness of apathy, but the activity which suggested conscious power. And yet can we fail to perceive that while the instincts of humanity have advanced, humanity itself has approached no nearer even to the rudest conception of a personal immortality. The most which the individual man could gather was that he formed an infinitesimal part of an all-pervading and an all-enduring element, that he was the drop of an ocean, or the breath of an atmosphere, or the spark of a mighty fire. But death would dissolve the difference between the element and its components; the drop would go back into the

ocean and be a drop no more ; the breath would be exhaled into the atmosphere and be a breath no more ; the spark would mingle with the fire and be a spark no more. The individual life was contemplated as an accident of being, and the fulness of universal life was to be the death of individual existence. Man had not yet dared to hope for a personal future, yet he had made one step towards that hope by realizing more clearly his value in the present.

We pass over two centuries more, and we are brought face to face with a still more advanced development. During these two centuries the masses of the Greek population seem to have caught something of the Ionic fire, and the common mind had been gradually permeated by a very rich and a very beautiful mythology. There was in this instance a close harmony between the early Greek religion and the early Greek philosophy ; both worshipped materialism in its aspects of freedom and activity. Never indeed in the history of mankind had men so powerful an excuse for the reverence of matter ; for never did the idea of matter present itself in so beautiful a form. It was one of the loveliest lands on which the human eye has ever gazed ; nature had lavished there not perhaps her vastest, but certainly her most attractive treasures. It was not nature in her Asiatic magnificence, which appalled even while it ravished—the magnificence of trackless deserts and tenantless plains and gigantic mountains, before which the individual life sank into insignificance. It was nature in that careless freedom, in that laughing beauty, which at once dominated the soul and left it untouched by the sense of its bondage. The Greek was not afraid of her ; in the very act of deifying he sported with her, he played while he worshipped, and he worshipped while he played. He looked upon the objects of nature as the child looks upon them—as a separate assemblage of vital forces, each following its own pleasure, each doing its own will. Sun, moon, and star, mountain, valley, and meadow, stream, river, and ocean, were all animated by independent lives, and each was a god over its own sphere. The religion of the Greek had become identical with his poetry, and his poetry had become identical with his prose. What to us is a beautiful metaphor, a fine simile, a happy trope or figure, was to him a fact as sober as the

sunshine or the rain. The beauty of the universe lay to him in its appearance, and to him, therefore, its appearance was its reality, for it was the sense of the beautiful which constituted his existence, and it was the vision of the beautiful that revealed to him the divine.

And now it was that philosophy asked the question, was there not some truth in this mythology? Beneath its manifest absurdities was there not after all a scientific basis? The common mind of Greece had invested material objects with the possession of vital forces; had not the vulgar here stolen a march on the philosophers? Would it not be possible to lift the whole Grecian mythology into the sphere of physical science, and to kindle the dry bones of intellectual speculation by uniting romance to reality, the poetical to the prosaic? That we believe was what Epicurus asked, that we believe was the motive which dictated his remarkable answer. That answer was the reduction of materialism to the smallest limits within which it had yet been restricted. He reduced the physical universe to a series of atoms, and within each atom he placed a self-acting force. He brought science very near to the realm of poetry, matter very near to the realm of spirit. It was no longer dead matter as in China, it was no longer life-like matter as in the school of Thales, it was matter actually living, animated, vitalized. One step alone remained to complete the development of materialism; it was to say that these forces of nature were themselves intelligent. That step was taken by Stoicism. The philosophy of the Stoics carried to the furthest verge of refinement the possibilities of the material line, to a height which almost blazed into spirituality in the thoughts of an Epictetus and the speculations of a Seneca. While we must remember that before that time came, the world had caught the glow of a brighter and a holier day-spring; while we can hardly refrain from the conclusion that Stoicism, like every other heathen system, must to some extent have participated in the fulness of the Christian light, we are by no means disposed to deny that considering the narrow limits from which it started, the philosophy of Stoicism deserves all praise. It made the best of poor circumstances, it built a tolerable structure upon a very mean foundation. Stoicism did for the materialism of ancient Greece what the latest

development of Darwinism has done for the materialism of modern England—it invested it with a soul. Let any student of modern philosophy compare the physical origin of life as exhibited by Alfred Wallace, with the physical origin of life as exhibited by Priestley and Lamarck, and he will be forced to admit that he is standing on a higher platform. The England of the nineteenth century is still in one sense materialistic, but its materialism is almost as distinct from that of the preceding age as the soul is distinct from the body. Matter is here no longer a thing, but almost a thought; no longer a dead mechanism, but a living force; no longer a passive effect, but an active if not an intelligent cause. The position of modern England, so far from being the product of the latest civilization, is the survival of an older culture, and the return to a former day. It finds its parallel in that history of ancient materialism which, beginning with the rudest and the most ungainly forms of physical origin, culminated in investing the physical world with the attributes of reason and the instincts of intelligent power.

What, all this time, had been the position of the doctrine of immortality? The Epicurean and the Stoic had striven to spiritualize the physical basis of life, had they thereby succeeded in inspiring man with the hope of an endless future? 'On the contrary, it is an undeniable fact that even in the ripest development of Stoicism the doctrine of immortality was repudiated. There were some high-strung and sensitive spirits who ventured to hope for a hereafter, not even the most sanguine aspired to an endless hereafter. . If the physical basis of life were itself a vital force, there might be some reason to believe that the force might survive for a time the decay of its bodily environments, might linger in some region of the universe after its earthly tabernacle had crumbled into dust. But in the mind of the Stoic all individual forces were only parts of one great primal force or fire; from this they came, and to this they must return. They might linger for a few years, they might remain active even for a few millenniums, but the time was coming when they must yield up their individual being. The great fire would try each man's work and find it wanting, the tiny individual spark would lose itself in the ocean of primal heat, and the original element of the universe would devour all minor forces. Nor was the

popular expectation of the vulgar in this case more sanguine than that of the gravest philosopher. There is a prevalent belief that the worshippers of the Greek mythology recognized an endless future ; that they certainly did not. In the popular religious world of Greece immortality was not for man ; the gods alone were the immortals, and those whom the gods made divine. There was a hereafter for the human spirit, but it was not to last forever, and while it did last it was little more than a half existence. Neither Hades nor Tartarus were contemplated as eternal states, and it is only by a straining of speech that they can be contemplated as states of consciousness at all. Hades and Tartarus were the dreams of the disembodied life-force ; Hades was a vague troubled dream, Tartarus was a wild nightmare dream. Hades was the home of those spirits not more than ordinarily notorious for the outward crimes of humanity ; Tartarus was the home of those spirits whose deeds of evil had been imperishably graven on history. Hades had a less amount of pain, but Tartarus had a fuller amount of existence ; the vital force was more actively conscious in proportion to the depth of its wickedness. Yet neither the realms of Hades, which held the mass of commonplace sinners, nor the realms of Tartarus, which contained the few specimens of moral monstrosity, ever elevated their inhabitants into the dignity of waking beings. So far from heightening, they lowered the condition of the soul, imprisoned the spirit of man within narrower limits than earth had ever afforded, and confined the range of his vision to heights compared with which the visions of earth were infinite.

We have now exhausted the possibilities of the material line of thought. We have followed it out to the utmost verge of its powers, we have seen it ever drawing nearer to the attainment of a spiritual stand-point, but even at its furthest verge of development we have found it unable to reach that stand-point. Baffled in this direction in discovering an immortality of pure nature, we come next to consider the course of the opposite and far more important line. At the same time when China was rearing a philosophy upon the basis of absolute materialism, India was establishing a religion on the foundation of an exclusive spirituality. China had started from the assumption that

there was nothing in the universe but matter ; India awoke with the conviction that there was nothing in the universe but mind. In China the climax of intelligence was the manifestation of physical power ; in India the manifestation of physical power was the limitation of intelligence. Brahminism, the first philosophic creed of India, was spiritualism run mad ; carried to such an extent that, in accordance with the law of extremes, it became equal to its opposite. In considering the nature of this spirituality, the eye naturally fastens upon that which is at once its characteristic and its blemish—the institution of caste. Amongst the few survivals of Asiatic culture which remain in modern Europe, the institution of caste stands out pre-eminent. That some occupations are in themselves, and apart from their respective aggravations, more heinous in the sight of men than others, is one of the first doctrines in the social catechism of England. That it is a survival of Asiatic culture is, we think, undoubted ; but the misfortune is that the gods of one age become the demons of the next. No modern Englishman will now defend caste on any other ground than that of worldly expediency ; to the ancient Brahmin the essential ground of its defence was its purely unworldly character. To the modern Englishman caste is dear as a badge of aristocracy ; to the ancient Brahmin, if we are not greatly mistaken, caste was originally revered for precisely the opposite reason. That it became in process of time an aristocratic agency, that it ultimately helped to sever man from man, that its social consequence was the immoral one of breaking down the bond of human brotherhood, all this is undoubtedly, undeniably true. Yet we hold that while its social consequence was immoral, the moral instinct which prompted it was right and noble. Let us just ask, for a moment, what was that principle on which the ancient Brahmin felt himself constrained to divide society ? We know that he separated mankind into four distinct sections, each rising in gradation above the other, and each expressing its gradation by the nature of its earthly work. At the foot of the ladder was the slave, at a higher stage was the man of commerce, higher still the soldier, and at the summit the priest. We do not say that such a classification would be exhaustive of any society, ancient or modern ; we do not say that even were it exhaustive

it would express a true gradation. But we do say that even at this remote lapse of time we can discover a principle on which such a gradation might be made, and that unless we have misconceived the Brahminical spirit that principle was the reverse of aristocratic. Is it not clear that the social ranks of ancient India were regulated by their power of ministration? Their relative height was determined by the amount of their vicarious sacrifice, and the more voluntary was the sacrifice, the higher was the social position. The slave lived for his master, but he did so by compulsion; the commercial man lived for the community, but he did so for expediency; the soldier lived for his country, but he did so for duty; the priest lived for humanity, and he did so for love. The priest thus reached the climax, both in the extent of his range and in the intensity of his motive; he was the vicarious representative of the sins and sorrows of all mankind; and in sacrificing for those sins and sorrows, he was in his highest ideal actuated by no lower motive than the enthusiasm for humanity itself.

It was unfortunate, however, that the spirit of sacrifice which appeared in caste as a whole was unable to be carried out in its different parts. These four classes, springing as they did from a common principle, were yet on earth forever divided. The slave might have the spirit of a soldier, but in this world he could not become a soldier; the soldier might have the spirit of a priest, but in the present order of things he could not become a priest. The bond of social union lay on the other side of death, in that singularly suggestive and ultimately wide-spread doctrine—the transmigration of souls. That doctrine was at once the adumbration and the travesty of the Christian belief, that as the tree falleth so it must lie. What Brahminism said to her votaries was this: “You are making your own hereafter; whatever your present is, your future shall be.” “Are you now a soldier with a craven spirit? you shall start upon your future in the position of a slave.” “Are you now a slave with the spirit of a soldier? you shall begin your hereafter in the rank of military life.” “Are your earthly deeds in advance of your earthly position? there awaits you in the world beyond death an advance of that position.” “Are your earthly deeds unworthy of the rank you hold? there awaits you behind the

veil a retrogression in the march of being." "Have you reached the climax of self-sacrifice, have you arrived at that stage in which your own joys and sorrows have been lost in the joys and sorrows of struggling human nature? then for you there can be only one immortality—the immortality of a life which is lost in God." "What other future would you have, what other future would be conformable to your own self-sacrificing spirit?" "If your joy be to lose yourself, your fullness of joy must be to be absolutely lost; to close this individual life of selfish cares and personal interests; to bid farewell to that which separates you from the stream of universal being." "Your life of sacrificial priesthood shall be perfected in that perfect sacrifice in which you shall surrender all which has made you an individual man, and be absorbed in that great fountain from which has sprung your earthly day."

Such was the immortality of Brahminism; the excess of spirituality had led to the same goal as the excess of materialism—personal annihilation. In process of time there came a movement which was to ancient India what Protestantism is to modern Rome—a moral revolution; that movement was the creed of Buddhism. Yet the difference between Buddhism and Brahminism lay rather in their method than in their doctrine. Both equally believed in personal annihilation, both equally desired that the personal annihilation would come. But Buddhism wanted to hurry it on more rapidly. Might not caste be abolished in the present world? Why should men be dependent for so great a boon on a transmigration of souls beyond the grave? Would it not be possible that even here the gulfs of society might be bridged over, and that the soul at the hour of death would be ready to enter into its annihilation—rest? That was what the Buddhist sought to do. He proclaimed a universal priesthood, he proclaimed the abolition of caste, he proclaimed the potential equality of all men, and he did so in order that to every man the hour of death might be the hour of nothingness. Western civilization stands aghast at such a spectacle. There are millions of human souls—thoughtful, earnest, devoted souls, living a life of exceptional morality, yet living for the very purpose of dying. Here is a multitude of men making death their goal, struggling more piteously to sink

themselves in the waves than ever drowning mariner struggled to be released from them ; calling on the rocks to fall on them, and on the mountains to cover them. The Greek had loathed the thought of death, but he was unable to escape from it ; the Indian could always have escaped from it, but he loved it too well. Is there any thing in the realms of fiction, is there any thing in the fairy tales of childhood half so unlike reality as this Eastern paradox ? To say that the Christian spirit did not create it is to say nothing ; at the lapse of three thousand years the Christian consciousness is unable to conceive it. Nay, if we are not greatly mistaken, it proceeded directly from the absence of the resurrection element. A soul without a body could be no more a person than a body without a soul ; yet how could a body be eternally united to a soul ? Was not a body a material thing, and was not every material thing sinful and selfish ? Was not matter the clog of spirit, the source of its imperfection, the secret of its unrest ? Was it not that which united man to the beast of the field, which implanted an animal nature within him, which prevented him from recognizing his fellowship with the divine, and as such, was it not something to be rooted out with an iron hand, to be torn from its place in the heart and buried in the depths of that spiritual ocean which it circumscribed ? We know how Platonism carried out that problem. Platonism was the true child of Brahminism, though it went into a far country and wasted its first substance in riotous speculation. It talked grandly of the immortality of the soul, but the soul was to it not a person, but an intellectual essence whose life was dwarfed by personality. It called upon that intellectual essence to set itself free from those miserable limitations which made it an individual man, to break the bars of the material prison-house, and to go back into the bosom of absolute, unconditioned thought. It was reserved for Christianity to rend the veil, to show that limitations might be real advancements, that the body might become the soul's chariot, that physical sufferings themselves might be the heavenly shadows in the Platonic cave, that frailty, weakness, imperfection, all that constitutes a cross, might enlarge the boundaries of being and set the spirit free.

Meantime, in the very home of its nativity, spiritualism was

growing weary. The soul wanted a house to dwell in. It was tired of wandering through vacancy without a local habitation or a name. Was there nowhere to be found some subtle medium in which it might be clothed? Conceding that flesh and blood were unworthy to form the tabernacle of a human spirit, was that spirit therefore bound to go without a tabernacle? Were there not fairer forms of matter than those of the corrupting and the corruptible flesh, were there not more glorious appearances in nature than those revealed in the images of men, had not the universe some element of beauty which was worthy to be reserved for the resurrection mantle of the soul? The answer to that question was, we believe, the origin of Parsism—the creed of the worshippers of fire. Men looked up to the fiery tropic sun, and beheld in it an image at once of glory and of terror, and they asked, was not this worthy to form the embodiment of disembodied souls? Would it not be a destiny consistent with the majesty of mind, if, when the house of this tabernacle were dissolved, the spirit of man should be clothed upon with a garment of celestial light? Would it not redeem the spirit from wandering forever more if there were provided for its habitation a mansion so beautiful and so permanent, a mansion which, while it belonged to the world of nature, yet stood on the very boundary line of the world of thought? The Parsee would have said with religious reverence what the poet said with poetic fervor: “Hail! holy light; offspring of heaven first-born.”

Now we have no hesitation in saying that spiritualism in this doctrine had approached one step nearer the Christian doctrine of a future state; it had actually succeeded in personifying the disembodied soul. The misfortune was that while it restored personality, it destroyed *human* personality. It may seem a wild paradox when we say that the immortality of Parsism was a lower condition of being than the life of earth. We speak familiarly of shining angels, and by the very expression we imply that light, in our view, would be a fitting embodiment for celestial spirits. It is quite possible it may be so; we know nothing whatever of the nature of celestial spirits. But if light were proved to be the suitable embodiment for an angel, it would by no means follow that it was the suitable em-

bodiment for a man. Embodiment in a sunbeam might be the enlargement of a seraph, it would certainly be the limitation of a human life ; it would cut off the half of its humanity, and therefore the whole of its personality. We believe a human form to be necessary to man's personal existence on the same ground that we believe rhythm necessary to the existence of poetry—the removal of either would alter the conception of the term. It is worth while considering that on this subject the Parsees ultimately became their own critics. If we pass over into Egypt we shall find the very heart of Parsism struggling after a better resurrection. The souls of the good and of the evil are supposed to have received their sentence of judgment ; the good pass into the embodiment of light, the evil are immured in folds of darkness, yet the good and the evil are alike unsatisfied. The souls of the blessed look down from the sunlit heights of Osiris, and in their gaze there seems to be something of a wistful longing. Their eye rests not on the luminous framework which enshrines them ; their eye is on the grave where reposes their old earthly tabernacle. That body can never rise again, yet it is necessary that even in death its form should be preserved. If decay obtain mastery over it, the souls of the blessed must cease to exist. Hence it is that the Egyptians embalm their dead ; it is not merely a rite of affection, it is a condition of the soul's immortality. What means this strange medley of loftiness and absurdity ? Here are souls which have attained immortality, which have reached the realization of the dreams of Parsism. They are clothed in bodies of light, and Osiris has pronounced them happy, yet their happiness rests on the preservation of other bodies too corrupt to enter into the realms of sunshine. Like the riddle of the Sphinx, the medley has a meaning. Is it not that the light has been found inadequate to clothe the spirit, that human thought has at last begun to crave for its own appropriate expression, that the human heart is straining to manifest itself in the glance of the earnest eye and the sound of the living voice, and that over the grave of the form which death has conquered the longing for a resurrection has begun to rise ?

When that longing came it was time for the Exodus to appear. From the heart of that Egypt which was waking from

the dreams of Parsism there issued a stream of life which was to refresh the wilderness—a stream which was to guide the world's footsteps from the rill of faintest hope to the ocean of eternal life. The history of the Jewish nation is even from its purely secular aspect the strangest in the annals of mankind. Its course was a singular blending of glory and of shame, of light and of darkness, of triumph and of tragedy. It was at once the most privileged and the most unfortunate of all peoples. Its fate collectively was the fate of its leader individually. Like Moses, it led the world through the wilderness to the very borders of the promised land, and like Moses, at the last, it did not enter in. It conducted the human mind to the first clear light of a personal immortality, yet it saw very dimly that light to which it was leading. It carried from Asia into Europe the costliest treasure which traveller ever bore, but it never thought of opening the casket to learn the nature of the gem. It went out of Egypt pursued with fire and sword, that it might attain the glory of a Messianic hope, yet pursuing Egypt in the future church of Alexandria reached the Messianic hope sooner than flying Judah. A fate so strange, a destiny so enigmatical demands a passing notice and challenges our historical interest. In an essay which aims at scientific catholicity we cannot of course assume the existence of a supernatural element. The supernaturalist says that the history of Judea was the direct product of divine interference; the mythicist says that the thoughts of the Jewish mind conjured up the divine interference and imagined the facts of the history. But there is one point on which supernaturalist and mythicist are alike agreed; they both admit that the thoughts underlying the history, however they came into the Jewish mind, certainly existed there. We shall accept this common meeting-place, and for the present ask no more. We shall take our stand upon the fact that a narrative has been written, and we shall never extend our inquiries further than these two questions, What does it say? and What does it mean? As we study that narrative we are ever increasingly reminded of the fact that Judea had to work out the problem which the Brahmin and the Parsee and the Egyptian had left it as a legacy. It had to determine the momentous question, Where does God dwell? Is there a home for

the Absolute Spirit? Its whole intellectual history is the pursuance of that problem. We could bring the entire Jewish scriptures, from the Exodus to the New Testament, in attestation of the truth that the speculative life of Judea is the struggle to find the house of God—the effort to redeem spirit from its abstraction and to clothe it in a form of endearment. First we have the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night; God moves before his people in a perpetual motion, ever leading onward, never resting to commune. Then comes the tabernacle, where the shekinah rests, more stationary than the cloud-pillar and the fire-pillar, but still without a fixed or abiding habitation. Next from the consolidated empire there rises a holy and beautiful house, a permanent temple, no longer to be borne from place to place through the wilderness, but to stand forever as the symbol of the Changeless. Yet the temple is not to stand forever; that is indeed the Father's house, but it is the Father's house with only one mansion, the priest alone can enjoy communion there. But the congregation also want a voice; therefore the glory of the temple fades and the glory of the synagogue appears. At last comes the fulness of the time, and the fulness of the Godhead dwells in a human form. Pillar of cloud, pillar of fire, shekinah, tabernacle, temple, synagogue, all melt away, and the house of God becomes not only the place of his rest but the embodiment of his revelation. The incarnation proclaims his eternal personality. He is no longer the incomprehensible Jehovah, dwelling in the unbroken solitude of an abstract existence, and only able to commune with his creatures through the intermediary forms of angel and archangel. He has spoiled principalities and powers and made a show of them openly. He has revealed himself as the immediate meeting-place with the soul, has broken down the middle wall of partition between matter and spirit, and enabled the eye of man to see God in the human form.

The eternal personality of God is intimately connected with the eternal personality of man; the doctrine of the incarnation must culminate in the doctrine of the resurrection. In finding the house of God in the habitation of a human form, Judea had virtually found the permanent house of man; for if matter was worthy to be the home of the Absolute Spirit, it was still more

worthy to enshrine a finite human soul. And this brings us to a subject which has always presented peculiar difficulty to the student of Judaic thought. Do the Jewish scriptures contain the doctrine of immortality, is a question which for centuries has engrossed the theological world, a question which has been oppositely answered and is not yet definitely solved. The combatants can by no means be ranged under the wide classification of broad and narrow churchmen; many of the most evangelical believers have felt themselves constrained to take the negative side. The controversy has received attention from the most cultured minds—from the mental precision of Calvin, from the keen rationalism of the English deists, from the utilitarian sagacity of Warburton, from the philosophic subtlety of Lessing, from the logical acuteness of Whately, from the Romanizing proclivities of Hengstenberg, from the elaborate research of Alger, from the massive learning and the conspicuous fairness of Dr. Hodge of Princeton. The arguments on both sides are exceedingly good; on their extreme opposing lines the combatants would seem to have mutually exterminated each other. We cannot wonder at this as long as the one can appeal to the orthodoxy of the Pharisees, and the other can point to the national toleration extended to the Sadducees. There is one point, however, which has often struck us: while Christ condemns the Sadducees for denying a resurrection, he never commends the Pharisees for holding it; nay, the latter are uniformly to him the more repulsive of the two. We cannot help thinking that the resurrection about which these parties disputed was not the resurrection which Christ came to preach. The resurrection of the Pharisees was the rising of a military host to form the army of a physical Messiah—a host which was to subjugate with fire and sword, a Messiah who was to shed not his own blood but the blood of his enemies. The Sadducee, on the other hand, had caught the infection of the cosmopolitan heathen atmosphere; he had brought Oriental culture out of his captivity, and was not specially desirous of an exclusive Judaism; the Pharisaic resurrection was therefore to him a matter of aversion. If the view we have suggested be of any weight, we shall find no difficulty in understanding how he whose special aim was to destroy the

physical expectation might find in the negative Sadducee a more hopeful and a more fruitful soil. We intend therefore to put the Pharisees and the Sadducees both out of court, to waive altogether the political aspects of the Jewish faith, and to view it entirely in that aspect in which it was received by that multitude who heard the Messiah gladly. It seems to us that in the short space which remains at our command, our object will be best served not by a didactic discussion but by a brief tentative narration. Here again we shall make no assumption of a supernatural element, we shall confine ourselves entirely to the question, What does the narrative say? We have long since entertained a settled opinion on this subject—an opinion which in some sense is neutral between the opposing views, yet while it expresses our personal conviction we advance it only tentatively and without the slightest dogmatism. We believe the function of the Old Testament to have been not to *teach* the doctrine of immortality but to *develop* it; not to give a final statement but to pave the way for a final statement. Judaism was only John the Baptist in the wilderness, and all the steps of Judaism were but steps in the desert. We will not therefore expect to find in the Old Testament the entrance into the Promised Land, but shall be content if we can discover there the traces of an onward march, the impressions on the sand and the footprints in the snow.

We hold then that in the history narrated by the Jewish scriptures the doctrine of immortality has passed through four distinct stages. The first stage was one of unbelief. Man had awakened to the sense of sin; paradise lay behind him, and the cherubim and the flaming sword barred the way to the tree of life. He would fain have put forth his hand to touch that tree; his was a reluctant unbelief. For the first time in spiritual philosophy we meet with a human being desiring a life of the body; in other words, craving a personal immortality, for the very sense of moral unworthiness has brought with it a sense of individual importance. The Brahmin revered death; the man conscious of a lost Eden revered length of days. He had no fear of death as a physical power; he would have laughed at the difficulties of the modern sceptic as loudly as the modern sceptic laughs at his. The sting of death was

sin; it was its moral element which made it dreadful, it was its moral element which made it eternal. It was the frown gathering on the Father's brow, it was the sentence of exclusion from the paradise of God. He feared not the act but the fact of death, not the dissolution but the disgrace, not the corruption but the curse; the removal of these would at any time have enabled him to say, "O death! where is thy sting? O grave! where is thy victory?"

Suddenly there is a rent in the cloud and through the aperture a new world appears; that rent is the translation of Enoch, the first faint light of a possible immortality. We shall not here dispute with the mythicist whether the translation of Enoch was an outward fact or the embodiment of an inward thought, for it so happens that it is the thought we are here specially in search of. Nothing indeed can be more simple, more unaffected, or more beautiful than the narrative in which the statement is conveyed. There is no attempt at elaboration, there is no effort at adventitious ornament; we see not even the chariots or the horsemen or the opened heavens or the ascending form. We hear only the description of a holy and Christlike life, and even that is narrated with the most unadorned simplicity, "Enoch walked with God, and he was not, for God took him." How and where the translation was made we are not told; the translation seems to come forth as the natural consequence of the life. All we know is, that in the midst of that vast cemetery whose tombstones record the deaths and ages of the ancient world there is one monument which records a term of earthly years not rounded by a sleep; "he *was* not," he never became a thing of the past; it always can be written of him "he is." What was the significance of such a revelation to the ancient world? Was it not clearly this, that over a life of holiness death would lose its dominion; that wheresoever the pure in heart should be found, these would be selected to see God? It was undoubtedly the advent of a hope into a world of despairing apathy. Yet we would call attention to the fact that the hope lent by the translation of Enoch was at best but flickering and feeble. Be it observed that Enoch had not conquered death; he had only passed death by. He had gained no victory over the king of terrors; he had simply been per-

mitted to escape his power. He had not removed the primeval curse from the fact of death ; he had only been translated so that he should not see it. The curse of death still remained, and death itself was still unconquered. The problem of immortality had not yet been solved. Enoch might continue his personal existence without dying, but the deepest longing of the soul was to continue its personal existence in spite of that death which naturally waits for all. The divine revelation of immortality had many things to tell the world, but the world could not bear them yet ; it was only able to receive the faintest streak of dawn, and the fuller flood of light must be reserved for other days.

And indeed it was not long before the indications of a fuller light began to appear. Gradually and almost imperceptibly, yet with ever deepening conviction, there was springing up in the heart of primeval man a great and unquenchable expectation. Enoch had not been sufficiently holy to conquer death ; he had only passed it by, but there was coming in the fulness of time a perfectly holy one who should meet death face to face and come forth triumphant. There was a seed germinating in the Jewish nation which would issue in a flower of peerless beauty—a beauty which would cancel all the years of barrenness. A moral deliverer was coming, one so pure that his life would obliterate the curse of death. The Holy One would not be suffered to see corruption, the Holy One would conquer corruption for all mankind. The Redeemer from death was coming ; he would stand at the latter day upon the earth and would call into life the dust of buried years ; then would the righteous shine forth as the stars in the kingdom of their Father. Such we believe to have been the moral expectation of a Messiah, and we are too apt to forget that there was a moral expectation. Every Jew was a human being, and the interests of the human being were wider than the interests of the Jew. A conquering king might satisfy the national mind ; but the individual lives of men wanted a sacrificing priest, a holiness which would cover their unholiness, a fulness of life which would enable them to feel worthy of a personal immortality.

With such a hope for the future, man could no longer look

for annihilation in the present. If there was coming a Holy One who should strip death of his treasures, these treasures must in in the mean time be preserved. There was, therefore, a treasury of souls, a resting-place of departed spirits. Sixty-five times is it mentioned in the Old Testament, sometimes as the place of the body, sometimes as the home of the disembodied soul, always as the designation for the state of the dead. Of the nature of that disembodied state Scripture tells us nothing, and nowhere does it reveal its inspiration more powerfully than by such reticence; that which is emancipated from human conditions must be beyond the conception of humanity. But what Scripture does not tell we can partially gather from the inferences of reason and from the popular imaginations of the Jewish people. Sheol, even to the best men, was never a place of desire; the Psalms are full of aversion to the passage into this unknown world, and Hezekiah's prayer for life is almost abject in its importunity. The dread of Sheol was not the dread of pain; it was the fear of a diminished being. It was admitted on all hands to be a limitation of human personality. It was a land of shadows, a land of silence, a land of profound sleep, broken occasionally by the louder waves of time, and in the Gehenna of later Judaism by the retrospective dreams of souls more than usually stained. It was not, generally speaking, a state of suffering; its chief pain was its impassiveness; it was a paralysis of the passions, a benumbing of the mental energies. The sails of life hung loosely over a windless, waveless sea, and the silence of the calm was the silence of the grave.

At last the promised Enoch came, the Holy One of Israel appeared, and the doctrine of immortality entered on its fourth and final stage. That stage was nothing less than the transfiguration of death. Death itself became the medium of translation. It was no longer a sleep, it was no longer a suspension of vital energy; it was the immediate transition into an enlarged personality, an intensification of the individual nature, whatever that nature might be. This transfiguration of death was one of redemption's universal gifts; it was purchased for all men. The retributive law still rested upon the transgressor, but it was lifted from dumb circumstances. It was lifted from labor and it was lifted from death; the sweat of the brow ceased to bear a stigma,

the weakness of the parting hour ceased to carry blame. All sufferings became possible fire-chariots, and death, the greatest of sufferings, had greater possibilities than all. In every case death in the Christian sense was an enlargement of personality. The rich man in the parable had a clearer vision in Gehenna than he ever had on earth. The intermediate state of the early fathers was not intermediate in respect of personality. The intermediate state of mediæval days was essentially purgatorial; but the very definition of a purgatory implied a personal enlargement. What, then, was this embodiment of the departed soul? Personality without an embodiment is in our view impossible, and in any view inconceivable. Do the New Testament Scriptures throw any light upon the nature of the soul's transition garment? In relation to an immortality out of Christ they preserve on this subject an unbroken silence; but in relation to that life which is their ideal of a perfect immortality, they offer what in our view is more than a suggestion. We believe the pervading thought of the New Testament to be, that the resurrection body of Christ forms the germ or nucleus out of which is to spring the transition garment of the believing soul. Let the student of the gospels and the Pauline epistles approach their study with such a thought in his mind, and he will be struck with the marvellous concentration of all other points around it. He will find a new significance in that grain of mustard-seed, which, though buried, rises up into a mighty tree and branches forth into the dwellings of the homeless. He will see a fresh meaning in those elements of communion which are professedly the symbols of Christ's earthly body—the body broken in death but distributed in resurrection. He will read in another light those narratives in which the Messiah conquers death, and measure by a new standard "the power of his resurrection." He will ask, not without intelligence, if when Christ spoke of the Father's house with many mansions—the house which his own resurrection was to prepare—he meant any thing less than that human body which had been the scene of the incarnation. He will ask yet again, and with still deepening conviction, if when Paul spoke of "the building of God, the house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens," he meant any thing less than that same Father's house which the evangelist had beheld in the form of

Jesus. He will inquire if Paul had any meaning when he said that Christians were "members of Christ's body," that they were "crucified together with Christ," that they were "buried with him in baptism unto his death," that they were already "risen with him," and "made to sit together with him in heavenly places," that the Christian dead "slept in him," and that he at his coming would "bring them with him;" above all, that their rising was so bound up in his resurrection, that if there were no resurrection of the dead, then Christ himself was not risen; but that if he were risen, they had already their "conversation in heaven." These are startling statements, but they are marvellously consistent with one fundamental thought; they point, in our view, unmistakably to the belief that when the soul is clothed upon with the house which is from heaven, it is clothed upon with the resurrection body of the Son of man. The effect of such a belief was to abolish death. The soul no longer needed to linger in an impersonal sleep awaiting the consummation of all things. "He that believeth on me shall never die," was the last word on the subject of immortality. Such a man hardly required translation; he was already the member of an incorruptible body. There is one scene of the New Testament in which that thought is portrayed with more than ordinary vividness; it is around the tomb of Bethany. There Judaism and Christianity meet face to face, and separate to meet no more. Martha murmurs that her brother must wait so long for the restoration of his personal existence. "I know he shall rise again at the resurrection." The answer of Christ is striking and graphic: "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live"—shall live in the hour of death, shall live in the act of death, shall live even in your Sheol, the place of death! In the light of that answer the immortality of Judaism faded away and a new immortality arose. That new conception has become so much the portion of humanity that we have forgotten its parentage and claimed it for our own. Yet let us not forget that what we call the natural light of immortality has risen not only on the ruins of Judaism, but on the ruins of our pre-Christian human nature. Where does it exist outside of Christianity? We have asked, in the course of this inquiry, what

form of ancient philosophy represents on this subject the light of modern reason? We have passed the systems of antiquity under a rapid review, yet not too rapid to embrace a doctrine which holds amongst them so insignificant a place. We have interrogated Confucius, Brahma, Buddha, Zoroaster, Thales, Epicurus, Plato, Seneca; we have consulted the popular expectations of Greece; we have questioned the sacred records of Judea, and as the result of the whole we have arrived at this conclusion—that the conception of death as an enlargement of man's personality is a conception which emanates from Christianity alone. We have found the East generally too spiritual; we have seen the West invariably too physical; the Christian doctrine of the resurrection repudiated both. Yet here, as ever, Christianity has reached its goal, not by destruction, but by incorporation; not by eliminating the antagonistic elements, but by removing the source of their antagonism. It purified matter from the taint of corruption, and made it worthy to be the home of spirit, and it showed that the intensest phase of spirit might infinitely dwell in the form of matter. The modern doctrine of immortality may have proceeded from human nature, but it is from human nature in its reconstructed form. A middle wall of partition had divided the personality of man; the flesh lusted against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; the incarnation restored their union, and the resurrection made their union eternal. Man has recognized a new future because he has recognized a new present. He has aspired to a personal immortality because he has reached a personal elevation. He has dared to project into eternity the shadows of the earthly hour because the earth has itself become to him a scene of spiritual possibilities, and the hour has itself revealed the shadows of a changeless day.

GEORGE MATHIESON.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT—AT HOME AND ABROAD.

THE true position of our own local government may be seen more clearly by comparing it with the systems of other nations. Brodrick¹ informs us that the origin of local government in England must be sought in the primitive communities of our Saxon forefathers. The German nations, as described by Cæsar and Tacitus, were nothing but associations of self-governed villages, or larger districts, occupied by separate families or clans, among whom there was not even the shadow of a common national allegiance, except for purposes of war. Such was the organization of the Saxons when they first settled in England, and continued for centuries to be the essential organization of the English people. In Scotland the most ancient form of local jurisdiction of which any trace remains was the baronial; and the power of the barons grew till it alarmed the crown which had created it. There sprung up, in the course of time, communities which engaged in manufactures and merchandise, and the crown sought in these some counterpoise to the great barons. It gave charters to these communities of the lands in their neighborhood, and made them perpetual corporations, with power to choose councils and magistrates, and with special privileges of trade. These, after a long term of abuse, grew into veritable republics, with magistrates chosen by the people, practically independent, in their office, of the crown, and their acts subject only to revision for error or illegality in the courts of law. These baronial courts continued in full vigor till the great rebellion of 1745, when their jurisdiction was so limited by Parliament that it

¹ "Local Government in England." By Hon. George C. Brodrick.

gradually decayed, and has now nearly died out. Local government in Ireland has but little distinct history from that of England; and the local authorities may be divided into five classes—those connected with Poor Law Unions, counties, towns, and harbors, respectively, with a class of minor authorities. The county authorities include baronial presentment sessions, grand juries, governors of lunatic asylums, trustees of inland navigation, and arterial drainage authorities.

In France there are no traditions to be considered as in England and Scotland. The old system of local government was entirely altered at the end of the last century. In France the department is divided into *arrondissements*—the *arrondissements* into cantons, and the cantons into communes. The canton is only a judicial division; but the department has its Parliament, the *Conseil General*, presided over by the *Préfet*; the *arrondissement* has its *Conseil d'Arrondissement*, presided over by the *Sous Préfet*; and the commune its *Conseil Municipal*, presided over by the Mayor. The number of the departments is 86; each of them including from two to six *arrondissements*, from 17 to 62 cantons, and from 72 to 904 communes. The number of inhabitants, according to the census of 1871, varies from 118,898 to 2,220,060. There are 362 *arrondissements*, 2865 cantons, and 35,989 communes. The commune is the administrative unit in France, and corresponds to our township. France suffers by so much being done through these municipal councils, in very much the same way as we suffer; for there, as in the United States, the city councils are not infrequently composed of an inferior class of men. But there is no clashing of areas of taxation, as in England. Each forms part of a harmonious whole. The departmental council fixes the departmental taxes, which are divided between the *arrondissements*, and by them subdivided among the communes. The *arrondissement* settles any district taxation, and partitions it between the communes. The commune votes its own taxes for municipal objects, and collects them with the communal share of the departmental and *arrondissement* taxation. Complete reports of the expenditures of the communes of France are rarely published, and are only accessible for the years 1836, 1862, 1868, and 1871:

	1836. Francs.	1862. Francs.	1868. Francs.	1871. Francs.
RECEIPTS:				
Ordinary.....	100,848,990	291,899,431	309,488,605	313,169,350
Extraordinary.....	24,461,073	149,517,559	130,178,005	226,416,910
EXPENDITURES:				
Ordinary.....	83,830,926	256,954,948	276,343,915	276,187,190
Extraordinary.....	33,962,204	193,283,419	167,518,655	244,314,970

It will be seen that the expenditures for the year 1871 aggregated 520,502,160 francs.¹ Deducting from these numbers the sums expended in consequence of the war, and the total expenditure for the year was 401,378,075 francs. The latest available statistics show that the local taxation of France is now, in round numbers, a sum exceeding 800,000,000 of francs for the whole country, including the Département de la Seine. The proportion between the various sources of income may be nearly estimated at 500,000,000 from direct taxation, 200,000,000 from indirect taxation, and 100,000,000 from tolls, duties, and miscellaneous revenues.

De Laveleye² has traced in the institutions which govern the provinces and communes of Belgium and Holland the double impress of the German and the Latin spirit. Whatever of autonomy they possess he thinks is owing to the free customs of the Germanic tribes who peopled the provinces of the Low Countries. Whatever of centralization they possess is due to the French conquerors of 1792, who, both under the Republic and under the Empire, took as their ideal of government a complete uniformity imposed upon every locality by the central power. Their institutions preserve to this day much of their ancient character, and on the borders of the Lake of Lucerne can be found all the features of the primitive democracy transmitted without interruption from times the most ancient.³ But as riches accumulated in the hands of the few,

¹ This does not include the commune of the Département de la Seine. The budget of the Ville de Paris is about 200,000,000 francs a year.

² "The Provincial and Communal Institutions of Belgium and Holland." By M. Emile De Laveleye.

³ This idea has been recently developed in De Laveleye's "Property, and its Primitive Forms."

democratic institutions disappeared little by little. The inhabitants having nothing in the way of common property to manage, had less reason for assembling together. They got tired of administering justice. They neglected to attend the public assemblies. In brief, communal liberties died, feudalism was established. Precisely the same evolution took place in England, where the manor absorbed the commune so that the very name has disappeared, and there remains nothing but the vestry. De Laveleye thinks nothing is more dramatic or more instructive than the picture of the progress of democracy in the great communes of the Low Countries, and nowhere can it be better studied than in the history of Liege. The conquest of popular liberties was there made in a more regular manner than elsewhere, because the sovereign authority exercised by an elective bishop was less powerful than when exercised by hereditary dynasties. The local government in Belgium and Holland has its foundation in the *commune*, though the communes no longer enjoy, as in the Middle Ages, the attributes of sovereignty; but they are ruled by elective bodies which in matters of administration and police have very considerable powers.

By no means the least important reform accomplished by the present Emperor of Russia has been the entire change which was effected in local government in 1864. Mr. Ashton W. Dilke, who has resided much in Russia, and has acquired no slight personal knowledge of its people, institutions, and language, informs us that before the ukase of 1864 there existed in Russia only three popular elected assemblies with deliberative powers. Of these, one, the lowest, and at the same time the most widely spread and important of all, was the village assembly (*mir*, *mirskaya skhodka*), which, though not materially altered, received extensive powers in 1864. The village commune (*mir*) is the unit of Russian local government. A Russian peasant lives for his commune and not for himself; to him life as a unit is almost unintelligible. The patriarchal system, a remnant probably of the time when the Slavonic race was still a pastoral one, has been handed down untouched—nay, strengthened even by some local circumstances. The town meeting is very frequently called as the people are leav-

ing church, and always takes place in the open air in the middle of the village street. After the meeting, the crowd generally adjourn to the village tavern, once more to discuss the business which has been settled. Formalities there are none; the credentials of voters are not looked into too closely. Nominally every head of a household is entitled to a vote. It is said that the assembly seldom comes to an actual vote on a subject. Russian peasants hardly ever decide by majorities; but if two parties disagree in a matter, it is talked over and over again, and the meeting is adjourned. At the next meeting a compromise is generally arrived at.

The only real and living piece of self-government in Prussia is the municipal government, which had its origin in Stein's great law in 1808. Morier says of it :

It has, after nearly 70 years of a fruitful existence, driven its roots deep into the soil and satisfactorily solved the great problem of local government, viz., the combining the administration of affairs which are partly private, partly public, in the same hands; it has established itself as the type which all future attempts at creating self-governing institutions must follow.

This comparison, brief and imperfect as it is, shows that in England alone the Anglo-Saxon idea of freedom took permanent root. Professor Gneist, one of the most profound political writers, in his various works¹ has sketched with great skill the relations borne by the local institutions to the general institutions of the country in Germany and England. He exposes the continental error of the eighteenth century, which supposed that the secret of England's political liberty lay in her parliamentary institutions. Morier, another good authority, observed this when he said the great continental recipe for political liberty became the creation of parliamentary institutions. Fix upon a census; divide the country into electoral districts; elect representatives; find some big town-hall for them to sit in, and the thing is done; all the rest will come of itself. The Parliament will beget self-government; self-government will beget liberty. It is this erroneous idea that Professor Gneist so effectually refuted and showed the reverse to be the case. He held that it was because the English were free in the old

¹ "Self-Government in England;" "Communal Institutions of England;" "The Administration of the Constitution of England."

Teutonic, positive, and concrete sense of the word *freedom*, and not in the abstract negative sense, of the word *liberté*, that England was self-governed, and that it was because they were self-governed in their local affairs that Parliament grew up, in which they were able to govern themselves in regard to imperial affairs ; in a word, that in the received continental doctrinaire view, cause and effect had been reversed.

Let us now glance briefly at the history of local government in England, from which our own system of local government had its origin, and in which as far back as the Conquest lay the hidden germ of our present political liberty. It may be traced by the light of charters and other documents still extant. London, as is well known, was chartered, though not incorporated, by the Conqueror himself. Henry I. granted its citizens the liberty of electing their own sheriff. The mayoralty of London is traced back to the beginning of Richard I.'s reign ; but it was from John that London first received the royal permission to choose a Lord Mayor annually. Other towns slowly gained their civic independence. After the reign of Richard I. and John, borough charters became numerous. Local freedom was encouraged by the Tudors, and propagated by means of new charters ; and the entire local government was placed in the hands of the Mayor and Common Council. There can be little doubt that in this diversity of municipal constitutions, franchises, customs, and sentiments, consisted one of the most potent securities for liberty. Had London been one symmetrical whole instead of being overspread with a net-work of public and private jurisdictions in the days of Magna Charta, it would have been far more submissive. Close students of the Middle Ages admit that the necessity of consulting local sentiment, and governing through local agency, made itself felt in every branch of civil administration. Louis XI. succeeded in debauching the ministers of Edward IV., but he could not debauch the members sent up to Parliament from the country ; Pepys records the same facts in the evil days of Charles II. But the local institutions that had nursed our liberties through the most trying times, could not withstand the political blight of the eighteenth century, and the decline in the old-fashioned public spirit took the very soul from municipal

life of olden times, and the Reform Parliament of 1832 opened a new order of things in Great Britain.

Brodrick mentions the curious and instructive fact that while the primitive ideal of self-government had thus become obscured, both in English counties and in English boroughs, it not only survived, but acquired a fresh vitality, in the colonies of New England. The New England "towns," which we shall presently consider, he says were nothing but a reproduction of Anglo-Saxon "townships," with a larger average area, and with better defined corporate identity. Their resident inhabitants, or "freemen," like the free suitors of the old town-moot, constituted the electoral body, which admitted new members, chose all local town-officers, such as "constables," "tithing-men," and "surveyors of highways," regulated all local taxation, and sent deputies to the "General Courts," which corresponded in most respects with county courts before the Conquest. Like the townships of Old England, the New England towns were held responsible for their own roads, bridges, and police; they were also held responsible for their own poor relief and education. Old usages and even old names were carefully preserved; there were grand juries and petty juries, militia regiments and district train bands, and even whipping-posts and stocks, as there were in England under the rule of Cromwell. The system thus evolved from the results of English experience, modified, as I shall endeavor to show, by the exigencies of a vast and new country, retains its characteristic outlines to this day in every State of the American Union. It has been truthfully remarked that the study of it may serve to show how little the working of political machinery depends on its outward form, and how much on its inward spirit.

Mr. S. A. Galpin¹ has roughly classed the minor political subdivisions of the United States for local purposes under three general types or systems, viz., the "town" system, the "county" system, and the "compromise" system. It will be necessary for our present purpose to indicate briefly the general characteristics of these types. Of the three systems mentioned

¹ "The Minor Political Divisions of the United States." By S. A. Galpin, LL.B., Hartford, Conn. Statistical Atlas of U. S.

above, the two which differ most widely from each other are the "town" system of New England and the "county" system of the South. Both of these were firmly rooted in their respective sections before the Declaration of Independence, and passed through the successive transfers of sovereignty growing out of the war of the Revolution, without any material change. Of course the county exists in the "town" States, their title being simply the result of the prominence given to the "town" in their interior political organization. So strong has been the impress of English tradition throughout the United States, that, with one exception, only the political division next below the State is known as the county. The only exception is found in Louisiana, which is divided into "parishes." But the powers these "parishes" possess are substantially the same as the counties of other States. The "town" system pure and simple prevails only in the six New England States—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The area of these States is 8348 square miles; population, 3,487,924; containing one thirtieth of the area and one eleventh of the population of the United States. In these States the "town" is the important political division of the State. It is a body corporate and politic, deriving its charter from the Legislature of the State, and generally entitled to an independent representation in the lower branch of the Legislature. It has power to elect its own officers, to manage in its own way its own roads, schools, local police, and other domestic concerns, and collects through its own officers not only its self-imposed taxes for local purposes, but also those levied by the Legislature for the support of the State, or for the support of county officers and to cover their limited expenditures. Where so much power is vested in the town, any larger subdivision of the State must necessarily have but a limited function. The county in the States above mentioned thus becomes a judicial, not a political, subdivision of the State.

The "county" system is now found in seventeen States, viz., Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. These "county" States have an area of 1,243,295

square miles, with a population of 11,955,731—about two thirds of the area and more than one third of the population of all the States. Under the “county” system the conditions of the “town” system are reversed—the outward form remains the same, but the inward spirit is greatly changed. The names of the greater and lesser subdivisions of the State remain unchanged, but the powers and position of these subdivisions are in no case or degree the same. The town or township is but the skeleton of the New England town, while the county is clothed with all the political power. It derives its charter from the Legislature, and is responsible to the State authorities for its share of the taxation. A comparison of the States of Rhode Island and South Carolina will show the reader at once the radical difference between these two systems. The area of Rhode Island, as given by the General Land Office, is 1306 square miles, less than double the average area of the political unit under the county system, yet it has within its limits 36 towns and cities, each being an independent political organization, while South Carolina, with an area of 34,000 square miles, has only 31 organized counties, which are in no respect the superiors of the Rhode Island towns in political power. On the other hand, the population of the Rhode Island town averages 6038, or, excluding cities, 4000 inhabitants, the area being about 36 square miles; that of the South Carolina county 22,731 inhabitants, distributed over an average area of nearly 1100 square miles. Under these conditions of settlement, differing so widely, it is easy to understand how different are the methods of administration.

Lastly comes the system called the “compromise system,” which, having its home in States lying between those already named, is itself the result of a fusion of the systems prevailing on either side of it. This third general type has been adopted in the organization of the States of the North-west, and now prevails in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. These fourteen States contain 672,824 square miles, and 22,671,986 inhabitants, their area being about one third of that of the States of the Union, their population nearly two thirds. In this system the political power, which in New England is lodged with the

town, and at the South with the *county*, is divided between the two organizations. The county is the creation of the Legislature, and is the political unit. It is, however, subdivided into towns or townships, which possess considerable political rights, and thus becomes a miniature of a State as subdivided for local purposes into its counties. The townships are laid out by the county officers,¹ and have power to elect their own officers, to lay and repair their highways, to determine in township meeting the amount of taxes to be raised for school and other local purposes, and submit an estimate of the same to the county authorities for approval, and, in general, to act upon all local matters in much the same way as the New England town, subject, however, to the *supervisory* of the county. The tabulated statement below is compiled from official sources, and shows at a glance the various systems of local government in the United States.

TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER AND AVERAGE AREA OF THE TOWNS, TOWNSHIPS, OR OTHER POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF THE COUNTIES OF THE UNITED STATES, SO FAR AS THE SAME CAN BE ASCERTAINED FROM THE RETURNS OF THE NINTH CENSUS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR AVERAGE POPULATION.

THE "TOWN" SYSTEM.	Total Number.	Average Area.	Average Population.	THE "COUNTY" SYSTEM.	Total Number.	Average Area.	Average Population.
Connecticut..	164	29	3,277	Tennessee....	1,282	36	982
Maine (1) (2)..	412	36	1,552	Texas.....	705	226	1,161
Massachusetts	338	23	4,318				
New Hampshire (2)....	231	39	1,378	The system.	6,961	79	1,301
Rhode Island.	36	36	6,038	THE "COM-PROMISE" SYSTEM.			
Vermont (2) ..	243	42	1,360				
The system.	1,424	34	2,450	Illinois (7)....	1,545	36	1,644
THE "COUNTY" SYSTEM.				Indiana.....	993	34	1,693
Arkansas....	659	79	735	Iowa (8).....	1,187	45	1,006
Delaware....	31	68	3,139	Kansas (9)....	353	104	1,032
Georgia (3)....	1,122	52	1,055	Minnesota (10).	662	79	664
Kentucky....	845	45	1,563	New Jersey..	228	37	3,974
Louisiana (4).	444	93	1,637	New York...	942	50	4,653
Maryland....	193	52	4,046	N. Carolina..	809	63	1,324
Mississippi...	325	145	2,547	Ohio.....	1,357	29	1,964
Missouri (5) ..	940	70	1,831	Pennsylvania.	1,452	32	2,426
South Carolina (6)....	415	82	1,700	Virginia (8)...	435	88	2,817
				West Virginia.	313	73	1,412
				Wisconsin....	780	69	1,352
				The system.	11,915	59	1,923

¹ We note one exception, New Jersey, the Legislature reserving this right in that State.

RECAPITULATION.

	Total Number.	Average Area.	Average Population.
The "Town" System.....	1,424	34	2,450
The "County" System.....	6,961	79	1,301
The "Compromise" System.....	11,915	59	1,923
	20,300	69	1,695

(1) The average area is estimated. (2) Only *organized* towns included in computations. (3) Militia districts of twenty counties estimated. (4) Wards of four parishes estimated. (5) Townships of one county estimated. (6) Townships of three counties estimated. Since 1870 all townships in this State have been abolished. (7) Townships of the twenty-six unorganized counties estimated from the returns of precincts or land survey townships of those counties. (8) Townships of two counties estimated. (9) Townships of twelve counties estimated. (10) Townships of nineteen counties estimated.

In attempting to examine the badly-kept accounts of upwards of 20,000 minor political divisions of a vast country, one is met with many and serious difficulties. We cannot expect to find the uniform order and method which prevails in France, alike in all the municipal budgets, from the largest town to the humblest commune. The Americans, as De Tocqueville has shown, can be very justly reproached for the sort of confusion which exists in the accounts of the expenditure in the townships and cities. Another writer of talent, in the comparison which he has drawn between the finances of France and those of the United States, says, "When I see the communes of France, with their excellent system of accounts, plunged in the grossest ignorance of their true interests, and abandoned to so incorrigible an apathy that they seem to vegetate rather than to live; when, on the other hand, I observe the activity, the information, and the spirit of enterprise which keeps society in perpetual labor in those American townships whose budgets are drawn up with small method and with still less uniformity, I am struck by the spectacle; for to my mind the end of a good government is to ensure the welfare of a people, and not to establish order and regularity in the midst of its misery and its distress." It will be well to bear in mind these words in this attempt to unravel some of the evidences of local misgovernment in the United States. It is my present purpose, now that the reader has been made acquainted with some

of the difficulties attending such an investigation, to first call attention to the debts of the cities and counties of the United States—those mortgages of property that weigh so heavily upon taxpayers. It may be useful to consider their rise and progress in the cities where they exist, and their pressure upon the populations ; to compare their relative amounts ; and to add up, when correct figures can be obtained, their vast totals ; so that we may form some idea of the aggregate burden as well as of their separate effect on the cities that are bowed down under the double yoke of debt and taxation. The census reports afford very little assistance in ascertaining the real local indebtedness of the United States. In 1870 the total indebtedness of the United States is given as follows : State debts, \$352,866,698 ; county debts, \$187,555,540 ; town and city debts, \$328,244,520 ; total, \$868,676,758. Leaving out the State debts, there remains \$515,810,060, which is put down in 1870 as the total county, town, and city debt of the country. Feeling satisfied, in 1876, that local indebtedness and taxation had augmented out of all proportion to the other two elements—value of property and population—with regard to which it should maintain a certain relation, I instituted an inquiry, with a view of finding out the facts. Letters were sent to the comptrollers of one hundred and fifty of the principal cities of the United States, selected not only for their size and importance, but to geographically represent the entire country. The facts sought after were the amount of the debt, the assessed valuation, annual taxation, and population in 1866 and 1876. One hundred and thirty responded, and from these answers a tabulated statement was compiled, which, as far as it went, formed at that time the most recent statistics of the kind attainable. The aggregate footings of the four elements of debt, valuation, taxation, and population, in the hundred and thirty cities which reported, are as follows :

	1876.	1866.
Municipal debt of 130 cities.....	\$644,378,663	\$221,312,009
Assessed value of property of same.....	\$6,175,032,158	\$3,451,619,381
Annual taxation of same.....	\$112,711,275	\$64,060,098
Population of same.....	8,576,249	5,919,914

The aggregate municipal indebtedness of these cities, as will be seen, was in 1876 over ten per cent of the assessed value of property, whereas in 1866 it was only six per cent, showing an increase of indebtedness of four per cent of the valuation of property. It will also be seen that debt increased upward of \$420,000,000 in the decennial period ending 1876, a yearly increase of \$42,000,000. The percentage of increase is about as follows : Debt, 200 per cent ; taxation, 83 per cent ; valuation, 75 per cent ; and population only 33 per cent. Population and valuation of property have by no means kept pace with debt. Another fact brought out by this investigation was that if the census report of 1870, giving \$515,810,060 as the total local debt of the United States, was correct, then the increase from that year to the close of 1876 must have been enormous, for incontrovertible figures showed that the municipal debt of one hundred and thirty cities, representing a population of only 8,576,249, exceeded by \$128,568,603 the county, town, and city indebtedness of the entire country in 1870 ; or, still more appalling, that in six years the indebtedness of these cities had exceeded by \$316,134,143 the bonded and floating indebtedness of all the towns and cities in the United States. I pondered over these figures some time before I ventured to make them public. There could be no mistake about the calculation, as the debt of 1876 came direct from the financial department of the respective cities, and the long column of figures were added up and fully verified. In 1875 and 1876 there was a very general halt in the reckless extravagance in municipal affairs. The New York commission appointed by Governor Tilden to devise a plan for the government of cities published their report ; and though but little heed was taken of it, the mere publication of the startling facts was not without its effect. Pennsylvania followed, and though the commission appointed by this State did not even take the trouble to collate statistics of its local indebtedness, the report served to call public attention to the threatening danger. Among the good results of this very general discussion of the subject of the growth of local indebtedness was the passage, by several States, of bills compelling the county, township, or city officers to make out annually, and forward to the State Auditor, a

report of the outstanding indebtedness. One or two States had deemed it of sufficient importance to collect these statistics before the general agitation of municipal reform which followed the overthrow of Tweed in New York, but in all other States no complete record had ever been kept. The advantages of these new laws are now beginning to be understood, and from the different auditors' reports of 1879 I have succeeded in obtaining a complete report of the existing local indebtedness (with one exception), at the close of the year 1878, of eleven States of the Union :

TABLE SHOWING THE AGGREGATE LOCAL DEBT OF ELEVEN STATES IN 1870
AND IN 1878.

STATE.	Total Local Debt, 1878.	Total Local Debt, 1870. ¹
New York (1).....	\$244,079,859	\$127,399,090
Massachusetts (2).....	89,601,156	40,940,657
Illinois (3).....	51,811,691	37,300,932
Ohio (4).....	41,205,840	12,509,910
Wisconsin (5).....	9,931,153	3,651,475
Minnesota (6).....	5,272,230	2,436,795
Kansas (7).....	13,473,197	4,843,976
Missouri (8).....	35,343,155	29,043,865
Connecticut (9).....	17,151,327	9,813,006
Georgia (10).....	26,130,351	15,209,212
Rhode Island (11).....	12,289,564	3,025,142
Total.....	\$546,289,528	\$286,179,060

Debt, then, in these eleven States has almost doubled, but the following table shows that the value of property has increased at no such ratio :

¹ The figures in this column have been obtained by adding together the reports of the county, town, and city debts, as given in the census of 1870. It includes floating and bonded debt. (1) New York makes no return of local indebtedness, so the figures were taken from the census report of 1875, and are undoubtedly correct. (2) Tax Commissioners' Report, January, 1879, p. 161. (3) Auditor's Report for 1878, p. 223. (4) Auditor's Report, 1878, p. 12. (5) Secretary State's Report for 1878, p. 146. (6) Auditor's Report, 1878, p. 137. (7) Auditor's Report for 1878, p. 253. (8) The returns of county, township, and city indebtedness of Missouri may be found in the Missouri State Almanac for 1878, p. 73. The figures as given were not even footed up, a work I performed myself. (9) Comptroller's Report for 1878, p. 25. (10) Comptroller's Report for 1878, p. 22. (11) Rhode Island Manual for 1878, p. 191.

STATE.	Total Assessed Valuation of Property, 1878. ¹	Total Assessed Value of Property, 1870. ²
New York.....	\$2,755,740,318	\$1,967,001,185
Massachusetts.....	1,568,988,210	1,591,983,112
Illinois.....	1,201,123,110	482,899,515
Ohio.....	1,574,645,765	1,167,731,697
Wisconsin.....	423,596,290	333,209,838
Minnesota.....	220,930,629	84,135,332
Kansas.....	137,826,643	92,125,861
Missouri.....	614,726,225	556,129,969
Connecticut.....	344,406,977	425,433,237
Georgia.....	235,659,530	227,219,519
Rhode Island.....	256,052,818	244,278,854
Total.....	\$9,333,696,515	\$7,172,148,179

The above statement indicates a better condition of affairs than did the investigation into the financial condition of the hundred and thirty cities. One advantage in the latter investigation is that reliance can be placed in the figures—especially those for 1878. Debt has increased almost a hundred per cent in the eight years, while the assessed valuation of property has only risen from seven to nine billions. In some States the assessed valuation has actually decreased—as, for instance, Massachusetts and Connecticut. In the former the local debt has doubled, in the latter it has gone from nine to seventeen millions. A comparison of the aggregate debts of the hundred and thirty cities exclusively with the returns of the total local indebtedness of the eleven States brings fully to view the fact that the danger lies exclusively in the city and not in the county and township debts. The debts of the hundred and thirty cities jumped from \$221,312,009, in 1866, to \$644,378,663, in 1876. On the other hand, by adding in county and township debts the increase is from \$286,179,060 to \$548,789,528—the one at a rate of 200 per cent, the other at less than 100 per cent. In short, the bulk of the debts are municipal. The debt of twenty cities in Pennsylvania, a State that gives no complete returns, aggregates \$87,329,180; nine cities in New Jersey, \$36,502,722; two cities in Maryland, \$34,000,000; five cities in Louisiana, \$20,000,000, and five cities in Kentucky,

¹ The assessed valuation of these States for 1878 has been taken from the last report of the State Auditors of the respective States.

² From United States census of 1870.

\$12,000,000. But when to these great debts are added the township and the county debts, the average per capita to the population is brought down, and the grand aggregate, though serious enough, loses some of its startling characteristics. I have made a careful estimate of the total local indebtedness of the United States, based on the returns received by the State Auditors, and such returns as I have been able to obtain, myself, from States where no regular reports are made. According to this calculation the total local debt of the country at the close of the year 1878 was \$1,051,106,112, exclusive of the debts of Territories. If this calculation be approximately correct it will be seen that the eleven States given in the table on page 14, representing a population of about 16,500,000, owe the largest proportion of the local debt. In eight years the debt has increased about half a billion dollars, while, as has been shown, in some States the assessed valuation of property has decreased. The imperfect and variable revenue laws may have much to do with the latter result, but the same may be said of the reports of 1870, so it is fair to make the comparison. Added to this it has been given out at Washington, in a semi-official manner, by those presumably well informed in such matters, that the next Federal census will reveal a condition of things not flattering to our national vanity. Statements based upon the most recent returns of the assessed valuation of the different States have been printed in the leading newspapers of the country, showing an actual decrease in the aggregate wealth of the United States during the last decade. Of course these are but estimates, and the figures showing the total assessed value of property of eleven States, on page 15, do not warrant such statements, still it is more than probable that the total increase in the real value of property will be small when compared with that of 1860-70. The wiping out of millions of worthless bonds, the decline in stocks, and the enormous shrinkage in real property will have a decided tendency to lower the value of property in 1880.

Of the separate effect of these debts so much has been said and written that it seems hardly necessary to more than allude in passing to one of the most recent and painful illustrations of the evils arising from the rapid growth of municipal debt. The

shocking condition of affairs in some of the cities of New Jersey formed the chief topic in the last annual message of the Governor of that State. The following tabulated statements obtained from official sources, and which may be regarded as authentic, will show at a glance that repudiation or bankruptcy alone can save the property of the tax-payers of those unfortunate cities from confiscation :

	Total Debt.	Population. Census, 1875.	Debt per Capita.	Expense per Capita.
Paterson.....	\$1,374,000	38,814	\$35 39	\$8 36
Newark.....	8,824,455	123,310	71 56	8 64
Jersey City.....	14,217,435	109,227	130 16	16 78
Hoboken.....	1,110,065	24,766	44 82	5 77
Rahway.....	1,690,000	6,947	243 27	23 36
Elizabeth.....	5,808,500	25,923	224 06	14 89
Trenton.....	879,567	25,031	35 13	5 99
Camden.....	1,130,200	33,852	33 38	6 24
New Brunswick.....	1,468,500	16,660	88 14	10 17
	\$36,502,722	404,530		

The annual amount of interest paid by these nine cities on their debt amounts to \$2,138,856, while the total annual expenses for carrying on the local government only amounts to \$2,307,368, or \$166,512 more than the interest on the debt. The tremendous burden under which the tax-payers of these nine cities are bowed down can more fully be understood by a glance at the following table, which I have compiled from the abstract of ratables reported in 1878, and which shows the assessed value of the property side by side with the debt :

	Total Tax Rate.	Amount Property Taxable.	Debt.
Newark.....	\$19 80	\$34,704,000	\$8,824,455
Paterson.....	22 50	19,150,861	1,374,000
Jersey City.....	23 60	60,404,281	14,217,435
Hoboken.....	18 57	15,278,573	1,110,065
Rahway.....	29 61	3,093,275	1,690,000
Elizabeth.....	35 60	13,579,650	5,808,500
Trenton.....	15 00	14,503,252	879,567
Camden.....	23 00	11,773,815	1,130,200
New Brunswick.....	29 00	5,658,000	1,468,500
		\$228,145,707	\$36,502,722

The town of Rahway, a town of 6500 population, and with property assessed at \$3,093,275, has a debt of \$1,690,000, or of \$243.27 per capita of its inhabitants, and which exceeds, by thousands of dollars, half the assessed value of all the property within the city. The value of the property in Elizabeth is \$13,579,650, and its debt almost \$6,000,000, or very nearly half the value of its property. There are many other cities in this country struggling under burdens almost as heavy for the tax-payers to sustain as those given above. It is not the intention of this article to continue further the examination of the separate effect of these debts, but rather to ascertain, if possible, what has been done and what can yet be done to lighten the taxation which with the present imperfect revenue systems often falls heaviest in the poorest localities and lightest in the richest.

Before venturing to suggest a remedy for this condition of affairs, it may be well to pass in brief review the propositions made by the distinguished commissions of New York and Pennsylvania, whose elaborate investigations in this direction were mentioned at the beginning of the article. The New York commission says the only remedy is that every city should have a responsible executive head elected by the people—heads of the department answerable to him, and removable for cause. Debt must be regulated by those who have to pay the taxes. A board of finance, elected by tax-payers and rent-payers, to have full control, jointly with the Mayor, of the financial affairs of the city. Property holders to have something to say about improvements chargeable to their estates. The Legislature of any State to be deprived of the power to impose burdens upon the tax-payers of cities for purely local affairs, and above all that local affairs be separated as far as possible from State and national politics. In these changes, and in nothing short of them, could Mr. Evarts and his eminent associates see anything like a rational and business-like management of the affairs of our large cities.¹

But the equally eminent gentlemen who composed the Penn-

¹ Report of the Commission to Devise a Plan for the Government of Cities in the State of New York, 1877.

sylvania commission¹ differed with the New York commission in regard to the property qualification for electors. The Pennsylvania commission say this proposition attracted their careful attention; and while they were prepared to admit the force of many of the arguments in its favor, and that, perhaps, in a city like New York it might prove effective, yet they were forced to the conclusion that in Pennsylvania no important results could be expected from requiring such a qualification. The proposition of the New York commission has been fully discussed by the press of the country, and has a great many advocates; on the other hand, the limited number printed of the Pennsylvania report has almost entirely cut off the discussion that such an elaborate investigation deserved. The commission show that the city of Philadelphia contained in August, 1876, 143,936 dwellings. It is estimated that 5000 have been built since that time, so that, in round numbers, Philadelphia now contains 150,000 dwellings. The number of votes cast at the last municipal election was 127,520, and it is not claimed that the city contains more than 135,000 voters. It will thus be seen that the great bulk of voters are either owners of houses or tenants paying rent. Hundreds of blocks of comfortable houses, renting from \$12.50 to \$20 per month, are scattered throughout the city. These are mainly occupied by the intelligent class of mechanics and operatives in manufacturing and other establishments. The provision recommended by the New York commission, requiring the payment of an annual rental of \$250 as a qualification for voting, would, if adopted in Pennsylvania, exclude this large and reputable class of citizens, while it would not exclude the tenants of low grog-shops and other disreputable establishments, who, in most cases, pay a higher rent. This is not the only point on which the Pennsylvania commission disagrees with that of New York. From a careful investigation they are led to believe that the undue accumulation of debt in most of the cities of the State of Pennsylvania has been the result of a desire for speculation on the part of owners of property themselves. Large tracts of land outside

¹ Report of the Commission to Devise a Plan for the Government of Cities in the State of Pennsylvania, 1878.

the built-up portions of the cities have been purchased, combinations made by men of wealth, and councils besieged until they have been driven into making appropriations to open and improve streets and avenues, largely in advance of the real necessities of the city. In many of these cases, the commission truthfully remarks, owners of property need more protection against themselves than against the non-property-holding class. It is due the municipal authorities that in some cases the largest debts have been contracted, not by their authority, but under the provisions of special acts of Assembly, appointing commissioners to open streets, park commissions, building commissions, and so on. It is plain, therefore, that an adequate protection against municipal debt cannot be found in a property or rental qualification. In the opinion of the Pennsylvania commission nothing short of absolutely forbidding cities to borrow money can effect any permanent good in this direction. They also proposed an elaborate scheme for divorcing the city councils from all executive functions, believing the great vice of the present system is the practical consolidation of legislative and executive powers in committees of city councils.

While New York and Pennsylvania have been adding to the literature on the evils of municipal debts, Massachusetts has set about their payment in a manner that will show a material reduction in the aggregate burden another year. From a comparison of the tables in the Tax Commissioner's report for 1879 it appears that 203 towns have diminished their net debt during the year 1878, and only sixty-five towns have increased it, and twenty have neither increased nor diminished. Sixty-three towns have no debt this year, against fifty-four which were in a like situation last year.

The idea is constantly gaining ground that at least a partial remedy for the evil of local indebtedness may be sought for and obtained in constitutional limitations. In view of this nearly all the recent State constitutions have inserted clauses looking to the limitation of local debts. New York, by the amendment of 1874, prohibits the loan of the credit of the State absolutely. The power to contract debt is limited: (a) to meeting casual deficiencies in the revenue, not to exceed at one time \$1,000,000; (b) to meeting the contingencies of war; (c) "to some

single work or object'' authorized by law and distinctly specified, in which case the proper tax shall be levied to pay the debt within eighteen years, provided that such law, on its final passage, be voted upon by the popular vote, when no other proposition of law or of the constitution is pending popular action. Subdivisions of the State are forbidden to appropriate money, incur indebtedness, or lend their credit in favor of any individual, association, or corporation, except to provide for the poor according to the general law. Pennsylvania, in like manner, limits the State debt for casual purposes to \$1,000,000, and does not admit other purposes for which debt can be contracted at all, except those of war and to pay existing debt. The State or municipal credit cannot be loaned for any purpose; the debt of municipal subdivisions shall never exceed seven per cent of the valuation; new debt of the amount of two per cent shall not be incurred without a popular vote. The State shall not assume municipal debts, but their payments shall be provided for by municipal taxation. Ohio, West Virginia; Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, Nevada, Alabama, Florida, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas all strictly limit the borrowing power of the State, without even a recourse to the popular sanction for an increase; the same States prohibit the loan of municipal credit. In Mississippi and Nebraska the power of the municipality to contract debt is based upon the popular vote. In New Hampshire the power of the municipality is restricted. Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, and North Carolina all limit the State debt and have strict prohibitions upon municipalities. California makes it the duty of the Legislature to limit municipal indebtedness.

Reading over the annual messages of thirty-eight governors produces a curious effect on the mind. Though alike in form and arrangement, the views are as varied as the colors of the covers. Though as a whole monotonous, here and there may be found a scrap of wisdom, and now and then a fact of deep interest. One prominent feature in all these messages is the apparent lack of intercourse between the executives of the different States. Some governors recommend laws and measures that have been tried and proved utter failures in sister States. Many of the messages contain paragraphs, and in some pages

are devoted to the subject of local reform, but there cannot be found in one a decided proposition looking toward a remedy of the evil so bitterly complained of. It is pleasing, however, to observe that several governors recommend that measures be immediately taken to ascertain the amount of the local debt of their respective States. Some governors take a gloomy view of the future of American local government. For example, the Governor of Pennsylvania says: "It is apparent to all that, under the present system, the bankruptcy of our larger cities is only a question of time." In this gloomy pre-eminence Pennsylvania is not alone. One day later Governor Robinson, of New York, said: "The people of this State have played with debt, and courted taxation, as if for pastime. Many towns almost buried themselves with bonds, issued for railroads which have never been built, and covered their farms with mortgages for which they have received no consideration. Now that the illusion is gone, they are deploring the misfortunes in which it has involved them. Some of them are even hinting at the dishonor of repudiation." Governor McClellan, of New Jersey, in speaking of the municipal problem in that State, says: "In some of our cities the problem is very serious and difficult of solution, and demands the utmost wisdom, so heavy is the burden of debt, so grievous the taxation." After calling attention to the local debt of Illinois, Governor Cullom says that about 30 per cent of the \$51,000,000 of local debt of that State represents the railroad aid debt of the municipalities of the State. The constitution of the State now forbids all counties, cities, or other municipalities from making subscriptions to capital stocks or donations in aid of any railroad or private corporation, and further forbids the incurring of any indebtedness to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per cent on the value of the taxable property therein. "These," the Governor says, "are wise and fortunate provisions, and under them the municipal debt of the State is now decreasing, and will for some years continue to decrease." Governors Croswell, of Michigan, and Williams, of Indiana, show the absolute need of at once taking steps to ascertain the local indebtedness of those States. Governor Gear, of Iowa, says that it is "a cause of general complaint by the tax-payers of our

cities that their municipal affairs are so loosely conducted, without due regard to their interest." He also suggests that a commission be appointed to report to the next General Assembly "the propriety of placing the cities and towns of the State under some more simple, uniform, and economical system of municipal government than we now have."

Year by year the question of reform in local government is augmented in importance. Already the demand for laborers in this field has met with a response from earnest and able men, in all parts of the country. How they differ from each other in their methods has been shown. Secretary Evarts, in New York, proposing to stop the flood-gates of corruption by a property qualification; the Pennsylvania commission by divorcing the legislative and executive powers of the cities; Governor Cullom, in Illinois, by constitutional amendments; Francis Parkman pointing out the failure of universal suffrage, and W. R. Martin showing the importance of cities as units in our polity, are all laborers toiling in the same vineyard. Each has his especial medicine for the malady, but the trouble is no *one* prescription will effect a cure. It needs time. It needs patience; and, above all, the working out of natural laws. New experiments and tinkering only aggravate the disease. Instead of looking for new schemes in the future, the proper way is to look back into the past—back, if need be, to where we started, into the primitive communities of our Saxon forefathers; back to the time of Tacitus and Cæsar; back to the time when communal liberty died and feudalism was established in Holland; back to the days of Anglo-Saxon liberty in England, before the dull thud of the "poor law" sounded the death knell of pure local government. It is by looking back into the past that a remedy can be found. The Anglo-Saxon idea of freedom, after preserving our liberties through centuries of darkness and despotism, acquired fresh vitality in the colonies of New England. To these little republics, Jefferson says, we owe the vigor given to our Revolution. It is this pure *self-government* we want now. The self-government of to-day hates trouble and loves self-indulgence—hence the deplorable condition of our cities. Self-government, it has been well observed, is a hard task-master. It expects every man to do his duty, not

optionally but as a public obligation. Have those who complain bitterly of high taxes and mismanagement done their duty? They have paid their taxes. Yes! What else? Folded their arms and done nothing. Without disparaging the efforts of the distinguished gentlemen who have expended so much thought on this question of reform in local government, it is my belief that it can never be thorough until our citizens return to their former simplicity. Let general orders be given out for *reform* in every one of the twenty thousand townships in the land, as to the sergeant of an army, and soon the whole nation will be thrown into energetic action in the same direction. Then, and not till then, the force becomes absolutely irresistible, and we are on the right road to true and lasting Reform.

ROBERT P. PORTER.

PHILOSOPHY AND APOLOGETICS.

DR. PATTON is a polemic both by taste and by profession. His recent review of "The Final Philosophy" in this journal illustrates the best traits of that character. It has all the learning, acuteness, and adroit logic which have distinguished him as a leading theological critic of the age, and at the same time is marked by a dashing candor and fairness but seldom shown within the lists of controversy. It is withal so courteous in tone and mingles so much praise with the blame, that it might seem almost churlish to reply to it, and better to let the book explain itself. But many will read the criticism who will never see the book, and some of the objections raised are really too serious to be passed by. Moreover, the discussion has lifted into public view several questions which are of more general interest than the opinions of either author or critic, and, therefore, not unworthy of a place in these pages.

It is important to bear in mind the just distinction between philosophy and apologetics, with which Dr. Patton opens his review of the work. By depreciating its apologetic value, he has thrown into strong relief that philosophical point of view from which alone it claims to be judged. Indeed, if he had gone further and argued that it has no apologetic value at all he might have reasoned more to the point. As its very title shows, it does not profess to be a treatise on apologetical theology, nor even a contribution to the evidences of Christianity as afforded by the growing harmony of science and religion. A volume of that kind might have been useful and timely, and may possibly have been anticipated as a natural product of the chair which the author holds. But it is not what he has

attempted in this treatise. In fact, it is precisely what he has disclaimed attempting. Carefully excluding all apologetic motive whatever, he has simply aimed to write an introductory essay, partly historical and partly critical, on that complete, conclusive system of knowledge which reason and revelation are combining to produce—"the Final Philosophy as issuing from the Harmony of Science and Religion."

It is true the most philosophical work need not be incompatible with apologetic interests. The author does not admit that this work puts in peril any such interest. He might rather argue, if this were the place, that the final philosophy, whensoever attained, will involve among its practical issues a confirmation of religion as well as the perfection of science. And he could also grant, if need be, that the work of the apologist is of much more direct and obvious utility than that of the philosopher. But all this would be aside from the point that he is now urging. He simply suggests that a book, purporting to be wholly philosophical, from its title-page to its index, ought not to have been judged as if it were an apologetical treatise, and held answerable for religious difficulties which it neither created nor was specifically designed to remedy. It was a mistake to assume that the author of such a work had written as an apologist rather than as a philosopher, or even had "undertaken to fill both offices at once." Happily, however, the mistake may be turned to general advantage. Though the distinguished critic has not found in the book what he looked for, yet he has come upon a collateral question outside of it, deserving the most careful study, viz., the relation of apologetics to philosophy. A little elucidation of this question may serve to scatter some of the mists which have settled upon it.

In general, it may be said that apologetics can enter into the construction of the final philosophy only as any other branch of applied logic can enter into it—in a purely philosophical spirit, without any dogmatic or partisan aim. The apologist must come into the wide realm of philosophy, if he come there at all, not as an apologist, defending his own religious faith, whatever that may be, but as a philosopher, seeking the whole truth, wherever it is to be found, in nature as well as Scripture, and by all available means, by revelation no less than reason. And

that it is possible thus to exchange the advocate for the judge, in the very same field of inquiry, has been abundantly shown by so illustrious examples as Locke, Descartes, Leibnitz, Berkeley, and Butler, who were philosophers as well as apologists, and have treated even apologetic questions in a philosophical spirit.

But more specifically it may be said, that the labors of the apologist, besides their primary religious value, have also a secondary philosophic value and admit of a philosophic use, which he never intended, which he may even repudiate, but which nevertheless is not to be despised. They may serve to ascertain one of the legitimate factors of knowledge, and so aid in completing the system of truth. If philosophy be defined as the science of knowledge, it is plain that to determine whether there be a divine revelation, making known the otherwise unknowable, is a strictly philosophical question. It is as much a philosophical question as that of determining the validity, functions, and limits of human reason as a source of knowledge. And in the present speculative crisis it is the most pertinent philosophical question which could engage the attention of the thinking world. We are just now menaced by a subtle agnosticism which seeks to extinguish one of the very eyes of philosophy and paralyze an entire half of the body of knowledge. It claims to have demonstrated that the Absolute is unknowable, and a revelation therefore metaphysically impossible. But the apologist is at hand with an immense mass of empirical proofs of the fact of such a revelation, which have been accumulating for eighteen centuries and which are as scientific in their nature as the Principia of Newton or the Copernican theory of the solar system. And now it is for the philosopher from his point of view, seeking all possible means of knowledge, to sift this evidence and decide whether it is scientifically probable. If he accept it, it will then be in order for him to admit the light of the duly-attested revelation upon all questions to which it refers, as they pass before him in the great debate between religion and science. And this he may do without any apologetic intent, as philosophically as if he were examining an essay on the human understanding instead of a treatise on the Christian evidences, and had found himself handling purely sci-

entific rather than also partly religious problems. In a word, the philosopher may derive valuable aid from the apologist in framing a theory and system of perfect knowledge.

In the light of these definitions and precautions we shall now be better able to estimate the criticism before us. The pith of it is thus expressed: "It is an error to suppose that the reconciliation of science and religion is the true function of philosophy. The effect of it is in the first place to magnify the opposition of science and religion and so enlarge the area of apologetics; and in the second place, to put unphilosophical elements into the very foundations of the philosophic structure." But if the foregoing reasoning be sound, there is a sense in which the area of apologetics is circumscribed and defined by philosophy; while the philosophic use of apologetics is but part of the demonstration and construction of philosophy itself. This will appear more plainly as we descend from the abstract discussion to some of the particular objections urged against the book in question. They are partly apologetical and partly philosophical.

From the former point of view it is repeatedly charged that it has "exaggerated the opposition between science and the Bible." How much of truth is in this statement may appear if we recur to some distinctions which the critic himself has made with great clearness and force, and which the author also, in his own way, has emphasized on every page. Although, assuredly, there can be no conflict between science and religion, none between science and Christianity, and none between science and the Bible; yet there may be and is a wide-spread conflict between the crude, unproved hypotheses put forth in the name of science, and the human, fallible dogmas claiming to express the sense of the Bible. And it would be difficult to exaggerate the proportions of this conflict. If it be true that "one's opinion respecting the area which it covers will depend, in a measure, upon the importance which he chooses to attach to certain so-called scientific hypotheses," yet it is also true that it will largely depend upon the importance which he chooses to attach to certain so-called religious dogmas, some of which are as trivial or pernicious as any scientific vagaries, and all of which,

from the lowest heterodoxy up to the highest orthodoxy, are avowedly drawn from the Word of God :

“ This is the Book where each his dogma seeks,
And this the Book where each his dogma finds.”

It is the crowning aggravation of the strife, that dogmatists are no more agreed in their interpretations of Scripture than are scientists in their interpretations of nature. And yet, amid all the warfare of the sects and the schools, there is still such a thing as true religion and true science ever in harmony with each other. There are common truths and facts in which nearly all can agree. To distinguish in this manner the imaginary from the actual, the problematical from the ascertained, and even to magnify the former in contrast with the latter, must contract rather than enlarge the real grounds of controversy, and can only tend to put the apologist in his right place, not as a polemic contestant for some questionable dogma on the open field of scientific research, but as an intrenched defender of essential Christianity against oppositions of science falsely so called.

It is further charged, however, from the same point of view, that by giving weight to every scientific speculation and by strong statements regarding the unsettled problems of religion the impression is made that every article of faith is involved in the conflict, and “ the whole Bible becomes a sealed book, which no one is worthy to open who has not been instructed in the Final Philosophy.” The objection is a grave one, and it is trenchantly put. It is to be met more than half way. In the first place, it disregards the distinction already made between the substantial truths of Scripture and their dogmatic definitions. There is much more certainty and general agreement as to the former than as to the latter. While the former are in a good degree settled, the latter are in a sense still unsettled, and may long remain so, unless we are prepared to put human dogma in place of divine revelation, the Church in place of the Bible, and a theocracy in place of the Church. And, in the second place, the objection ignores the difference between matter of faith and matter of knowledge, between the aim of theology and that of philosophy. There are many dogmas concern-

ing which we may confidently say We believe, but cannot yet affirm We know. They have not acquired that scientific certitude which leaves no room for doubt and converts faith into knowledge. They may or they may not yet explain all the facts, both of Scripture and of nature, to which they refer, and are therefore, in the view of a sound philosophy, as problematical as a scientific hypothesis that is not yet fully verified. And there are also some dogmas which relate to pure mysteries of faith as well as paradoxes of reason, and which, even though the final philosophy should never arrive, would still figure in the most subtle theology as mere fruitless attempts to unseal a book which neither man nor angel is worthy to open. All dogmas are indeed valuable as exponents and tests of faith, and the more one studies their history the more important and durable do certain great orthodox tenets appear ; but after all that may be said for them, they are neither infallible in religion nor axiomatic in science ; and if the final philosophy could put every one of them in conflict, it would do no more than the Reformation did when it appealed from the traditions of the church to the pure Word of God, and opened the Bible which they had sealed.

But the crowning charge brought from the same apologetic point of view is that of scepticism or agnosticism as the logical conclusion to which a student of the Bible would be driven. It is thus illustrated :

“ Suppose that the doctrine in question is that of creation as opposed to the hypothesis of evolution. A Christian says, ‘ I am an Extremist ; I shall oppose the hypothesis.’ But our author says this will not do. ‘ I will be an Indifferentist, then, holding the dogma, but ignoring the hypothesis.’ Again the writer says this is not philosophical. ‘ Then I will combine the hypothesis and the dogma, and this will place me among the Eclectics.’ But our author would say that efforts of this sort are premature. Finally the Christian says, ‘ I will give up the doctrine, for I see no way of reconciling it with the hypothesis.’ But this proposition is open to objection with all the rest. What, then, should he do ? He must not attack the hypothesis ; he must not hold the dogma ; he must not combine the hypothesis and the dogma ; he must not give up the dogma. Is it possible to conceive of a condition of more unqualified scepticism than that in which this unfortunate inquirer would be left ? And when it is remembered that the rival hypotheses and dogmas cover the whole field of revealed religion and embrace even the question whether a revealed religion is possible, it is safe to say that Dr. Shields has made the

strongest plea for an agnostic theology which has been presented to the English-speaking world in the present generation."

Now, so far as this is a real difficulty, it would be enough to reply that the author has not made it, and is not responsible for it. It inheres in a state of facts which he has simply described and which no one denies. The critic himself admits the existence of the various hypotheses and dogmas and of the different classes described. But he has chosen to imagine "an unfortunate inquirer" perplexing himself with these conflicting opinions and parties which Christendom presents. It is simply the modern religious sceptic that he has evoked, and it would be only fair that he should now be left to lay the spectre as best he can. He has driven it out of the four classes, and will not admit it into the final philosophy: what limbo remains?

But the difficulty, as he has imported it into the present argument, is imaginary as well as irrelevant. He seems to have forgotten that the essential truths of the Bible might remain to its supposed student, in spite of all mere hypotheses, and though every dogma in existence were modified, even the various dogmas as to inspiration itself. And he has strangely overlooked the pivotal fact that the four classes are not presented as religious, but as philosophical or rather unphilosophical parties, embracing scientific as well as religious factions, infidels as well as apologists, sciolists as well as dogmatists; and that both are alike condemned, but condemned only for philosophical errors, for having unphilosophically attempted to oppose, separate, mingle, or mar two related portions of truth and vitally-connected bodies of knowledge; in a word, for obstructing in various ways the proper work of philosophy. And then for such philosophic vices a remedy is proffered, which, whatever else it may be, is not agnosticism. Through two entire chapters the theory of nescience is directly combated, the very notion of an agnostic theology is repudiated, the claims of the revealed theology upheld, and its complementary relations with the rational theology explained. In the next chapter, the opposite theory of a perfectible science is based upon the harmonious interaction of reason and revelation, and the whole series of sciences reviewed in order to show that their rational and revealed portions are fast coming into logical agreement. And in the closing chap-

ter a scheme of architectonic rules is projected for organizing these growing masses of knowledge into a complete system. Moreover, it is a well-known fact that hitherto the heaviest charge preferred against the teaching of the book has been that of a supposed gnosticism or illicit mixture of revealed and rational knowledge. And this is the work which is now pronounced "the strongest plea for an agnostic theology which has been presented to the English-speaking world in the present generation"!

In bringing this grave charge Dr. Patton is kind enough to discriminate between the avowed faith of the author and the supposed mischief of his argument, and to allow that the former may be held in spite of the latter. There could be no higher compliment than that of having one's piety praised at the expense of his logic. To be illogical and yet pious, is to be pious under peculiar difficulties. But in this case the compliment is not deserved. The author cannot avail himself of such a plea. Leaving the piety out of the question, he expects to hold to the logic of the book, at least until it encounters "some Herbert Spencer with wit enough to capture it and turn it against the citadel of Christianity." Meanwhile, his advice to the "unfortunate inquirer" might be, "Stick to your Bible and to your creed, and let philosophy alone. You can be a good Christian and even a sound divine without being a philosopher. Not every one is born to be a philosopher; nor is a philosopher by any means the happiest of mortals. In much wisdom is much sorrow."

In other words, the worst that could happen to the supposed student of the Bible would be, that he should remain contented in some one of the four unphilosophical classes indicated: as an apologist, defending true religion against false science; or as a dogmatist, constructing revealed truths without regard to scientific facts; or as a religious eclectic, adjusting dogmas and hypotheses together; or as a religious despondent, holding both as contradictory; or even as an earnest Christian, not caring too much for either. There would be nothing unsafe or ignoble in any of these positions, and he would find himself in much good company. But if at any time he should be seized with the philosophic impulse, the passion for wisdom, the intellectual

craving for unity of truth and completeness of knowledge, he would then need to inquire into the terms of a philosophic settlement of the problems that had so perplexed him. This brings us to the second part of the criticism—the philosophical objections.

The first one relates to the function of philosophy in harmonizing science and religion. It is suggested that “by dividing the work of reconciliation among the Extremists, Indifferentists, Eclectics, and Despondents, it can be accomplished satisfactorily and without much delay.” But, according to the critic, these are the very parties that have perplexed and baffled the “unfortunate inquirer,” and the author has argued through several hundred pages that they are wholly inapt to the task of combining human with divine knowledge ; the two former classes, as their name implies, being actually averse to it, and the two latter having attempted it unphilosophically and failed. It is true that even the infidel without meaning it, and the sciolist without knowing it, may contribute occasional labor and materials which the philosopher can use ; but for him to adopt their crude notions and partial conjectures as presented without modification, would be what the critic well terms “putting unphilosophical elements into the very foundations of the philosophic structure.” It is true also that great service may be rendered to the cause of truth by such writers as Guyot and Dawson ; and the author has “carefully premised that in the class of religious eclectics will be included many who may have the true cognitive theory latent in their minds without elaborating it, and whose work therefore will endure and appear in the final system of knowledge.” These admissions do not affect the principle in question. It is one thing to attempt to harmonize science and religion as an apologist, solely in the interest of the latter and for the defence of a dogmatic faith, but another thing to attempt this as a philosopher, wholly in the interest of both and with the view of establishing and completing the system of knowledge. As there are still many scientists who oppose, ignore, or modify important revealed truths, so there are still many religionists who oppose, ignore, or modify important discovered facts ; and to not a few in each class the two opposite structures of knowledge which they are separately rear-

ing may now seem like hostile ramparts, with a dark and impassable chasm between. But in the long future the day may come when in the view of both classes they shall prove to have been but the rising piers of the completed arch of the final philosophy, having one base in Bacon's *Organum* and the other in Butler's *Analogy*, with a perfected Christian science as the triumphal key-stone.

The next objection concerns the order of the unsolved problems between science and religion falling within the purview of philosophy. It is alleged that "the philosopher is supposed to approach the subject with the foregone conclusion that the Bible is true, in which case the arbitration proceeds by begging the gravest question now before the world." The author may be allowed to recall his exact words: "The whole field of natural theology and the Christian evidences logically [not chronologically] precedes all questions between the Bible and Science." This is not begging the question: it is simply stating it by distributing its details for a methodical treatment. If we mean to wait until all logically connected questions are settled chronologically, we shall have to wait a long time. The question of a supernatural revelation is indeed prior in the order of reasoning to the other questions dependent upon it; but like them it is also in process of settlement. A vast number of philosophers think it already settled; and these at least need not suspend judgment until everybody else is convinced. Many of them may even think the whole series of questions sufficiently settled for an intelligent faith, though not yet matter of certain knowledge. If any of them, in these times of wide-spread unbelief, like defaulters in a financial panic, have "managed to go into theological bankruptcy with a snug fortune hid away in the doctrine of inspiration," it is charitable to hope they are but few. It should be remembered, too, that there are sceptics in science as well as religion, who decry all our cognitive faculties, together with the whole scientific procedure of reason, and to whom it must be conceded that we are still far from having a complete organon of any of the sciences, some of the most successful scientists having known little or nothing of the inductive logic which they used. Yet this does not deter the true philosopher from accepting the immense body of physical

knowledge which rests upon that logic. Nor does the fact that the logic of Christian evidence is still incomplete oblige him to discard the whole mass of religious truth which it upholds. He need not prejudice the contents of revelation because its credentials have not all arrived. He may even find the internal evidence strengthening the external as well as the external enforcing the internal ; science corroborating revelation and revelation completing science, as the two ever mount together towards the fulness of absolute truth. Moreover, he cannot hope to settle all questions at once, and build the temple of knowledge in a day. The simple fact is that in so vast and complicated a work as the construction of the final philosophy many laborers must be successively as well as simultaneously employed, in different ages and countries, each with his own task ; some toiling in the quarry ; some laying the foundations ; some chiselling blocks for the architrave ; and all building better than they knew. So that in the finished structure will doubtless be wrought here and there a corner-stone which the apologist has rejected as well as some chance boulder that the infidel has hurled from his catapult.

A remaining objection of the critic has reference to the philosophical system issuing from the harmony of science and religion. It is argued that "as the final philosophy has not yet made its appearance, it would follow that the questions with which it is to deal are open questions, and may so remain for many a day." They are open questions only in the sense in which all questions are open, which do not admit of demonstrative as distinguished from probable evidence, the most scientific as well as the religious ; and if in any other sense they are kept open, it will not be by the philosophy which seeks to close and settle them, but by the polemic scientists and divines that refuse its mild and just umpirage. In fact, as we have seen, that philosophy is already proceeding with their settlement, and so fulfilling its own high mission. It would not be difficult to show, and that from the present condition of scientific research, that the *Philosophia Ultima* for which earnest thinkers have long aspired is at least in full view if not within our reach. In the first place, we have the fit opportunity for a complete theory of the sciences, which by correlating revelation

with reason as a legitimate factor of knowledge shall supply what neither the positivist theory of nescience nor the absolutist theory of omniscience can afford. In the second place we have the prepared means for a complete organon or logic of the sciences, by which the metaphysical sciences shall be based upon the Christian evidences and brought into due complementary relations with the physical sciences. And in the third place we have the accumulated materials for a complete system or organization of the sciences, in which their chief authorities shall appear as harbingers and witnesses of their essential harmony with religion ; in which their ascertained portions of truth, both rational and revealed, shall be exhibited as in proved agreement, the physical sciences with natural religion and the psychical sciences with revealed religion ; in which their problematical portions, the hypotheses and the dogmas, shall be provisionally adjusted as in process of settlement ; and in which even their paradoxical portions, the old miracles of religion and the new marvels of science, shall be made to balance and explain each other.

But these are themes that have been elsewhere propounded by the author as parts of an unfinished scheme, which the shortness of life and other weaknesses may frustrate, and of which it might be neither wise nor modest here to speak.

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